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1Chapter 1
Introduction
Theorem 1. (Euler’s average discreteness hypothesis). For any b ≤ δ, there
exists an isotropic tangent space of Ker(φ) at ψ such that we can construct an
infinite sequence in H ⊗ Qnp that diverges.
Proof. Suppose α is a relation f−1 of ν and let v be an unbounded series in
Mn(Z). The result follows by dévissage.
Theorem of the day at http://davidsd.org/theorem/, October 24, 2014
Derrida’s perceptive reply went to the heart of classical general relativity:
“The Einsteinian constant is not a constant, is not a center. It is the very
concept of variability – it is, finally, the concept of the game. In other words,
it is not the concept of something – of a center starting from which an observer
could master the field – but the very concept of the game.”
Derrida (1993), quoted by Sokal (1996a)
1.1 Social Text
The reader of a doctoral thesis in economics is in a precarious situation, ar-
guably more so than its author. The goal of the current introduction is to show
the veracity of this statement. However, if the reader wishes to skip to Chap-
ter 2 without hesitation, I will gladly provide her with the main point of this
introduction: ‘Economists, beware!’.
2In 1996, a professor of physics named Alan Sokal published a paper in the
academic journal Social Text. The work, entitled Transgressing the Boundaries:
Towards a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity, was a hoax; an
amalgam of syntactically correct, but intentionally meaningless claims, word-
plays, and quotations from the masters of postmodernist social science and phi-
losophy. Even a cursory look at its structure might make one incredulous that
such a paper could have have passed through any kind of review. The merely
6000-word essay boasts 109 footnotes along with a 218-item bibliography (!),
mostly monographs by well-known postmodernist writers, mathematical and
physical textbooks, as well as some popular science books.
On the day the article was published, the magazine Lingua Franca brought
out another writing (Sokal, 1996b). In this, Sokal described his scam, and
denounced not only the editors of Social Text, but also the intellectual milieu
that made it possible. In the exchange of letters that ensued in Lingua Franca
and many other journals over the next years a number of possible interpretations
of the events surfaced.
One (anonymous) editor of Social Text suggested that although Sokal origi-
nally did have serious intentions with his paper, he changed his mind just before
its publication (Sokal, 1996c). This of course seems utterly preposterous. Oth-
ers have argued that while Sokal might have wanted to discredit sociology of
science, in fact, he was inadvertently contributing to already extant debates
within cultural politics (Robbins, 1996). In other words, through a reversal so
typical to postmodernist discourse, he became part of the very debate he sought
to discredit.
It has been emphasized that at the time, Social Text did not practice peer
review; however, its editors could have asked for an expert physicist or math-
ematician to check the cogency of its contents. Moreover, the editors should
at the very least have addressed the points relevant to social theory, but they
chose not to do so. Sokal interpreted this as a manifestation of intellectual
laziness, and lamented the general decline in standards for leftist intellectuals
(Sokal, 1996b). Surprisingly, the editors replied by admitting to the selection
bias, claiming that they were excited by the prospect of a respectable physicist
addressing social science (Robbins and Ross, 1996). It is quite ironic that a high
panel of a purportedly anti-authoritarian intellectual movement do not find it
shameful to relinquish scientific standards just because the text bore the seal of
an NYU physics professor. However that may be, the emphasis here is on the
technical organization of the academia.
Intellectual laziness also has a more pronounced political aspect. The man-
ifest main point of the original article was to derive a leftist agenda from ‘post-
3modern science’ (quantum mechanics, chaos theory, differential topology, etc.):
The content and methodology of postmodern science thus pro-
vide powerful intellectual support for the progressive political project,
understood in the broadest sense: the transgressing of boundaries,
the breaking down of barriers, the radical democratization of all
aspects of social, economic, political and cultural life.
According to Sokal, this was one of the crucial components of his trap: He
injected such leftist political ideas across the writing, because he expected the
editors would find them favorable and publish his essay anyway, regardless of the
validity of the supporting arguments. Of course, Sokal’s point rests on a post
facto unverifiable counterfactual: Had the essay been imbued with right-wing,
or politically neutral ideas, it had not been accepted. Whether this political
ingroup-outgroup bias motivated Social Text, or even whether it is a general
characteristic of (postmodernist) social science is impossible to tell based on this
observation alone. However, there is some empirical evidence that compared to
the general population, the political views of academics are strongly skewed
towards the Left, which could feed such a bias (Gross and Simons, 2007).
Perhaps surprisingly, Sokal’s main contention with postmodernist thought
concerns the existence of observer-independent reality (Sokal, 1996b). Accord-
ing to him, the emphasis on power relations and the ‘laboratory life’ (Aronowitz,
1997) of the scientist stems from an anti-realist philosophical position. This, in
turn, leads to relativism and a disbelief in objective truth. If there is no objective
truth, natural science is not an approximation of reality, but a mere phantasm
created by those in power in academia. Thus, the entire edifice of science is ren-
dered structurally and epistemologically indistinguishable from pseudo-science.
For instance, social scientists were much too ready to accept a dumbed-down
understanding – spread partially by popular science books – of the Copenhagen
interpretation of quantum mechanics. According to this interpretation, the act
of observation and measurement changes reality itself; therefore, the notion of
objective reality has been dismantled by physics. Similar non sequiturs were
made from the theory of general relativity, Gödel’s first incompleteness theo-
rem, etc. For these misconceptions, Sokal partially blames physicists and math-
ematicians for a lack of oversight in the communication of their results towards
the general public. However, social scientists were also much too ready to rely
on superficial information when they used the names of Bohr, Heisenberg, and
Gödel to advance their philosophical and political agendas.
41.2 Natural Text (no one is safe)
It might be thought that ultimately, the Sokal affair has little relevance to
other branches of science. After all, postmodernism is clearly out of fashion,
even in philosophy departments and art galleries (see Figure 1.1). Moreover,
relativism and anti-realism did not change the philosophical stance of most
scientists. Few archaeologists or psychologists would claim that the object of
their study is a purely social construction; and even fewer biologists or physicists
would subscribe to such a tenet. Whether or not the Sokal affair has contributed
to postmodernism’s decline, the whole story is just a historic artifact,1 with
little impact on what or how we research today. In short, the Sokal affair is
a cautionary tale about postmodernism and its bad practices – about Them,
rather than Us.
Figure 1.1: Frequencies of the word ‘postmodernism’, and the names of ‘Fou-
cault’, ‘Derrida’ and ‘Baudrillard’ in the Google NGram corpus from 1970 to
2008.
The 20th century has a long-standing tradition of provoking the establish-
ment through hoaxes. Various avantgardist movements – most notably, dadaists
– have tried to challenge the art elite through such scams. The idea for one of
the most well-known works of the century, Duchamp’s ‘Fountain’ – a readymade
pissoir – came when Duchamp was thinking of ways to provoke the American
cultural elite. Duchamp lamented that instead of being approached with irony
and humor, art was taken far too seriously in the U.S. In a way, the idea back-
fired, because instead of relaxing the attitude to art, ‘Fountain’ unleashed a
1 The concerned might be interested to know that the journal Social Text is alive and well
today, and does practice peer review.
5torrent of all-too academic discussion around the problem of the definition of
art.
In another early incident, the American poets Witter Bynner and Arthur
Davison Ficke, upholders of the classical form, tried to mock modernist poetry
by writing intentionally bad verse. Though arguably they were quite success-
ful with the latter: Their publisher thought the work serious, and eventually
brought out Spectra: A Book of Poetic Experiments.
ANNE KNISH: Opus 40
I HAVE not written, reader,
That you may read...
They sit in rows in the bare school-room
Reading.
Throwing rocks at windows is better,
And oh the tortoise-shell cat with the can fled on!
I would rather be a can-tier
Than a writer for readers.
I have written, reader,
For abstruse reasons.
Gold in the mine...
Black water seeping into tunnels
A plank breaks, and the roof falls...
Three men suffocated.
The wife of one now works in a laundry;
The wife of another has married a fat man;
I forget about the third.
Ficke (1916)
Though the artistic world might have been the birthing point of ‘Sokal
hoaxes’, other domains have not been exempt from questioning their own sys-
tems of operation. As part of an experiment, Stanford researcher David Rosen-
han sent five healthy participants to psychiatric wards across the United States.
The participants reported (fake) hallucinations at admission, but started to be-
have normally afterwards. All of the participants were diagnosed as having
psychiatric disorders, and were assigned treatment. However, after their symp-
toms ceased, their subsequent release was conditional on declaring themselves ill,
and on promising to take anti-psychotic drugs in the future (Rosenhan, 1973).
In the same way that Duchamp’s ‘Fountain’ emphasized the role of the gallery
for art, and thus the distinction between art and non-art as essential, this study
indicated that normal and abnormal behavior, psychiatric health and illness are
highly context-dependent terms. Thus, the Rosenhan experiment gave a major
lesson in self-doubt for professional psychiatrists.
In fact, it turned out that Sokal cannot even claim primacy for his own ex-
periment within scientific publishing. Psychologists have been studying various
6biases of academic journal editors since at least the eighties. Peters and Ceci
(1982) resubmitted previously published articles to the very same psychology
journals. They found that only a small share of editors detected the resubmis-
sion. Papers that proceeded to reviewers were mostly rejected. Mahoney (1977)
and Epstein (1990) find evidence of confirmation bias on the side of researchers
within behavioral psychology and social work.
However, the impact of these early experiments is hardly comparable to
that of the Sokal hoax itself, which made its way out of academic debates into
popular media. When Sokal and Bricmont published their book on the topic,
violently attacking leading postmodernist intellectuals such as Lacan, Deleuze,
and Baudrillard, the issue went viral. The book (Sokal and Bricmont, 1998)
was included in the New York Times’ 100 most notable books of the year, and
went on to become a Boston Globe and a San Francisco Chronicle bestseller.
The academic public – including, but not limited to social scientists – started to
question the trustworthiness of its practices, in particular, the process of peer
review. Where some saw danger, others noticed an opportunity, and before
long, the ‘Sokal phenomenon’ started spreading like wildfire across all fields and
branches of science.
Perhaps the weirdest Sokal-like event to date took place in the realm of
physics. A French pair of twins, Igor and Grichka Bogdanov, were working to-
wards a doctoral degree in theoretical physics at the University of Burgundy.
They had trouble getting their thesis work accepted. After some struggles,
Igor Bogdanov was told that if he could publish three peer-reviewed papers, he
would finally be granted a Ph.D. And so, Igor and Grichka sent out their written
work for publication. In 2001, the journal Classical and Quantum Gravity was
the first to give way, accepting one of their papers (Bogdanov and Bogdanov,
2001). The twins soon became even bolder, publishing virtually identical pa-
pers in three different journals over the course of the next year; and as a result,
Igor got his Ph.D. The papers started coming under scrutiny in late 2002, when
some readers of the published articles felt that the journals became victims of a
‘reverse Alan Sokal hoax’ (Baez, 2002). For example, the string theorist Jacques
Distler wrote: “The Bogdanov’s papers consist of buzzwords from various fields
of mathematical physics, string theory and quantum gravity, strung together
into syntactically correct, but semantically meaningless prose.”(Distler, 2004)
The strange thing about the affair is that the Bogdanovs insisted – and, in fact,
still do – that their papers were entirely serious. A 24-page CRNS committee
report later determined that as the PhD thesis has no new content, and cam-
ouflages the lack of real arguments with flowery expressions, the work is void
of any scientific value (Comité national du CNRS, 2003). It thus seems that
7the natural science journals are in no better condition when it comes to distin-
guishing fake and real science than social scientists. If even the hallowed field
of physics is fallible, surely every discipline is in danger!
A recent paper examined how the evaluations of scientific abstracts changes
when a nonsensical mathematical formula is added to them (Eriksson, 2012).
It found that especially the non-mathematically trained are prone to evaluate
a text containing the mathematical gibberish more favorably. What we do not
understand holds a magical attraction.
Sokal’s technique has become the litmus test of the integrity of scientific
fields and practices. For example, Maarten Boudry, a philosopher from Ghent
University successfully submitted gibberish to two theology conferences (Coyne,
2012). For many, including Boudry himself, this points to the corruption of the
field of theology. Sokal-style schemes have also been used on a larger scale, in the
recent debate concerning the quality control of open access journals. Bohannon
(2013) sent a fake article reporting on the cancer-cell killing property of a certain
chemical to 304 open-access journals, getting 157 acceptances, 98 rejections, and
49 non-replies. While in Bohanon’s eyes this indicates the unreliability of open-
access journals, many have pointed out some fundamental flaws in Bohanon’s
experiment, including the fact that there was no control, i.e., he did not include
subscription-based journals (Taylor, Wedel and Naish, 2013).
The proliferation of Sokal experiments indicates a fundamental change in the
attitude to science. No longer can we, as readers of academic texts, assume that
the author has serious intentions. One has to be on the lookout, even though
(or, perhaps, especially because!) the field of economics has been spared of such
scandals thus far.
There is one common element in the examples discussed above: These works
were all, ultimately, direct products of the human mind, composed to deceive
the relevant authorities. In the next subsection, we turn our attention to an even
more intriguing type of hoax and research tool: works generated by computer
programs.
1.3 Generated Text
The 17th century marked a fundamental change in the attitude towards lan-
guage and representation. Previously, language was an irreducible component
of the world, and the language perpetually analyzed itself as part of the world
(Foucault, 2002). The defining genre of this worldview was commentary: com-
mentary of the Bible, of texts of ancient philosophers, and often, commentaries
8of commentaries. With the burgeoning of the natural sciences and increasing
skepticism in the validity of classical texts, however, it became clear that ana-
lyzing nature requires a fundamentally new language. Such a language would
allow the representation of natural objects and their relationships as they are,
untainted by the inherent imperfections present in human communication. Most
importantly, it would circumvent the variability of natural languages, inheriting
instead the immutability of the laws of nature. A whole range of possible recti-
fications were recommended, like returning to the lost – and supposedly perfect
– Adamic language, or the adoption of Chinese, where symbols of things were
thought to perfectly match the things themselves. Scientists like John Wilkins
developed artificial languages, complete with writing and phonological systems
that tried to reflect the scientifically revealed order of things one-to-one (Méder,
2005).
Figure 1.2: Leibniz’s illustration of the symbolic characteristica universalis, to
be used for reasoning.
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz recommended, though never fully worked out,
a characteristica universalis, which was to serve as a universal language for all
human thought (see Figure 1.2). This language would be processed by a calculus
ratiocinator to produce deductive knowledge of the world through manipulating
9words (symbols). This calculus could, in principle, be fully automatized, and
thus be embodied by a mechanical calculating machine. Leibniz constructed
such machines for algebraic calculation, which was obviously a small, though
indispensable segment of this project. My goal here is of course not the exegesis
of Leibniz’s obscure and oft-debated writings on the subject. His revolutionary
idea, one we are still struggling with today, was this: New knowledge can be
generated not only by the workings of the human mind, but also in a purely
automatic fashion, by a machine, through the manipulation of symbols.
This idea took a more intricate practical shape in the work of Charles Bab-
bage, “the father of the computer”. Babbage is perhaps most known for his
ambitious project of a difference engine, a machine intended to calculate the
values of polynomials. Due to financial difficulties, this machine materialized
only long after his death. However, the project’s ultimate goals were no less
ambitious than Leibniz’s, including the development of a universal symbolic
language. Ada Lovelace, an avid correspondence partner of Babbage, credited
as the first programmer in history, wrote:
The Analytical Engine does not occupy common ground with
mere ‘calculating machines.’ It holds a position wholly its own. . . A
new, a vast, and a powerful language is developed [...] in which
to wield its truths so that these may become of more speedy and
accurate practical application for the purposes of mankind than the
means hitherto in our possession have rendered possible.
(Lovelace, quoted in Gleick, 2012)
Even from such a brief outlook, it is clear that the founding fathers and
mothers of computing tried to automatize the search for scientific knowledge,
the quest for truth. Did the advent of the digital age fulfill their dreams?
The cynical answer is that it did, though not quite in the expected way:
Computers can produce text that appears like scientific output, but is, in fact,
randomly generated by software. An example is the Postmodernism Generator,2
back from the early days of the Internet (and incidentally, published online in
1996, the year of the Sokal affair). Whilst mainly an exercise in computa-
tional linguistics, the texts it creates based on a postmodernist corpus are, at
first glance, surprisingly similar to the productions of many a deconstructivist.
Nonetheless, its output is unlikely to pass any stage of peer review.
2 http://www.elsewhere.org/pomo/.
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There are more ambitious attempts to computer-generated scientific text,
however. Perhaps the most successful program to date, SCIgen,3 spawns re-
search papers in computer science. SCIgen’s first success in breaking academic
barriers was Rooter: A Methodology for the Typical Unification of Access Points
and Redundancy, which was invited to 2005 World Multiconference on Sys-
temics, Cybernetics and Informatics. Other papers were accepted for publica-
tion in various journals. In line with the original intention of its programmers,
SCIgen can be effectively put to use as an automated Sokal tester for computer
science conferences and proceedings. A similar engine, Mathgen4, produces
LATEX source code for mathematics research papers.
Ultimately, of course, the attempt to simulate research through random text
generation would indicate the inability of digital machines to produce genuine
scientific output. This struggle is analogous to that of passing the infamous
Turing test. Instead of creating genuine artificial intelligence, most competitors
today engage in a purely statistical emulation of human textual output. But
the role of computation in engendering new knowledge is not limited to mere
imitation. Automatic reasoning, a branch of computer science, has achieved
considerable success in automated proof checking, and, more importantly for
our argument, automated theorem proving. Its most publicized result is the
four color theorem, which states that every planar map divided into a finite
number of contiguous regions can be colored with four colors in a way such that
there will be no two regions having the same color, and sharing a common line
boundary. The theorem was proved in 1976 through a task-specific computer
program (Appel and Haken, 1980). Whether the output of theorem-proving
software, output that has not (or, cannot) be checked by hand by a human
should be considered a valid proof is still somewhat contentious (Mackenzie,
2004).
Still, the four color conjecture was formulated by humans, only the proof
was left to the program. However, in the foreseeable future, improvements in
automated theorem proving can lead to a point where every step of (formal)
research is taken by software. Automatization could push not only manual
workers, but even mathematicians out of jobs. There is already some indication
that computers are taking over areas of intellectual labor that was previously
deemed impossible, like law or architecture (Meltzer, 2014). Perhaps theoretical
economists should be more wary of potential genuine automatically generated
results in their field.
3 http://pdos.csail.mit.edu/scigen/.
4 http://thatsmathematics.com/mathgen/.
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1.4 Economic Text
Put in logical terms, the boundary between syntax and semantics has become
increasingly obscure in science for two reasons. First, academic pranksters at-
tempt to publish fake papers to break down the distinction between real and
sham science, or to test the ‘quality assurance’ of science, that is, the peer review
process. Second, the job of thinking might be taken over by artificial intelligence
in the long term, a process that has begun with the proving and generating of
mathematical theorems by sophisticated software.
What does all this imply for economics in particular? Specifically, what is
the social role of a researcher in decision and game theory, such as the author of
this academic thesis is attempting to become? Naturally, these questions cannot
be answered within the confines of an introduction. In fact, it is unclear what
a satisfactory answer would constitute at all.
Consider the original aim of game theory, clearly articulated by Thomas
Schelling:
A new kind of inquiry that gave promise, fifteen years ago, of
leading to such a theory of strategy is game theory. [ . . . ] But in
international strategy, the promise of game theory is so far unful-
filled. Game theory has been extremely helpful in the formulation
of problems, and the clarification of concepts, but its greatest suc-
cesses have been in other fields. It has, on the whole, been pitched
at a level of abstraction where it has made little contact with the
elements of a problem like deterrence.
Schelling (1960)
Fifty-five years later, the situation has hardly changed, if indeed at all. Game
theory was spectacularly successful in some domains (e.g., auctions, matching),
but still has little to say on the strategy of (non-zero-sum) conflicts.
As of yet, the fundamental story of game theory is thus a story of a promise
unfulfilled. Should this observation bother us? Should the decline in the accessi-
bility of theoretical results be a matter of concern? After all, it could be argued
that technical complexity, a rigid, unyielding language, and a proliferation of
buzzwords were the factors that made the Sokal hoax possible in the first place.
I believe not. In my view, the community of researchers has – as it should have
– complete authority over the direction of research, the accepted methodology,
sophistication of the terminology, and the evaluation of individuals and their
work. In short, I subscribe to the oft-cited methodological anarchism of Paul
Feyerabend: “anything goes” (Feyerabend, 1993).
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This methodological anarchism admits that there are no a priori ways to
make a distinction between syntax and semantics, meaningless and meaningful,
fake science and real science. Nor can we devise any failproof institutional
mechanism that protects us from tricks and traps. The simple reason is that the
scientific method cannot be formalized. In short, by looking at a text formally,
we can evaluate whether the text obeys the laws of grammar, we can at most
check whether mathematical derivations are correct; but we cannot evaluate
it as a piece of science. Meaning is in the eyes of the beholder. This is why
economists should not be afraid of tricksters flooding economics journals, or
artificial intelligence taking over economists’ jobs. As meaning is generated
through the scientist’s use of concepts – the scientific language game –, it is
impossible for hoaxes to succeed for extended periods of time. It is equally
impossible that automated systems of formal theorem-proving machines would
substitute humans, as the connection of these formal theorems to the social
world will always require a human interpreter. Thus, while nobody is safe on
the short run – the social role of the economist (decision theorist, game theorist)
is guaranteed for the long run.
1.5 This Text
At this point, a clarification seems warranted: The text presented in the fol-
lowing chapters (or, for that matter, in this introduction) was not produced by
either a text- or a theorem-generating algorithm. It is not meant to be ironic.
In fact, a deliberate attempt was made by the author to limit his unserious and
half-serious thoughts by letting them expand up to this section, but no further.
Thus, the role of this thesis is not to exhibit some inherent flaw in the design
of graduate education of economics. The reader can thus take a relaxing breath
here, and put his academic hat back on before diving in.
It would be natural to try to present the chapters of this thesis as part of one
overarching project. In fact, the title ‘Beliefs, intentions, power’ seems to suggest
that there is one such grand narrative. However, any such ex post construction
would do injustice to the actual genealogy of these works. Instead, I must
admit to the incidental nature of their connections. If one wishes to see such
an overarching trend or tendency across them, then they can be said to move
from the abstract to the concrete, from general considerations on optimality
(Chapter 2), through decision makers facing their own fallible nature (Chapter
3), to the behavior of actual human beings in a social context (Chapter 4).
Chapter 2 investigates notions of limit optimality. It is partly inspired by the
13
works of Frank Ramsey and Weizsäcker (Ramsey, 1928; von Weizsäcker, 1965).
However, while they mostly focus on intergenerational distributive decisions,
i.e., optimal consumption paths over a succession of generations, we focus on a
single individual decision maker facing a single problem in discrete time. The
problem is modeled as a Markov decision problem, so that the set of states and
the set of possible actions in each state are finite. Preferences over future payoff
streams are represented by a utility function. The standard economic problem is
identifying the decision maker’s optimal strategy. In general, this identification
requires the evaluation of infinite streams of payoff. If a decision maker is
able to make these evaluations, we say that her decision horizon is infinite.
However, not everyone is able or willing to execute the occasionally involved
calculations required by the infinite horizon. Instead, it might be the case that
payoffs after a certain point in time are disregarded. In this case, we say that
the horizon of the decision maker is finite. We are concerned with strategies
that are optimal not on a particular finite horizon, but on an infinite sequence
of finite horizons, say, horizons of length 2, 4, 6, . . . The chapter examines the
relationship between sets of strategies that are optimal on the infinite horizon,
and those that are optimal on an infinite number of finite horizons. It turns out
that the latter set is included in the former, but not vice-versa. Our main result
thus provides a refinement notions for infinite-horizon optimality. There are at
least two reasons why strategies that are optimal according to such refinements
are interesting and/or should be preferred. First, if the game stops suddenly,
due to an external reason not included in the model – an ‘act of God’, so to
speak –, then the decision maker can be strictly better off. Second, it might be
easier to find such a strategy, because one can start finding optimal strategies
by backward induction on a finite horizon, and then expand this horizon step
by step.
The subsequent chapter is an extensive analysis of dynamic inconsistency.
Dynamic inconsistency describes situations in which preferences change in such
a way that optimal strategies formed at various points in time prescribe differ-
ent choices for the future. Such inconsistencies are empirically well documented
(Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue, 2002). Previous research has estab-
lished that there are two fundamentally different types of behavior in the face
of preference change over time: naiveté and sophistication. Naifs do not con-
sider their changing preferences, while sophisticates give a best response to the
behavior of their future selves. Again, we model these types as a discrete-time
Markov decision problem. The chapter makes an important distinction between
the intentions and beliefs of agents about future behavior, and it provides defi-
nitions and optimality for naiveté and sophistication using this distinction. We
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can compare naifs and sophisticates directly in a number of scenarios. Is sophis-
tication always preferable? Does it bring advantages in situations that involve
temptations? Can it help in avoiding procrastination? Finally, it is known that
sexual arousal or alcohol use might induce people to behave more myopically
and naively (Loewenstein, 1996). Thus, we might want to model some situations
as involving changes in type. Our general framework enables us to define a new
hybrid type of decision maker, who is naive in some states, and sophisticated
in others, with transitions depending stochastically on the current state, and
decisions taken therein.
Chapter 4 moves from empirically-inspired theory to an experimental con-
text, and also from studying single decision makers to a multi-player environ-
ment. We address the fundamental question of how cooperation is maintained,
given that it carries the danger of being exploited by free riding. In this, the
chapter follows a long line of behavioral economists and evolutionary game the-
orists who studied this problem through the prisoner’s dilemma and its gener-
alization, the public goods game. In such settings, it has been shown that peer
punishment can sustain cooperation (Fehr and Gächter, 2000, 2002). However,
it can only function effectively if the impact of punishment is sufficiently large
compared to its cost. Though many experiments assume efficient punishment
options to be readily available, we were interested in its emergence from a ‘state
of nature’, having equal and decentralized punishment. Moreover, the problem
of second-order free riding is still not solved theoretically. Since punishment
is assumed to be costly, in the subgame-perfect equilibrium of a finite public
goods game with punishment, no one should engage in it. To see whether these
limitations could be overcome, we designed a novel economic game, the ‘power
transfer game’. In the power transfer game, players are confronted with a social
dilemma, and can engage in costly peer punishment. In addition, our setup
enables players to give up and transfer their punishment power to others. The
chapter presents the results of this behavioral experiment.
Overall, this thesis is an attempt to showing – instead of proving – that the
games we theorists play are worth it.
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Chapter 2
Optimal choice for finite and
infinite horizons
This chapter lays down conceptual groundwork for optimal choice of a decision
maker facing a finite-state Markov decision problem on an infinite horizon. We
distinguish two notions of a strategy being favored on the limit of horizons, and
examine the properties of the emerging binary relations. After delimiting two
senses of optimality, we define a battery of optimal strategy sets – including the
Ramsey-Weizäcker overtaking criterion – and analyze their relationships and
existence properties. We also relate to the work on pointwise limits of strategies
by Fudenberg and Levine (1983).
This chapter is based on Z. Z. Méder, J. Flesch and R. Peeters: Optimal choice for finite
and infinite horizons. Operations Research Letters 40/6, 469–474.
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2.1 Introduction and motivation
Some decision problems are clearly limited in time: they only involve decisions
and payoffs until a certain temporal point, having no relevant options and effects
for the decision maker beyond that point. At one extreme, think of choosing the
flavor of (a scoop of) ice cream: the decision is blatantly one-off, and any payoffs
from choosing vanilla or chocolate are gained immediately. Other decisions,
however, are potentially infinite, in the sense that utility-changing decisions
might have to be made after arbitrary long times. Here, one can think of
choosing the palette of flavors for an ice-cream company: Managers come and
go, today’s kids grow old, but until the company is up and running, the flavor
palette will need to be reconsidered. Such decisions will have both immediate
and long-term effects.
The horizon of a decision problem is the temporal distance between the
time when the decision maker is confronted with the problem, and the furthest
horizon that is payoff-relevant. This chapter starts with an infinite-horizon
decision problem. However, even when the horizon is infinite, a decision-maker
might still behave as if it were finite. There are various possible reasons for
the decision maker acting in such a way. Maybe she (wrongly) believes that
the decision problem is actually limited. It could also happen that, due to
cognitive limitations, she is unable or unwilling to calculate with any utility
that she receives too far in the future. In our example, a manager might care
only about the short-run profits of the ice-cream company, and postpone R&D
expenditures.
Short-sighted attitudes amount to cutting the decision tree so that it becomes
finite. One alternative is to take into consideration the entire decision tree,
including effects arbitrarily far into the future. Alternatively, if more cognitive
resources, right beliefs, or deep commitments are available, the full decision
problem can be tackled. Suppose now we let the horizon of the decision-maker
grow ad infinitum, i.e., we cut off smaller and smaller parts of the tree. Intuition
would suggest that decision strategies that are optimal on the full tree can always
be approximated by strategies that are optimal for infinitely many such cuts.
However, this is not always the case, and strategies that are optimal on the
complete horizon can be suboptimal for all finite truncations of the horizon.
A third and distinct optimality notion emerges by taking pointwise limits of
strategies optimal on finite horizons.
In investigating the limit properties of decision strategies, the present work
provides a systematic approach towards formulating and comparing optimality
criteria such as the Ramsey-Weizsäcker overtaking criterion (von Weizsäcker,
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1965) or the limit-equilibrium of Fudenberg and Levine (1983).
Our results provide grounds for optimality refinements. As we will see, it is
possible that a strategy, despite being optimal on the infinite horizon, can be
beaten by another strategy on any finite horizon. This means that up to any
period, the decision maker would be strictly better off in expectation with the
other strategy. In such cases, there might be good intuitive reasons to go with
one strategy rather than the other, albeit they induce the same expected payoff
on the complete horizon.
The next section outlines our model and notation. In Section 2.3, we define
some relations between strategies, delimiting the strong and weak senses of
taking limits of finite horizons. Section 2.4 distinguishes two senses of optimality,
and analyzes the resulting strategy sets. The limit of strategies approach of
Fudenberg and Levine (1983) is considered in Section 2.5. Then, we consider an
approach to prove the nonemptiness of one of our optimality refinements, while
the last section provides some concluding remarks.
2.2 The problem
Our decision maker faces a finite Markov decision problem.
Definition 1. A finite Markov decision problem is given by:
• the set of time periods {1, 2, . . . };
• a finite set of states Ω, with ω1 ∈ Ω as the initial state;
• a finite and nonempty set of pure actions Aω that the decision maker can
choose from in state ω;
• a payoff function uω : Aω → R that assigns a payoff to every action in
state ω;
• transition probabilites mω : Aω → ∆(Ω), with mω(ω′|aω) denoting the
probability to transit from state ω to state ω′ when action aω is chosen.
In every period, the decision-maker chooses an action from those available
to her. We call a path of states and actions that the decision maker can go
through a ‘history.’
Definition 2. A history h has the form h = (ω1, aω1 , . . . , ωt−1, aωt−1 , ωt), with:
• ωi ∈ Ω, for i ∈ {1, . . . , t};
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• aωi ∈ Aωi , for i ∈ {1, . . . , t− 1};
• mωi−1(ωi|aωi−1) > 0, for i ∈ {1, . . . , t− 1}.
The length of h or current time at h is denoted by t = t(h). In a similar vein,
the function ω(h) = ωt(h) indicates the current or end state at history h. We
use H to refer to the set of all histories.
Obviously, the well-being of the decision-maker depends not only on her
current choice, but also on her future actions. Thus, the decision maker needs
a decision rule that tells her what to do at any history. Such a decision rule is
called a strategy.
Definition 3. A strategy of the decision maker is a function s that assigns to
every history h an action s(h) ∈ Aω(h). The set of all strategies is denoted by
S.
We suppose that discounting is exponential, so the expected utility induced
by a strategy s on horizon T ∈ N is:
UT(s) =
∑
h | t(h)≤T
δt(h)−1 uω(h)(s(h))Ps(h),
where uω(h)(s(h)) is the payoff received from taking the action s(h) at history
h, while Ps(h) is the probability that history h occurs when the decision maker
chooses strategy s. The horizon T of this function is interpreted as the period
beyond which the decision maker ignores payoffs. If the decision maker considers
all future payoffs, however far they might be, we say that her horizon is infinite.
The utility induced by s on the infinite horizon is U∞(s) = limT→∞ UT(s).
2.3 Comparing strategies
We start by defining relations to compare two strategies within S. First, suppose
the decision maker has a finite horizon.
Definition 4. A strategy s is (strictly) favored over another strategy s′ on a
finite horizon T if it induces a (strictly) higher utility on that horizon. More
precisely, we write s <T s′ if UT(s) ≥ UT(s′). Similarly, we write s T s′
whenever UT(s) > UT(s′).
Next, it is possible that the decision maker considers the complete horizon
of infinite length of the decision problem.
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Definition 5. A strategy s is (strictly) favored over another strategy s′ on the
complete horizon if it induces a (strictly) higher utility on that horizon. More
precisely, we write s <CH s′ if U∞(s) ≥ U∞(s′). Similarly, we write s CH s′
whenever U∞(s) > U∞(s′).
Another alternative is to conceive of the infinite horizon as the limit of finite
horizons, as the parameter T that determines the length of the horizon goes to
infinity. This option involves comparing strategies by their induced expected
utility for large enough T . There are, however, at least two ways for looking at
this limiting behavior, in a stronger and in a weaker sense.
Definition 6. A strategy s is (strictly) favored over another strategy s′ on the
limit of finite horizons in the strong sense (LHS) if it induces a (strictly) higher
utility for all horizons T beyond a certain horizon T ′. More precisely, we write
s <LHS s′ if there is a T ′ such that s <T s′ for all T ≥ T ′. Similarly, we write
s LHS s′ whenever there is a T ′ such that s T s′ for all T ≥ T ′.
Definition 7. A strategy s is (strictly) favored over another strategy s′ on the
limit of finite horizons in the weak sense (LHW) if, for any horizon T ′, we can
find a longer horizon T such that s induces a (strictly) higher utility on T than
s′. More precisely, we write s <LHW s′ if for all T ′ there is a T ≥ T ′ such that
s <T s′. Similarly, we write s LHW s′ whenever for all T ′ there is a T ≥ T ′
such that s T s′.
Note that the latter definition is equivalent to saying that there are infinitely
many horizons on which the first strategy induces a (strictly) higher utility.
Following Ramsey (1928), von Weizsäcker (1965) investigates both LHS
and LHW, although in a different setting than ours. The optimal growth liter-
ature adopts the stronger version as the Ramsey-Weizsäcker overtaking criterion
(Gale, 1967; Brock, 1970; Brock and Haurie, 1976). Within a game-theoretic
framework, Rubinstein (1979) considers an even stronger version of this relation.
Theorem 2. The relations <T, <CH, <LHS, <LHW and their strict versions
satisfy the properties given in Table 2.1.
Proof.
The relations <T, <CH, T and CH.
The properties of <T and T simply inherit the properties of the non-strict
and strict orders ≥ and > on R, since they are equivalent to single utility
comparisons. Similarly, <CH and CH inherit the properties of ≥ and > on R.
The relation <LHS.
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< 
T/CH LHS LHW T/CH LHS LHW
Total + – + – – –
Reflexive + + + – – –
Irreflexive – – – + + +
Symmetric – – – – – –
Asymmetric – – – + + –
Antisymmetric – – – + + –
Transitive + + – + + –
‘+’ indicates that the property necessarily holds.
‘–’ indicates that the property does not hold in general.
A relation R is:
total if xRy or yRx for all x, y;
reflexive if xRx for all x;
irreflexive if xRx for no x;
symmetric if xRy implies yRx;
asymmetric if xRy implies not yRx;
antisymmetric if xRy and yRx imply x = y;
transitive if xRy and yRz imply xRz.
Table 2.1: Properties of the relations.
To verify that <LHS is not total, consider the decision problem in Figure 2.1
with  as the initial state. The two options of the decision maker are going
west (strategy s) and going east (s′). Suppose the discount factor is δ = 0.5.
We see that
UT(s) =
{
0 if T = 2k + 1
−(0.5)T if T = 2k
and
UT(s
′) =
{
0.5T−1 if T = 2k + 1
−(0.5)T−1 if T = 2k.
This means that whenever T = 2k, then s T s′, but whenever T = 2k + 1,
then s′ T s. It follows that neither s <LHS s′, nor s′ <LHS s, therefore <LHS is
not total.
The relation <LHS is reflexive (and not irreflexive), as any strategy is weakly
better than itself on all horizons.
We turn to symmetry: <LHS is not symmetric, asymmetric or antisymmet-
ric. Lack of symmetry follows trivially from cases when one strategy generates
strictly higher utility on all finite horizons. Due to its reflexivity, it is not asym-
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Figure 2.1: The relation <LHS is not total.
metric. To see that it is not antisymmetric either, take two different strategies
s 6= s′ that induce the same expected utility on all horizons. For these, we have
s <LHS s′ and s′ <LHS s with s 6= s′. Thus <LHS is not antisymmetric.
To show that <LHS is transitive, suppose s <LHS s′ and s′ <LHS s′′. This
means that there is a T ′ such that s <T s′ for all T ≥ T ′, and that there is a
T ′′ such that s′ <T s′′ for all T ≥ T ′′. Let T ′′′ = max{T ′, T ′′}. Consequently,
s <T s′′ whenever T ≥ T ′′′. It follows that s <LHS s′′.
The relation <LHW.
In contrast with <LHS, the relation <LHW is total. Choosing any s and s′,
for any T , either s <T s′ or s′ <T s. But the set of possible choices for T is
infinite. Therefore, s <T s′ for infinitely many T or s′ <T s for infinitely many
T (or possibly, both).
Next, <LHW is reflexive for the same reason as <LHS, and thus not irreflexive.
The symmetry properties of <LHW are also the same as those of <LHS, again
for the same reasons.
Figure 2.2 shows a decision problem where <LHW is not transitive. Suppose
again that  is the starting state and the discount factor is δ = 0.5. The decision
maker has three options: going southwest (strategy s), south (s′) or southeast
(s′′). The payoffs for these strategies on different horizons are summarized in
Table 2.2. We see that whenever T = 3k, then s <T s′, so s <LHW s′. Moreover,
whenever T = 3k + 2, then s′ <T s′′, so s′ <LHW s′′. But UT(s) < 0 = UT(s′′)
for all T , so there is no T such that s <T s′′. It follows that s is not favored
over s′′ according to <LHW, therefore <LHW is not transitive.
The relation LHS.
By comparing any strategy s to itself, or two distint strategies that generate
the same payoffs on all finite horizons, we can see that LHS is not total.
In contrast to its non-strict version, LHS is irreflexive, since no strategy can
strictly beat itself on any horizon. Therefore, it is also not reflexive.
The case when one strategy yields higher payoff than the other for all hori-
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Figure 2.2: The relations <LHW and LHW are not transitive.
UT(s) UT(s
′) UT(s′′)
T = 3k + 1 −0.5T−1 0 0
T = 3k + 2 −0.5T−1 0.5T−2 0
T = 3k −0.5T−1 −0.5T−2 0
Table 2.2: Utility comparison for Figure 2.2.
zons shows that LHS is not symmetric. It is, however, both asymmetric and
antisymmetric: If s LHS s′, then there exists T ′ such that s T s′ for all
T ≥ T ′. But then it is not possible that also a T ′′ exists for which s′ T s for
all T ≥ T ′′, since this would imply s T s′ and s′ T s for T ≥ max{T ′, T ′′},
which is impossible.
To show that LHS is transitive, we can use the argument for the transi-
tivity of its non-strict counterpart, replacing non-strict inequalities with strict
ones everywhere.
The relation LHW.
For similar reasons as LHS, the relation LHW is not total.
This relation is irreflexive (and not reflexive), and we can again use the same
argument as for LHW.
The analogy also carries over for non-symmetricity. However, LHW is not
asymmetric or antisymmetric: the example in Figure 2.1 shows that it is possi-
ble that s T s′ for infinitely many T and also s′ T s for infinitely many T .
It is easy to see that the example on Figure 2.2 also shows the non-transitivity
of LHW, since all of the strategies in Table 2.2 are strictly best on the respective
horizons.
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2.4 Optimal strategies
The decision maker is looking for an optimal strategy. However, she might, for
any reason, decide to restrict her choice to a nonempty subset G of the full
strategy space S. For example the decision maker might restrict her attention
to stationary strategies.
Given a relation R on S, a strategy in G can be said to be optimal in two
senses. First, a strategy can be regarded as optimal if no further improvements
can be made on it, i.e., if there is no other strategy in G that is favored to
it. One can think of a former criterion for retaining the title of World Chess
Champion, which required not being beaten in a title match – in case of a tie,
the incumbent would remain the world champion. Formally, a strategy s∗ ∈ G
is optimal in G according to relation R in the ‘not-beaten’ (NB) sense, if there
is no other strategy s ∈ G such that sRs∗.
Alternatively, a strategy in G can be said to be optimal if it is favored to all
other strategies in G. Here, one can think of horse races, where in case of a tie
bookmakers consider all the horses in the dead heat as ‘winners’. Formally, a
strategy s∗ ∈ G is optimal according to relation R in the ‘beat-all’ (BA) sense
if s∗Rs for all other strategies s ∈ G.
The orders defined on finite and the complete horizons involve single utility
comparison. Therefore, a strategy is not beaten by the strict order if and only
if is favored to every other strategy according to the weak order. Similarly, a
strategy is not beaten by the weak order if and only if it is favored to every
other strategy according to the strict order. Therefore, we have the following
definitions for optimal strategies.
Definition 8. The set of strategies in G that are optimal on horizon T is given
by:
GT = {s ∈ Gs| 6 ∃s′ ∈ Gs, s′ T s} = {s ∈ G| ∀s′ ∈ Gs, s <T s′},
with Gs = G \ {s} here and henceforth.
The set of strategies in G that are uniquely optimal on horizon T is given by:
GT = {s ∈ G| 6 ∃s′ ∈ Gs, s′ <T s} = {s ∈ G| ∀s′ ∈ Gs, s T s′}.
Definition 9. The set of strategies in G that are optimal on the complete
horizon is given by:
GCH = {s ∈ G| 6 ∃s′ ∈ Gs, s′ CH s} = {s ∈ G| ∀s′ ∈ Gs, s <CH s′}.
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The set of strategies in G that are uniquely optimal on the complete horizon is
given by:
GCH = {s ∈ G| 6 ∃s′ ∈ Gs, s′ <CH s} = {s ∈ G| ∀s′ ∈ Gs, s CH s′}.
As its name suggests, a uniquely optimal strategy set contains at most one
element.
The simple duality of the two senses of optimality fails in the case of the
limit of finite horizon relations since these are not total (<LHS), or not transitive
(<LHW). Thus, we have a total of eight possible definitions for the concept of
‘optimal strategy on the limit of finite horizons’:
Definition 10. The sets of strategies s in G that are ‘not-beaten-optimal’ or
‘beat-all-optimal’ on the limit of finite horizons in the strong or weak sense,
according to the respective strict or non-strict relations, are given by the con-
ditions in Table 2.3:
LHS LHW
NB, < 6 ∃s′ ∈ Gs, s′ <LHS s 6 ∃s′ ∈ Gs, s′ <LHW s
NB,  6 ∃s′ ∈ Gs, s′ LHS s 6 ∃s′ ∈ Gs, s′ LHW s
BA, < ∀s′ ∈ Gs, s <LHS s′ ∀s′ ∈ Gs, s <LHW s′
BA,  ∀s′ ∈ Gs, s LHS s′ ∀s′ ∈ Gs, s LHW s′
Table 2.3: Optimality conditions.
We denote {s ∈ G| 6 ∃s′ ∈ Gs, s′ <LHS s} by GNB<LHS . The other sets are denoted
in a consistent manner.
Theorem 3. For any Markov decision problem and G ⊆ S, the different no-
tions of optimality induce the following relations on the resulting sets of optimal
strategies:
GCH ⊆ GNB<LHW = GBALHS
⊆
GNBLHW = G
BA<
LHS ⊆
⊆
GNB<LHS = G
BA
LHW
⊆
GNBLHS = G
BA<
LHW ⊆ GCH.
Proof.
GCH ⊆ GBALHS .
Take s ∈ GCH. Then, U∞(s) > U∞(s′) for all s′ ∈ Gs, hence there exists a
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T ′(s′) so that for all subsequent horizons T ≥ T ′(s′), we get UT(s) > UT(s′).
Thus, s ∈ GBALHS .
GNB<LHW = G
BA
LHS , G
NB
LHW = G
BA<
LHS , G
NB<
LHS = G
BA
LHW , G
NB
LHS = G
BA<
LHW.
Strategy s is in GNB<LHW if and only if there is no s
′ ∈ Gs such that s′ <T s
for infinitely many T . This is true if and only if UT(s′) ≥ UT(s) for only
finitely many T , which is again equivalent to there being a T ′(s′) such that
UT(s) > UT(s
′) for all T ≥ T ′(s). The latter condition is the definition of
GBALHS , so indeed G
NB<
LHW = G
BA
LHS . Similarly, the definitions of all the other pairs
of sets are logically equivalent.
GBALHS ⊆ GBA<LHS , GBALHW ⊆ GBA<LHW.
These cases are trivial, since s T s′ implies s <T s′.
GBALHS ⊆ GBALHW.
Choose any s ∈ GBALHS . Thus, for all s′ ∈ G, there is a T ′ such that UT(s) >
UT(s
′) for all T ≥ T ′. Obviously then, for all s′ there are infinitely many T ′ for
which UT(s) ≥ UT(s′), so we have s ∈ GBALHW.
GBA<LHS ⊆ GBA<LHW.
This case is analogous to the previous one, by replacing  with <.
GBA<LHW ⊆ GCH.
Fix s ∈ GBA<LHW and s′ ∈ G. Since s <LHW s′ for infinitely many T , U∞(s) =
limT→∞ UT(s) ≥ limT→∞ UT(s′) = U∞(s′). Therefore, s ∈ GCH.
We know that whenever G ⊆ S is nonempty and closed for pointwise lim-
its, strategies optimal on the complete horizon exist, i.e., GCH is nonempty
(see Theorem 3).
The set GNBLHS = G
BA<
LHW contains those strategies that are non-strictly favored
to any other strategy on infinitely many horizons. For this reason, we call them
‘repeatedly’ optimal strategies, and denote the resulting set of strategies by GR.
We conjecture that whenever G is nonempty and closed for pointwise limits,
the set of repeatedly optimal strategies is also nonempty. In Section 2.6 we deal
with an attempt to prove the nonemptiness of GR.
Members of the set GNBLHW = G
BA<
LHS are those strategies s for which, for every
other strategy s′, there is a certain horizon – depending on s′ – after which s
is non-strictly favored to s′ for all further horizons. This is exactly the set of
strategies that von Weizsäcker (1965) calls optimal. Therefore, we call these
‘overtakingly’ optimal strategies, and denote the resulting set by GOT. Such
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strategies are not guaranteed to exist. Indeed, for the decision problems in Fig-
ures 2.1 and 2.2, there are only two, respectively three possible strategies, those
defined in Theorem 2. Since s, s′ 6∈ SU for the first problem, and s, s′, s′′ 6∈ SU
for the second problem, there are no overtakingly optimal strategies in these de-
cision problems for G = S. The seminal paper of von Weizsäcker (1965) remarks
in a different setting that it might be possible for a strategy to be repeatedly,
but not overtakingly optimal; however, he does not provide an example.
It can be easily seen that GNB<LHS = G
BA
LHW can be empty. Think of a decision
problem where there are only two different strategies and they induce the same
payoffs over all horizons. Then neither of them can be called optimal according
to this optimality criterion. Due to such instances, this particular notion is less
appealing to us.
One could call the set of strategies in GNB<LHW = G
BA
LHS ‘strictly overtakingly
optimal’. Thus, we can denote them by GOTS. From our previous results, it
is obvious that a decision problem might have no strictly overtakingly optimal
strategies. Moreover, if GOTS is nonempty, then it contains exactly one element.
Figure 2.3 illustrates the set inclusion relationships between the various op-
timality notions defined in this section.
2.5 Pointwise limits
We now turn to examine the relationship between the pointwise limits of strate-
gies optimal on finite horizons examined by Fudenberg and Levine (1983) and
our optimality notions.
Definition 11. Suppose s = (si)i∈N is an infinite sequence of strategies. We
say that strategy s ∈ S is a pointwise limit of s if there is an index set I ⊆ N
of infinite cardinality so that for every history h there is an index mh such that
s(h) = si(h) for every i ∈ I with i ≥ mh .
It is easy to provide an iterative method for finding pointwise limits of a
sequence of strategies. First, order all histories by length. Then, go through
the histories step by step: At each history, choose any action that is taken by
infinitely many strategies, and eliminate the strategies that do not take this
action at that history. After each step of choice and elimination, the number of
remaining strategies will be infinite. Thus the algorithm will never halt, and at
least one pointwise limit will exist for any infinite sequence of strategies.
For a set of strategies G ⊆ S, denote by GFL the set of all strategies s for
which there exists a sequence s = (sT) with sT ∈ GT for each T ∈ {1, 2, . . . } such
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GCH
GR
GCH
GOTS
GOT G
BA≻
LHW=
GNB<LHS
Figure 2.3: The different optimality notions.
A solid boundary indicates that the set is (conjectured to be) nonempty. A dashed or dotted
boundary indicates that the set might be empty. A dotted boundary also indicates that the
set contains at most one element.
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that s is a pointwise limit of s. The following theorem follows from the results
of Fudenberg and Levine (1983). Since they use a game-theoretic approach, and
their formalism is somewhat different, we attach a short proof.
Theorem 4. Suppose G ⊆ S is nonempty and closed for pointwise limits. Then,
GFL is a nonempty subset of GCH.
Proof. Since G is nonempty and closed for pointwise limits, the nonemptiness
of GFL follows from the discussion above on the iterative method. We will
now show that GFL ⊆ GCH. Take an arbitrary s ∈ GFL. Then, there exists
a sequence (sT)T∈N , with sT ∈ GT for each T ∈ N, and an infinite index set
I ⊆ N such that s is the pointwise limit of the subsequence (sT)T∈I . Let s′ ∈ G.
Because sT ∈ GT, we have UT(sT) ≥ UT(s′) for every T ∈ N. Let R be the
maximum of the absolute values of all payoffs, and for every T ∈ N let
wT =
∞∑
t=T+1
δt−1R =
δT
1− δR.
Then, UT(sT) ≤ UT′(sT) + wT′ for every T, T ′ ∈ N with T ′ ≤ T , and UT(s′) ≥
U∞(s′) − wT for every T ∈ N. Consequently, for every T, T ′ ∈ N with T ′ ≤ T
we have
UT′(sT) ≥ UT(sT)− wT′ ≥ UT(s′)− wT′ ≥ U∞(s′)− wT − wT′ .
For a fixed T ′, taking the limit when T tends to infinity within the set I yields
UT′(s) ≥ U∞(s′)− wT′ .
Next, taking the limit when T ′ →∞ yields
U∞(s) ≥ U∞(s′).
Because s′ was arbitrary in G, we have shown that s ∈ GCH.
Remark. A strategy generated through pointwise limits is not necessarily re-
peatedly optimal, i.e., GFL is not necessarily a subset of GR, even if G is closed
for pointwise limits.
To see this, consider the decision problem in Figure 2.4. Suppose that  is
the starting state and the discount factor is δ = 0.5. Let gt be the following
strategy for t > 1: Go southeast, stay there until t, go east in that period, then
stay there.
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Figure 2.4: Pointwise limit of strategies optimal on finite horizons is dominated
on all horizons.
First we show that gt is the unique optimal strategy on horizon t. On
this horizon, it induces the payoff sequence (0, . . . , 0, 4) and hence a utility of
4 · 0.5t−1. There are only three types of alternative strategies to it: taking less
time or more time to get the payoff of 4, or going southwest. Since the payoff of
4 is taken at the last possible moment, any strategy that takes more time will
induce a utility of 0 on horizon t. On the other hand, any strategy that takes
less time will end up with a utility smaller or equal to 0, because of the repeated
payoff of −8 on every round after taking the payoff of 4. Last, going southwest
induces a utility of 0.5t−1. Thus gt is uniquely optimal on horizon t.
Since gt is uniquely optimal on horizon t, it can easily be verified that GFL is
a singleton set, only consisting of the strategy s of going southeast, then staying
at that point forever. This strategy earns 0 on all horizons. However, we have
seen that going southwest earns 0.5t−1 on all finite horizons, therefore s′ LHS s,
and s is not repeatedly optimal.
2.6 Existence of repeatedly optimal strategies
Take G ⊆ S to be nonempty and closed for pointwise limits. A natural attempt
to prove the existence of a repeatedly optimal strategy within G would be by
using Zorn’s lemma, which is equivalent to the axiom of choice. For s, s′ ∈ G,
we write sRs′ if and only if either s = s′, or s LHS s′. It follows from Theorem
2 that relation R is a partial order on G, i.e., R is reflexive, antisymmetric and
transitive. Take a nonempty set G′ ⊆ G. We call G′ a chain in G if R is a total
order on G′. A strategy s ∈ G is called an upper bound for a chain G′ if sRs′
for every s′ ∈ G′. By Zorn’s lemma, if every chain G′ in G has an upper bound,
then there exists a strategy s ∈ G for which there is no strategy s′ ∈ G such
that s′ LHS s. This would mean that s ∈ GNBLHS , i.e., that s is a repeatedly
optimal strategy of G. So we would only have to prove that every chain G′ in G
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has an upper bound. The following example demonstrates that this is not easy.
In this example, we first construct a chain of countably infinite cardinality, and
subsequently show that the unique pointwise limit of this chain is not an upper
bound.
For the decision problem represented in Figure 2.5, the decision maker has
the options of going east (E) or staying in place (S) in the initial state . By
choosing to go east, she first gains a payoff of 2, and she has a 50/50 chance
of either returning to the initial state or moving to the absorbing state. The
behavior-relevant segment of a strategy is represented by a sequence of E-s and
S-s: (aT )T∈N , with aT ∈ {E,S} as the action for the decision maker if she is in
state  in period T .
1
&&
2 ◦ −1zz
(0.5)
LL
(0.5)
SS
Figure 2.5: Pointwise limit of a sequence of strategies is dominated by each
strategy in the sequence on all horizons.
Suppose the discount factor is δ = 0.5. It is easy to see that any strategy is
optimal on the complete horizon, earning an expected utility of 2. Moreover, it
can be shown that for any finite horizon T , the number of E-s in the strategy
up to and including T determine the expected utility up to T , their order being
irrelevant. In general, if a strategy s contains k number of E-s up to T , then its
expected utility up to T is
UT(s) = 2 +
1
2T−1
(
1− 1
2k−1
)
,
which is increasing in k. Take the following sequence of strategies: s = (sT)T∈N ,
where
sT = SS . . . S︸ ︷︷ ︸
T−1
EE . . . E︸ ︷︷ ︸
T
SSSS . . .
Fix any horizon T . We then have
s1 ≺T s2 ≺T . . . ≺T sT
for all T greater or equal to 2T − 1. Therefore,
s1 ≺LHS s2 ≺LHS . . . ≺LHS sT.
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Obviously, s has a single pointwise limit, namely s = SSS . . . that prescribes
staying in forever. However, s is not favored to any strategy in the sequence on
any horizon, since s ≺T s1 for all T . Thus, the limit strategy, our most natural
choice for an upper bound of this chain lacks the desired property, repeated
optimality.
2.7 Discussion
First, it should be noted that our examples concern non-generic decision prob-
lems. We do not regard this as a serious drawback, as many interesting decision
problems are non-generic. In the generic case, all the sets of optimal strategies
defined in the previous sections collapse into a single one.
The existence of repeatedly optimal strategies remains an intriguing open
question, although we conjecture that for subsets of the strategy space closed
for pointwise limits, repeatedly optimal strategies do exist. If the existence of
repeatedly optimal strategies can be shown, we have good reasons to use them
as a refinement of optimal strategies on the complete horizon. Namely, the
choice of a repeatedly optimal strategy will guarantee that for infinitely many
periods, the decision maker has reason not to feel any regret over her strategy
choice. If an overtakingly optimal strategy can be found, there is even more
reason to rejoice: Compared with every other strategy, any regret for choosing
the overtakingly optimal strategy will fully dissipate after just finitely many
periods.
The assumption of exponential discounting can be relaxed for most of our
results. We can use a more general, history-dependent discount function, as
long as it is continuous at infinity in the sense of Fudenberg and Levine (1983).
While our model is presented in a decision-theoretic framework, the game-
theoretic extension of the concepts introduced should be straightforward. Re-
sults concerning the relationships of various strategy sets will carry over, but
the existence properties of various strategy sets will have to be readdressed for
games.
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Chapter 3
Naiveté and sophistication in
dynamic inconsistency
This chapter introduces a general framework for dealing with dynamic incon-
sistency in the context of Markov decision problems. It decouples and examines
concepts that are often entwined in the literature: It distinguishes between the
decision maker and her various temporal agents, and between the beliefs and
intentions of the agents. Classical examples of naiveté and sophistication are
modeled and contrasted based on this new language. We show that naive and
sophisticated decision makers can form optimal strategies at each possible his-
tory, and provide welfare comparisons for a class of decision problems including
procrastination, impulsiveness, underinvestment, binges and indulgence. The
creation of a unified formalism to deal with dynamic inconsistency allows for
the introduction of a hybrid decision maker, who is naive sometimes, sophisti-
cated at others. Such a hybrid decision maker can be used to model situations
where type determination is endogenous. Interestingly, the analysis of hybrid
types indicates that self-deception can be optimal.
This chapter is based on joint work with J. Flesch and R. Peeters.
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3.1 Introduction
Imagine that you are sitting with friends, drinking beer. You have just finished
your second pint, and your friends want to order another round. You think
to yourself: ‘well, I could deal with one or two more, but then I really should
go home.’ However, from previous experience, you are also acutely aware that
after your third beer your mindset is likely to change: you will start fooling
yourself, repeating over and over in the course of the evening: ‘just one more
beer, and then I am really going home’. This would lead to an undesirable
outcome, getting drunk and having a hangover the next morning. So you wisely
leave your friends after just your second beer. What is happening here? The
framework that we propose here makes it possible to model this and similar
scenarios.5
Traditionally, there are three main ways to portray decision makers under
time inconsistency. The first one regards decision makers as naifs (Akerlof,
1991; O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999b), the second attributes sophistication to
them (Laibson, 1997; Fischer, 1999; Harris and Laibson, 2001), while the third
argues that even resolute behavior is possible (McClennen, 1990). A common
assumption of these models in the classic papers on dynamic inconsistency is
regarding the decision maker as falling entirely into one of the above three cate-
gories, treating her type as exogeneously given. More recently, mainly building
on the work of O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001), hybrid decision makers have been
considered, in models of so-called ‘partial naiveté’. However, these models still
treat this type as exogeneous to the decision problem.
One way to interpret our example above is that you are sophisticated after
finishing the first two beers, but as you drink more, you expect to become
naive later on. The story indicates that in certain situations, a decision maker
could cause her type to change; moreover, she might even be able to reason
about such changes. Any perspective that assumes a fixed type is unable to
capture such situations. In order to fix this shortcoming, we attempt a general
interpretation of naiveté and sophistication for dynamic inconsistency. The
language we develop allows the introduction of hybrid-type decision makers
such as the one in our example.
Following a review of the relevant literature, we start building a formalism
that allows for precise definitions of the two most commonly discussed types of
decision makers, naifs and sophisticates. We work in discrete time, assuming
that the situation of the decision maker can be captured as a Markov deci-
5 The model of this situation is presented in Section 3.7.
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sion problem. Adopting the terminology of multiple self models, we distinguish
between the agent level and the level of the decision maker. Starting on the
agent level, we introduce the notion of a strategy, which contains information
about the intentions and beliefs of the individual agent at one particular his-
tory. Next, the properties of strategies (coherence, stationarity, consistency)
are discussed. Moving to the level of the decision maker (i.e., the collection of
all agents), we define the concept of a frame, and consider its properties. We
link the properties of strategies to the properties of frames. Frames are a novel
concept that provide all the relevant information about a decision maker facing
dynamic inconsistency.
After clarifying our assumptions on utility functions, we define and intro-
duce the two types of decision making, naiveté and sophistication. We provide
existence results for optimal frames of both types, and discuss various properties
of such frames. In the main text body, we then introduce decision makers with
a hybrid type, also providing an existence theorem, and discuss two examples
of hybrid decision making in detail. In the concluding section, we point towards
further extensions of the model. The Appendix gives a minimalist summary
of classical decision problems of the literature on dynamic inconsistency, and
compares naively and sophisticatedly optimal frames for these problems. It also
serves as an illustration for the applicability of our approach.
The contributions of this chapter are thus threefold. First, it provides new
concepts and distinctions for problems of dynamic inconsistency. In particular,
the representation of the decision maker through a frame, the distinction be-
tween a stationary strategy and frame, and the theorems relating consistency
and stationarity should prove useful (Section 3.3.6). Second, it provides defi-
nitions for naiveté and sophistication, and shows the existence of naively and
sophisticatedly optimal frames. Third, it introduces hybrid naive-sophisticated
types, expanding the scope of dynamic inconsistency models. As a corollary,
the analysis of hybrid types shows that self-deception can be optimal.
3.2 Related literature
Modelling approaches to dynamic inconsistency come in two varieties (Asheim,
2007). Dual-self planner-doer models bear a close analogy to principal-agent
models (Thaler and Shefrin, 1981). A (single) planner, endowed with dynami-
cally consistent preferences formulates plans; a present-biased doer can execute
them or deviate from them. The conceptual background of planner-doer models
is multifold: They sometimes rely on the hot-cold empathy gap (Loewenstein,
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2005), on recent findings of neuroscience, or even the Freudian distinction be-
tween the id and the ego. Fudenberg and Levine (2006) argues in favor of a
dual-self model as being analytically simpler, more in line with findings in neu-
roscience, and nevertheless being able to explain a large number of empirical
phenomena. An important advantage of this approach is that welfare compar-
isons are relatively straightforward: The preferences of the planner are generally
adopted to be normatively relevant. Recent models allow for the planner to learn
about the doer’s type through costly experimentation (Ali, 2011), or can include
self-control (Gul and Pesendorfer, 2001; Benabou and Pycia, 2002; Fudenberg
and Levine, 2012).
Despite all their advantages, dual-self models make the strong assumption
that individuals have long-run, time-consistent preferences, and that these pref-
erences can be identified. In this chapter we avoid this assumption, and instead
adopt the multiple-self approach.6 Our primary focus is on naive and sophis-
ticated decision makers, and hybrid types. Multiple-self models have analyzed
naive and sophisticated decision makers in a variety of settings. For instance,
Laibson (1994); Fischer (1999); Laibson (1997); Angeletos et al. (2001) work
with sophisticates, while Akerlof (1991) and O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999b)
assume naiveté. In a generial equilibrium setting, Herings and Rohde (2006,
2008) deal with both naifs and sophisticates. For us, a crucial precursor paper
is O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a), which compares naiveté and sophistication
for the case of quasi-hyperbolic discounting, with so-called immediate costs and
rewards.
The first model of hybrid types can be found in O’Donoghue and Rabin
(2001). They use quasi-hyperbolic (β − δ) discounting to define partial naiveté.
While naifs think their β is 1, the actual β is fully known to sophisticates,
while partially naive agents think they have a β that is larger than their actual
one. Partially naive agents thus entertain false beliefs about the future (just
like naifs). This approach has proven its fruitfulness especially in the contract
design literature (DellaVigna and Malmendier, 2004; Eliaz and Spiegler, 2006;
Gilpatric, 2008); while DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006) focus on a monopo-
listic firm facing a mixed population of consumers. Heidhues and Kőszegi (2009)
generalize the distributional assumptions on beliefs, but still in the context of
quasi-hyperbolic discounting.
An important aspect of the O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001) approach is that
– compared to sophistication – any degree of partial naiveté can generate arbi-
6 Bach and Heilmann (2011) link multiple-self models to the philosophical literature on
personal identity.
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trarily large losses in efficiency for a decision maker. In this sense, the limit of
partial naiveté (as the perceived present-biasedness approaches the real param-
eter) is not sophistication.
There were a few other attempts to treat hybrid decision makers. In Asheim
(2007), agents have a perceived preference persistence, i.e., a probability (be-
tween 0 and 1) with which they think their preferences will be identical in the
next period. However, this belief is always incorrect, as their preferences will
change with probability 1. In Jehiel and Lilico (2010), agents endowed with
exponential discounting have access to information about a number of future
periods (‘foresight’). They find that improving the length of foresight always
improves welfare.
This chapter expands on the existing literature by providing the foundations
of a hybrid model that is independent of the quasi-hyperbolic assumption of
O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001), and where type determination is an endogenous
part of the decision problem, as in our motivating example.
In the Appendix, we provide stylized models of a few standard problems of-
ten discussed in the context of dynamic inconsistency: procrastination (Akerlof,
1991; Fischer, 1999; Ariely and Wertenbroch, 2002; Steel, 2007), impulsiveness
(Ainslie, 1974, 1975), underinvestment (Laibson et al., 1998; Angeletos et al.,
2001; DellaVigna and Malmendier, 2004) and binging behavior/addiction (Gru-
ber and Kőszegi, 2001; Ainslie and Monterosso, 2003). Indulgence is a particular
type of timing problem, where the issue is when to consume a certain good. We
adopt the latter model directly from O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a). For all
of these problems, we compare the welfare of naive and sophisticated decision
makers. The Appendix also serves as a means of illustrating the potential use
of our framework.
3.3 Basic concepts
In this section, we introduce our framework and notations. Standard defini-
tions are provided for the notions of ‘decision problem’ and ‘history’. However,
before introducing strategies, we argue in Section 3.3.3 for a new way of defin-
ing strategies that includes both beliefs and intentions. We then proceed by
defining strategies and frames, corresponding to two different levels of analy-
sis. Towards the end of the section, we present some results on the relationship
between consistency and stationarity.
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3.3.1 Markov decision problem
We start with a decision maker facing a finite Markov decision problem on an
infinite horizon.7
Definition 12. A finite Markov decision problem is given by:
• the set of time periods T = {0, 1, 2, . . . };
• a finite set of states Ω, with ω¯ ∈ Ω as the initial state;
• a finite and nonempty set of pure actions Aω that the decision maker can
choose from in state ω;
• a payoff function uω : Aω → R that assigns a payoff to every action in
state ω;
• transition probabilities mω : Aω → ∆(Ω), with mω (ω′|aω) denoting the
probability to transit from state ω to state ω′ when action aω is chosen.
This definition excludes the possibility of randomization over actions, although
in some cases such an extension is needed to guarantee the existence of a sta-
tionary optimal strategy (see Section 3.A.2). Nevertheless, in order to keep the
presentation simpler, for the moment we only consider pure actions.
3.3.2 History
To capture all the informational aspects on which an action choice can be con-
ditioned, we introduce the notion of a history:
Definition 13. A history h has the form h =
(
ω0, aω0 , . . . , ωt−1, aωt−1 , ωt
)
,
with:
• ωi ∈ Ω, for i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , t}, and ω0 = ω¯;
• aωi ∈ Aωi , for i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , t− 1};
• mωi (ωi+1|aωi) > 0, for i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , t− 1}.
The length of h or current time at h is denoted by t = t(h), and the function
ω(h) = ωt(h) indicates the current or end state at history h. We use H to refer
to the set of all histories.
7 The latter is not a restrictive requirement, since it is easy to rewrite a decision problem
on a finite horizon to one on an infinite horizon.
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If history h′ begins with h, we say that h′ succeeds h, or equivalently, that h
precedes h′; and denote this with h 4 h′, or equivalently, with h′ < h.8 The
subset of H that consists of all histories that succeed h is denoted by H<h:
H<h = {h′ ∈ H| h′ < h}.
We refer to h0 = (ω0) as the ‘root history’. To shorten notation, when specifying
a history, we sometimes omit the commas separating states and actions, and also
the enclosing parentheses. Thus, history h = (ω0, aω0 , ω1) will be occasionally
written as h = ω0aω0ω1.
3.3.3 Conceptual foundations
The fundamental entities in our model are agents9: They are the ones with
the ultimate power of choosing an action and executing it. We assume a one-
to-one correspondence between histories and agents. Our agents form beliefs
and intentions about the future, and have the ability to choose an action in the
present.10 To refer to the collection of all agents, we use the notion of decision
maker.
We keep the general assumption that past actions have no effect on the well-
being generated by current and future actions of the agents, i.e., ‘bygones are
bygones.’ Our agents have full control over their current actions.11
Using the distinction between experienced utility and decision utility (Kah-
neman, Wakker and Sarin, 1997), we can delimit two senses of ‘expected utility
from taking action a.’ Let us disregard the immediate payoff for taking the
action, and consider only future payoffs. In one sense, the phrase could mean
‘experienced utility from expectation’, i.e., utility that is actually experienced
by the agent due to expecting a certain stream of future payoffs. Think of a
student that decides to study for an upcoming exam instead of watching her fa-
vorite TV show. She might, in fact, already enjoy the benefits of the decision to
study (she is already less anxious around the exam, maybe she relishes the idea
that she is doing ‘the right thing’, etc.). The other sense of ‘expected utility’
could be rendered as ‘the expected present value of various streams of payoffs’
8 Obviously, h′ 4 h & h 4 h′ ⇔ h = h′.
9 Others in the multiple-selves approach refer to them as ‘selves’.
10 We follow Cowen (1991), who identifies a self ‘with a set of preferences linked to certain
cognitive and volitional capacities.’
11 To appreciate that this choice is not so obvious, see Jehiel and Lilico (2010). Similarly,
Elster’s interpretation of the Ulysses story is an example of a model where control over current
action is essentially eliminated (Elster, 1979).
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that the agent’s current decision can lead to. In this sense, the agent does not
experience any actual change in utility by choosing one or other course of ac-
tion; she is merely able to calculate with these future payoffs. This distinction
between the two senses of expected utility will be used in Section 3.4, and in our
conceptual interpretations of naiveté and sophistication in subsequent sections.
3.3.4 Intentions, beliefs, strategy
We aim to give a full description for the two most prevalent decision maker
types (naifs and sophisticates) and the hybrid types that we introduce later.
For this purpose, we define a strategy as having three components: the current
action, the intended future actions, and the belief about what future agents
will in fact do. There is no special reason for assuming that the latter two
coincide for future actions, although with our definitions, they coincide for naifs
and sophisticates, but not for hybrid decision makers. To simplify notation, we
reduce this triadic framework to just intentions and beliefs, and assume that for
the current action, these two have to coincide: No agent can be wrong about
which action she takes, and each agent takes the action that she intends to at
that moment.
The basic building blocks of our model are all functions from the set of
histories that succeed the agent to the set of available actions at those histories.
Definition 14. The intentions of an agent at history h¯ assign an intended
action to each history that succeeds the present:
ih¯ : h ∈ H<h¯ 7→ Aω(h).
Definition 15. The beliefs of an agent at history h¯ assign an action to each
history that succeeds the present:
bh¯ : h ∈ H<h¯ 7→ Aω(h).
Note that intentions and beliefs are defined at all succeeding histories, even at
those that the agent does not intend to reach or believes will not be reached.
We now proceed to define strategies as the pair of intentions and beliefs for
an agent.
Definition 16. A strategy of an agent at history h¯ is a pair of intentions and
beliefs for that agent, with the added property that the belief and intention for
the current action coincide:
sh¯ =
(
ih¯, bh¯
)
,with ih¯
(
h¯
)
= bh¯
(
h¯
)
.
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The set of all strategies for this agent is denoted by Sh¯.
For an agent at h¯, ih¯ (h) refers to the intention, while bh¯ (h) refers to the belief
component of the strategy sh¯ about the future agent at h. For example, bh¯ (h) =
a should be read as: ‘The agent at h¯ who holds strategy sh¯ believes the agent
at h will choose action a.’
We emphasize that our definition of a strategy in terms of an intention-
belief pair is not standard. In fact, the most common practice is to conflate the
two concepts. On the other hand, in epistemic game theory, beliefs are strictly
seperated from actions. It might be convenient for the reader to think of the
term ‘strategy’ simply as an abbreviation for ‘intention-belief pair.’
We can now define two properties of strategies, stationarity and coherence,
as well as a relation over the set of strategies, consistency.
Definition 17. The intentions (or beliefs) of an agent at h¯ are stationary when-
ever the intended (believed) actions depend only on the end-state. Thus, ih¯ or
bh¯ is called stationary if, for all h, h′ ∈ H<h¯ with ω(h) = ω (h′), we have
ih¯ (h) = ih¯ (h′) or respectively, bh¯ (h) = bh¯ (h′). A strategy sh¯ is stationary if
both its constituent intentions ih¯ and beliefs bh¯ are stationary.
For example, if each day of the week can be modeled as a single state, the
strategy of an agent who intends and believes eating in a restaurant every second
Saturday, but staying home on every other one is not stationary.
Definition 18. An agent at h¯ is said to hold a coherent strategy, if her intention
and beliefs about future actions coincide for all future histories. Formally, a
strategy sh¯ = (ih¯, bh¯) of an agent at h¯ is coherent if ih¯(h) = bh¯(h) for all
h ∈ H<h¯.
For example, a strategy of an agent who intends to stop drinking, but believes
she will be unable to do so is not coherent.
Definition 19. The strategies of two agents at h and h′ are said to be consistent
if they assign the same intentions and beliefs to each history that succeeds
both agents, i.e., sh and sh
′
are consistent, if sh (h′′) = sh
′
(h′′) for all h′′ ∈
H<h ∩H<h′ .12
For example, a strategy formulated yesterday which intended eating apples to-
day and a strategy formulated today which intends eating cookies instead are
not consistent.
12 So, if two strategies are defined at histories that neither succeed nor preceed each other,
then they are consistent, as there are no histories that succeed both.
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While coherence concerns the relationship between the intentions and beliefs
of the same strategy, i.e., belonging to one agent, consistency compares strategies
of two distinct agents. In other words, coherence is an intrinsic property, whereas
consistency is an extrinsic (relational) property of a strategy.
A natural question is whether the consistency of strategies is transitive,
i.e., whether the consistency of sh and sh
′
and the consistency of sh
′
and sh
′′
imply that sh and sh
′′
are also consistent. If h 4 h′ 4 h′′, then this is indeed
the case. However, without this constraint, consistency is not transitive in
general – it is not even transitive within the set of stationary strategies. To see
this, take the decision problem in Figure 3.1.13 We construct three stationary
strategies shρ , shσ , and shτ such that shρ , shσ are consistent, as well as shσ , shτ ,
but shρ , shτ are not consistent. Fix hρ = (ρ), hσ = (ρ,A, σ) and hτ = (ρ,B, τ).
Also, let shρ (hρ) = (A,A), shρ(h) = (C,C) if ω(h) = σ, and shρ (h) = (E,E)
if ω(h) = τ . Intuitively, shρ means: ‘I choose A, believe and intend C in state
ρ, and believe and intend E in state τ .’ Define two other strategies through
shσ (h) = (C,C) for all h < hσ (‘do C in σ’), and shτ (h) = (F, F ) for all h < hτ
(‘do F in τ ’). All of these strategies are stationary. Clearly, shρ and shσ are
consistent, since they both require the decision maker to choose C in state σ,
and after history hσ no state state other than σ is reachable. Next, shσ and
shτ are consistent, since histories hσ and hτ neither succeed, nor precede each
other. But shρ and shτ are not consistent, as they assign different actions to
the state τ . This shows that consistency of strategies is not transitive on the
set of stationary strategies.
3.3.5 Truncation
The following definitions of ‘truncation’, albeit technical in nature, are neces-
sary for the definition of a stationary frame. Truncation formalizes the idea of
‘bygones are bygones,’ and chips away an initial segment of the history.
Definition 20. Take any history h = (ω0, aω0 , . . . , ωt(h)). The truncation op-
13 We use figures like this one to represent decision problems. States are denoted by Greek
characters; in this decision problem, we have states ρ, σ, τ , with ρ indicating the initial state.
For actions, we use Roman capitals – in this case, we have action A,B (available in state ρ), C
(the only action available in σ), and E,F (in τ). Whenever – unlike in this example – payoffs
are important, the payoff associated with an action is written in the form A|3, meaning that
choosing action A generates a payoff of 3. Our examples involve only deterministic transition
probabilities, and the transitions associated with each state are represented by arrows. For
example, for the decision problem in Figure 3.1 choosing action E in state τ implies that the
next state will be τ with probability 1.
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Figure 3.1: Stationary strategies with intransitive consistency.
erator ak, defined for any k ≤ t(h), removes the first k pairs of this sequence,
so ak h = (ωk, aωk , . . . , ωt(h)). For a set of histories H ′ ⊆ H, we refer to the set
of k-truncated histories by akH ′.
A truncated strategy applies this idea to strategies: It is defined for an agent
who‘forgot’ (or disregards) all of her past; future histories obviously do not
include descriptions of forgotten segments of the past anymore. Thus, the trun-
cated strategy of an agent at h¯ will be defined on the set at(h¯)H<h¯.
Definition 21. For any strategy sh¯, the truncated strategy a sh¯ : h ∈at(h¯)
H<h¯ 7→ Aω(h) denotes the function for which a sh¯
(
at(h¯)h
)
= sh¯(h), for all
h ∈ H<h¯.
We note that while truncated histories are defined for truncations of arbitrary
length (ak), for strategies we only need truncations of length t(h¯) for a strategy
sh¯ of an agent at history h¯.
To see this definition at work, think of the decision to stop smoking on the
first day of the next month. Take an agent who resolves on July 24th: ‘I will
stop smoking from August 1st’ and then fails. On August 24th, she makes
another decision: ‘I will stop smoking from September 1st’. If we interpret
each statement as a strategy, it is easy to see that they are not consistent: For
instance, they prescribe different smoking behavior for August 28th – the first
strategy forbids it, while the second allows it. However, there is an intuitive
sense in which they are very similar. Indeed, they map them into the same
resolve that uses indexicals instead of precise dates: ‘I can smoke for one more
week, and then I will stop’.14 Truncating the present history highlights this
14 Actually, the difference between specifying a future consumption period by a calendar date
or through its temporal distance from the present has already been noticed by Strotz (1956).
This difference is experimentally explored by Read et al. (2005), which finds that subjects only
exhibit hyperbolic discounting when future periods are identified via their temporal distance.
44
similarity by getting rid of the past. In our example, the original strategies are
not identical or consistent; but their truncated versions are identical.
3.3.6 Frames
We now move from the agent level to the level of the decision maker. Since
there is no a priori reason for the agents to have consistent strategies, different
agents can form different intentions and entertain different beliefs about any
certain future agent. To have an ‘external’ overview of all agents, we introduce
the concept of a frame. In our terminology, a frame is an auxiliary tool for
representing the strategies of all possible agents, and not something that is
intentionally put together by the decision maker. Whereas each agent chooses a
strategy, the decision maker does not choose a frame. Instead, a frame contains
a full description of the intentions and beliefs in all contingencies, i.e., at all
histories.
Definition 22. A frame assigns a strategy to each agent. That is, a frame is a
function f : h ∈ H 7→ Sh.
Figure 3.2 shows an extremely simple decision problem, for which an example
of a frame is represented in Table 3.1. Each entry is a pair of A’s and B’s, an
intended action and a belief about an action. Each row corresponds to a strategy
for an agent at h¯, defining an intention and a belief for each history that succeeds
h¯. For example, the entry AB for row h¯ = ρAρ and column h = ρAρAρ should
be interpreted as: the agent at ρAρ intends to choose action A at history ρAρAρ,
while believing the agent at ρAρAρ will, in fact, choose action B. The whole
frame thus specifies the intentions and beliefs of all agents over all other (present
and future) agents. Our definition of a strategy ensures that on the diagonal of
the table, the intentions and the beliefs match.
ρ
A

B
EE
Figure 3.2: A basic decision problem.
We now proceed to introduce three properties of frames. Our definition
of stationarity makes use of the truncation operator defined above.
45
h ∈ H<h¯
ρ ρAρ ρBρ ρAρAρ ρAρBρ . . .
h¯
ρ BB AB AB AA BB . . .
ρAρ – BB – AB BA . . .
ρBρ – – AA – – . . .
ρAρAρ – – – BB – . . .
ρAρBρ – – – – AA . . .
. . . – – – – – . . .
Table 3.1: An example of a frame for the decision problem in Figure 3.2.
Definition 23. A frame f is said to be stationary, if only the end-state matters
when assigning strategies to histories, i.e., for any histories h and h′, if ω(h) =
ω (h′), then af(h) =af (h′).
Stationarity of a frame is different from the stationarity of the strategies in-
volved. For the decision problem in Figure 3.2, Table 3.2 offers a non-stationary
frame of stationary strategies. To check for this, what needs to be verified is
that each row represents a stationary strategy. As there is only one state for
this decision problem, this means that in each row, we should see the same
intention-belief pair, which is indeed the case. Thus, Table 3.2 shows a frame of
stationary strategies. The frame itself however is not stationary: By truncating
the strategies in the first and second row, we get a different strategy.
On the other hand, Table 3.3 shows a stationary frame of non-stationary
strategies. It is easy to see that it is a frame of non-stationary strategies,
as each row represents one strategy, which are not stationary – for instance,
sρ(ρ) = (B,B) 6= (A,A) = sρ(ρAρ). The frame itself is stationary, which can
be checked by comparing the rows. As there is only one state, we need to
compare the truncations of all strategies. It can be read from Table 3.3 that
by ‘forgetting the past’, we get the same strategy in each row, namely: The
agent picks action B right away, intends to choose action A, and believes she
will always do so in the future.
For a concrete example of a stationary frame of non-stationary strategies,
think of the decision maker who, waking up every day, decides to take just one
more shot of heroin, and intends (and believes) to quit the next day.
Next, we define a consistent frame. The intuitive idea is that a frame is
consistent if no deviation can be expected from previous intentions and beliefs.
Definition 24. A frame f is said to be consistent if the strategies f(h) and
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h ∈ H<h¯
ρ ρAρ ρBρ ρAρAρ ρAρBρ . . .
h¯
ρ AA AA AA AA AA AA
ρAρ – BB – BB BB BB
ρBρ – – AA – – AA
ρAρAρ – – – AA – AA
ρAρBρ – – – – BB BB
. . . – – – – – . . .
Table 3.2: Non-stationary frame of stationary strategies.
h ∈ H<h¯
ρ ρAρ ρBρ ρAρAρ ρAρBρ . . .
h¯
ρ BB AA AA AA AA AA
ρAρ – BB – AA AA AA
ρBρ – – BB – – AA
ρAρAρ – – – BB – AA
ρAρBρ – – – – BB AA
. . . – – – – – . . .
Table 3.3: Stationary frame of non-stationary strategies.
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f (h′) assigned to any two histories h and h′ are consistent.
Consistency is a very strong notion: A consistent decision maker – at whichever
history she is contemplating the present and the future – would never change her
mind about any intention-belief pair. An example would be a heroin user who
goes cold turkey immediately and definitely, never ever restarting her substance
use. If she relapses, she will not be consistent anymore: Her choice to quit
for good implies that at the time of quitting her intentions and beliefs for the
future history at which she relapses do not match her intentions and beliefs at
the point of relapse for the (then-)current history.
According to this definition, if f is a consistent frame, then we get f(h) (h′′) =
f (h′) (h′′) whenever h′′ ∈ H<h∩H<h′ , and either h′ ∈ H<h, or h ∈ H<h′ . Note
that, since for a consistent frame, f(h)(h) = f(h′)(h) for all h′ and h ∈ H<h′ ;
and our requirement for strategies that ih(h) = bh(h), a consistent frame is
necessarily made up by coherent strategies. This implies that a choice of an ac-
tion for all histories uniquely determines a consistent frame. Similarly, a choice
of an action for all states uniquely determines a consistent frame of stationary
strategies.
Theorem 5. A consistent, stationary frame consists of stationary strategies.
Proof. Take any histories h, h′ and h′′ for which ω(h′) = ω(h′′). We have to
show that f(h) (h′) = f(h) (h′′). For this, see that:
f(h) (h′) =f (h′) (h′) =af (h′) (at(h′)h′) =
= af (h′′) (at(h′′)h′′) = f (h′′) (h′′) = f(h) (h′′) .
For the respective equations, we use, in order, consistency, definition of trunca-
tion, stationarity of the frame, definition of truncation, and consistency again.
Theorem 6. A consistent frame of stationary strategies is a stationary frame.
Proof. Take histories h, h′, h′′, h′′′ with ω(h) = ω (h′). We have to show that
(af(h)) (at(h)h′′) = (af(h′)) (at(h′)h′′′)
if at(h)h′′ =at(h′)h′′′. Note that such h′′ and h′′′ exist, because the end-state in
h and h′ is identical. Using the fact that ω(h′′) = ω(at(h)h′′) = ω(at(h′)h′′′) =
ω(h′′′), we get:
(af(h)) (at(h)h′′) =f(h)(h′′) = f(h0)(h′′) = f(h0)(h′′′) =
=f(h′)(h′′′) = (af(h′)) (at(h′)h′′′).
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We use, in turn, the definitions of truncation, consistency, stationarity of the
strategies, consistency, and finally, truncation again. (We make use of the root
strategy h0 as a history which is surely succeeded by both h′′ and h′′′.)
ρ
A
  
B

σ
C
``
D
OO
Figure 3.3: Stationary frame of stationary strategies is not necessarily consistent.
Based on the two theorems above, one might expect that a stationary frame of
stationary strategies would be consistent. However, this is not necessarily so, as
can be seen from the following example. Consider the Markov decision problem
in Figure 3.3. For all h < h¯, let:
sh¯1 (h) =
{
(A,A) if ω(h) = ρ,
(C,C) if ω(h) = σ,
and sh¯2 (h) =
{
(B,B) if ω(h) = ρ,
(D,D) if ω(h) = σ.
Now, let us define a frame f , so that:
f(h) =
{
sh¯1 if ω(h¯) = ρ;
sh¯2 if ω(h¯) = σ.
This is obviously a frame of stationary strategies. It also is a stationary frame,
since only the end-state matters in assigning a strategy to a history, according
to the definition. However, it is not a consistent frame, since:
f(ρ)(ρAσ) = sρ1(ρAσ) = (A,A) 6= (B,B) = sρAσ2 (ρAσ) = f(ρAσ)(ρAσ).
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3.3.7 Induced strategy
We assume that, since each agent has control over her current action (and only
that), the actual actions executed by each agent h can be obtained from frame
f by looking at f(h)(h), in other words, from the diagonal of the frame.
Definition 25. The induced strategy of a frame f specifies the actual actions
chosen by each agent:
Λ(f) : h ∈ H 7→ Aω(h), given by Λ(f)(h) = f(h)(h).
The induced strategy of the frame represented in Table 3.1 is Λ(f)(ρ) = (BB),
Λ(f)(ρAρ) = (BB), Λ(f)(ρBρ) = (AA) etc.
It is handy to define for some frame f , and an agent at h¯, the induced
strategy for the (present and) future:
Λ<h¯(f) : h ∈ H<h¯ 7→ Aω(h), given by Λ<h¯(f)(h) = f(h)(h);
Λh¯(f) : h ∈ H<h¯ \ {h¯} 7→ Aω(h), given by Λh¯(f)(h) = f(h)(h).
3.3.8 Remarks
The considerations of this section highlight the interdependencies between vari-
ous concepts. Coherence reflects a match between beliefs and intentions, desires
and reality, and is a necessary condition for consistency. Consistency of a frame
ensures that agents are not ‘let down’ by future agents, and thus that expec-
tations match outcomes: A consistent decision maker should not experience ex
post regret. In various contexts, stationarity of strategies and stationarity of a
frame can also be desirable properties; primarily, stationary (Markovian) strate-
gies embody the simplest form of behavior consistent with rationality (Maskin
and Tirole, 2001). Finally, a stationary frame describes a decision maker who
is stable over time.
The language developed here can be helpful for discussing problems of dy-
namic inconsistency formulated in the multiple-agent framework, and is in-
dependent of the specific assumptions on utility functions of the next sec-
tion. In particular, we believe that our distinction between beliefs/intentions,
agents/decision makers, strategies/frames, as well as our method of representing
frames through tables should prove useful. To see the latter in use, we refer the
reader to the Appendix. Moreover, the distinction between stationary strategies
and stationary frames is, as far as we are aware, entirely new in the literature.
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3.4 Utility and discounting
The term payoff, introduced in Definition 12, refers to the immediate gains or
losses resulting from an action. Formally, a payoff gained in period t is denoted
by ut, and a stream of payoffs starting at period t by ut→ = (ut, ut+1, . . . ). We
say that a stream of payoffs ut→ starting at period t coincides with a stream of
payoffs u′t′→ starting at period t
′ if ut = u′t′ and ut+1 = u
′
t′+1, and so on.
Payoffs are fully determined by the decision problem, the state and the
action taken. However, time preference implies that identical payoffs might be
regarded differently by various agents. Throughout the chapter, we make two
assumptions on the utility functions Uh(u) that integrate a stream of future
payoffs into a single number. The first assumption states that Uh is continuous
at infinity for every h, and is adapted from Fudenberg and Levine (1983).
Assumption 1. Uh is continuous at infinity for every h, i.e., for any , there
is a horizon T (h) – possibly depending on h – such that the total variation of
utility after t(h) + T (h) is less than .
Another crucial assumption that we adoptis that agents are identical in the
way they evaluate streams of payoffs, i.e., we assume stationary preferences
(Peleg and Yaari, 1973).
Assumption 2. For any two agents at histories h and h′, and coinciding
streams of payoffs ut(h)→, u′t(h′)→, the utilities of the two agents are equal, i.e.,
Uh(ut(h)→) = Uh
′
(u′t(h′)→) .
If the utility functions satisfy First and Second Order Separability15 (Lapied
and Renault, 2012), then the discount factor for a future payoff ut can only
depend on the time distance t(h) − t. In our examples in Section 3.7 and the
Appendix, we use a discounted utility function of a particular form, namely,
quasi-hyperbolic discounting:
Uh(ut(h)→) = ut(h) + β
∞∑
t=t(h)+1
δt−t(h) ut,
with 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ δ < 1.
15 First Order Separability means that preferences over a set of outcomes are such that
there is no interaction between the outcomes of various periods. Second Order Separability
allows the isolation of effects of temporal distance.
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In Section 3.3.3, we distinguished between two senses of the term ‘expected
utility’: utility actually experienced from expecting a future payoff stream, and
‘expected utility’ as simply a means of calculating with various future courses
of action. This distinction is formally nailed down and further refined by the
following definitions.16
Definition 26. The expected utility based on intentions of playing strategy sh
for an agent at h is:
Uhi
(
sh
)
= E
[
ih
] (
Uh
)
.
The next definition focuses on how much utility an agent can reasonably expect
ex ante, whenever making utility calculations:
Definition 27. The expected utility based on beliefs of playing strategy sh for
an agent at h is:
Uhb
(
sh
)
= E
[
bh
] (
Uh
)
.
Our final definition disregards mere expectations, and captures the utility gained
by an agent by considering which actions future agents will have actually im-
plemented under various eventualities. Using the notion of an induced strategy,
we can define induced utility :
Definition 28. Given a frame f , the (ex post) induced utility of the root agent
at h0 is:
Ur (f) = E
[
Λ<h0(f)
] (
Uh0
)
.
We will use the notion of induced utility for welfare comparisons between various
frames, especially in the Appendix, when contrasting naive and sophisticated
decision makers in particular decision problems. Implicitly, this means picking
the perspective of the root agent for welfare comparisons of frames. We do so in
order to avoid any normative assumptions on the agent’s long-run preferences.17
Notice that traditionally, the above three meanings of the term ‘expected
utility’ coincide. The reason is that where dynamic inconsistency does not
pose a problem, intentions and beliefs on future actions coincide; moreover, the
decision maker always executes the intentions of past agents.
16 Sáez-Martí and Weibull (2005) connect discounting with altruism towards future selves.
They note that “[c]urrent welfare or ‘total utility’, so defined, does not stem only from current
instantaneous utility but also from (the anticipation of) the stream of future instantaneous
utilities”. Our distinction highlights exactly this: Is it the actual future stream, or the antici-
pation of that stream that is really important?
17 One alternative would be using a Pareto criterion, as for instance, in Herings and Rohde
(2006).
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3.5 Naiveté
At first sight, it is not even clear whether naiveté is a property of the decision
maker or that of an agent. In this and the following section, we define naiveté
and sophistication primarily for agents, assuming that the decision maker is al-
ways naive (or sophisticated). We return to the introductory example presented
in Section 3.1 after analyzing and contrasting these base cases.
Naiveté has been characterized in several ways in the literature; a naif is
aware or unaware of different things, depending on the particular interpretation.
A naif is said to:
• choose at each stage an option which seems currently the best (Strotz,
1956; Hammond, 1976);
• fail to realize that future selves will have different preferences (O’Donoghue
and Rabin, 2001; Sarafidis, 2004; DellaVigna and Malmendier, 2006; Her-
ings and Rohde, 2006; Heidhues and Kőszegi, 2009);
• believe that – though her preferences might change – she has perfect self-
control about the future, allowing her to commit to a strategy (O’Donoghue
and Rabin, 1999a; Gruber and Kőszegi, 2001; Ali, 2011).
It is easy to see that these are genuinely alternative interpretations of naiveté.
A common aspect is that something is amiss with the beliefs held by the agent.
We argue that these troubles arise from the way the naif determines her beliefs.
In particular, for a naive agent, her current preferences determine her intentions,
which in turn determine her beliefs on future actions. Thus, it does not matter
whether the agent holds an explicit belief on the lack of change in her preferences,
or whether she believes she will simply fail to act on such changes, or that she
has strong beliefs in her own will- or pre-commitment power. The essential
features of naiveté are the directions of determination seen in Figure 3.4. All
the above cases are described by this model.
Preferences → intentions → beliefs → strategy.
Figure 3.4: The forming of intentions and beliefs by a naif.
Definition 29. A strategy s˜h of an agent at h is naively optimal, if it maximizes
expected utility based on intentions:
s˜h ∈ arg max
s∈Sh
Uhi (s) ,
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and it is coherent:
b˜h (h′) = i˜h (h′) , for all h′ ∈ H<h.
A frame f˜ is naively optimal if the strategy f˜(h) is naively optimal at each
history h.
Working in a continuous-time discounted utility framework, Strotz (1956)
shows that only when the discount function is exponential does the decision
maker possess a consistent naively optimal frame for all decision problems. For
any non-exponential discount functions there are decision problems for which
there is no consistent naively optimal frame. However, the existence of a sta-
tionary naively optimal frame is guaranteed under our assumptions.
Theorem 7. For any decision problem, there exists a stationary naively optimal
frame.
Proof. For each h, the set arg maxs∈Sh Uhi (s) is nonempty, because the set Sh is
nonempty and closed for pointwise limits, and Uhi is continuous (Assumption 1).
Therefore, the set of strategies where the maximum is, in fact, reached is
nonempty. But note that the optimality condition in the definition of naively
optimal strategies only determines the intention-component of strategies, thus,
beliefs can be constructed freely. This means that we can ensure coherence,
i.e., we can choose a naively optimal strategy at each h.
Now, to guarantee that the generated frame is stationary, we need to choose
the same truncated strategy for each set of histories where the end-state is
identical. This is always possible, since whenever the final state is identical for
two histories, both the truncated strategy set and the utility function defined
at those histories are identical (Assumption 2), and therefore so are the set of
truncated optimal strategies.
Is the stationary naively optimal frame unique? For a naive decision maker, this
depends on whether for each history, there is a unique naively optimal strategy;
this latter problem can be reduced to whether for each state that can be reached,
there is a unique naively optimal strategy (defined at any history where the
current state is that state). For generic decision problems, it seems likely that
this is indeed the case, though the scope of the proof is beyond this work. Now,
if there is a unique naively optimal strategy for each history, then there is only
one naively optimal frame – and it is stationary, too. In degenerate cases, where
multiple naively optimal strategies can be assigned to at least one state, we get
stationary naively optimal frames, along with non-stationary ones. It should
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also be noted that – because of the possibility of inconsistency – multiplicity
of naively optimal frames also leads to a multiplicity of induced utilities. In
particular, the agents facing multiple naively optimal strategies believe it does
not matter which strategy they choose, as they expect they will stick to those
strategies – but they can be wrong.
As an example, consider the decision problem on Figure 3.5. Discounting
is quasi-hyperbolic with β = δ = 0.5. Since naively optimal strategies are
coherent, we will only consider such strategies. There are only two histories,
h0 = (ρ) and h1 = (ρ,A, σ), where the action choice is not trivial, so the naive
root agent at h0 = (ρ) has to consider only four coherent strategies, which we
will denote, by sh0AC , s
h0
AD, s
h0
BC and s
h0
BD. They are defined as:
1. sh0AC(h0) = (A,A) and s
h0
AC(h1) = (C,C);
2. sh0AD(h0) = (A,A) and s
h0
AD(h1) = (D,D);
3. sh0BC(h0) = (B,B) and s
h0
BC(h1) = (C,C);
4. sh0BD(h0) = (B,B) and s
h0
BD(h1) = (D,D).
It can be easily seen that from the perspective of the root agent, Uh0i (s
h0
AC) =
Uh0i (s
h0
BC) = U
h0
i (s
h0
BD) = 0 > − 14 = Uh0i (sh0AD). Thus, the naive root agent is
indifferent between choosing action A first, and C afterwards, or simply B.
ρ
A | 0
~~
B | 0
  
σ
C | 0
~~
D | 2
  
τ2
E2 | 0
FF
τ0
E0 | 0
FF τ1
E1 | − 3
FF
β = 0.5, δ = 0.5
Figure 3.5: Multiplicity of induced utility for naively optimal frames.
Now we focus on the agent at h1. She has two strategies available, which we
will denote by sh1C and s
h1
D . They are defined as:
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1. sh1C (h1) = C;
2. sh1D (h1) = D.
For the agent at h1, Uh1i (s
h1
D ) = 0.5 > 0 = U
h1
i (s
h1
C ). Therefore, the naive agent
at h1 prefers to choose action D. Now, consider the two naively optimal frames
fBCD and fACD, defined as:
• fBCD(h0) = sh0BC and fBCD(h1) = sh1D ;
• fACD(h0) = sh0AC and fACD(h1) = sh1D ;
From the previous calculations, we see that both fBCD and fACD are naively
optimal frames. However, the induced utilities are not equal: Ur(fBCD) = 0
and Ur(fACD) = − 14 . The underlying reason is as follows: When an agent
picks a naively optimal strategy in h0, she expects to earn 0 by either choosing
strategy sh0BC or s
h0
AC . But if she chooses s
h0
AC , after getting to history h1 – on
account of being present-biased – she will not stick to her previous strategy,
which would prescribe her choosing action C; instead, she chooses D, which
leads to a decrease in her induced utility.
To sum up our discussion of naiveté: If we interpret an optimal frame as
predictive for a naive decision maker’s behavior, then in the generic case, we
get a unique prediction of actions, intentions and belief for each history; and we
expect stationary behavior in realization, and a single prediction for the induced
utility. On the other hand, in degenerate cases we can get multiple predictions
of actions, intentions and beliefs for some agents; we do not necessarily expect
stationary behavior; and we do not necessarily get a unique expectation for
induced utility.
3.6 Sophistication
Similarly to naiveté, there are several definitions of sophistication:
• optimality under a credibility constraint: following a feasible optimal
strategy, or a plan that she will actually follow (Strotz, 1956; Yaari, 1978);
• game-theoretic notion: an intra-personal subgame-perfect equilibrium,
sometimes also referred to as ‘Strotz-Pollak equilibrium’ (Peleg and Yaari,
1973; Kocherlakota, 1996; Vieille and Weibull, 2009);
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• rational expectations: perfectly anticipating future behavior (O’Donoghue
and Rabin, 2001; Gilpatric, 2008);
• self-awareness: being aware of future changes in discount rates and pref-
erences (Hammond, 1976; Heidhues and Kőszegi, 2009; Ali, 2011).
These definitions do not match precisely. For instance, the notion of sophisti-
cation as an intra-personal equilibrium does not guarantee the satisfaction of
rational expectations in case when multiple such equilibria exist. It is possible
that sophisticated agents at h and h′ with h ≺ h′ each choose a strategy sh,
sh
′
supported by an intra-personal equilibrium, but the action bh(h′) 6= bh′(h′);
that is, sophistication in itself is no guarantee for consistency.18 Just like for
naiveté, we would like to offer a new interpretation of sophistication. We regard
sophistication as primarily a characteristic of agents. In our framework, the
defining feature of sophisticated agents is that they first consider their beliefs
about the future, and only then do they form intentions. For now, our sophis-
ticated agents assume that all future agents will be sophisticated, too – we will
relax this assumption for hybrid agents in Section 3.7.
A sophisticatedly optimal strategy is made up, first, by beliefs about future
agents’ choices: She believes each future agent will pick a best response to
future agent’s choices. So we implicitly have to consider second-order beliefs,
the beliefs of each agent about the beliefs of agents about the future. However,
we assume that in a sophisticated strategy, the second-order beliefs coincide
with first-order beliefs.19 Thus, the current agent believes that future agents
will believe what she currently believes.
Beliefs and preferences → intentions → action → strategy.
Figure 3.6: The forming of intentions and beliefs by a sophisticated.
The second component of a sophisticatedly optimal strategy concerns the
intentions, which are set to match the beliefs; as the agent knows she has no
control over her future selves, she can just as well intend future actions that
future selves are choosing anyway.
Finally, the current action is chosen to be a best response to future actions.
18 See also case 1.b.ii in Section 3.A.2.
19 O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001) makes the assumption on second-order beliefs explicit for
partially naive agents.
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Definition 30. A strategy sˆh of an agent at h is sophisticatedly optimal, if:
bˆh (h′) ∈ arg max
a∈Aω(h′)
Uh
′
b
(
sˆh [a : h′]
)
, for all h′ ∈ H<h,
and it is coherent:
iˆh (h′) = bˆh (h′) , for all h′ ∈ H<h,
where sˆh [a : h′] denotes the strategy where the action taken at h′ is replaced
with action a in strategy sˆh.20
A frame fˆ is sophisticatedly optimal if the strategy fˆ (h) is sophisticatedly
optimal at each history h.
One remark about the intention component of a sophisticatedly optimal strategy
is in order. It could be argued that instead of intending to give a best response
to future beliefs at h′ based on the preferences at h′, the agent at h should intend
something else at h′; namely, to give a best response to the choices of future
agents based on the preferences at h, not the ones at h′. However, we want to
guarantee the coherence of sophisticatedly optimal strategies to ensure that a
consistent sophisticated strategy always exists. Moreover, it is psychologically
plausible that the sophisticated agent wants to maintain this coherence – indeed,
this is why she is reasoning about future agents after all, realizing that the
preferences of future agents might be different from her current ones. We will
see in Section 3.7 that for hybrid agents intentions and beliefs might not match.
Theorem 8. For any decision problem, there exists a consistent sophisticatedly
optimal frame.
Proof. Fix an enumeration of all histories, that is, a bijection ρ : N → H.
Although it is not necessary for the proof, we can assume that the root history
is taken first, then all histories at stage 1 are enumerated, then all histories at
stage 2, and so on. Let A = ×h∈HAω(h), where the product is taken in the
order according to ρ. So, an element a =
(
ah
)
h∈H of A prescribes, for every
history h ∈ H, an action ah for the agent at h. Take an arbitrary aˆ ∈ A .
Now, for every n ∈ N, we construct an an ∈ A as follows. For every history
h beyond stage n, that is, with t(h) > n, let ahn = aˆh. Then, we proceed by
20 When calculating Uh
′
b
(
sh
)
, only the payoffs generated by sh for the histories succeeding
h′ should be taken into account; i.e., we consider the expected utility induced by sh for the
subtree starting at h′.
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backwards induction. For every history h at stage n, that is t(h) = n, let ahn be
an action for the agent at h that maximizes her utility if all agents that succeed
her play the action according to an (or equivalently, according to aˆ). In general
for k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, if we have defined ahn for all histories h with t(h) > k, then
for every history h with t(h) = k, we choose ahn to be an action for the agent
at h that maximizes her utility if all agents that succeed her play the action
according to an.
So, we obtain a sequence (an)n∈N in the space A . Note that A with the
product topology is compact, and because H is countable, it is metrizable
too. Consequently, it is sequentially compact, which implies that the sequence
(an)n∈N has a subsequence (ank)k∈N which converges to some aˆ∈A . This means
that, for every m ∈ N, there exists an Km ∈ N such that, for every k ≥ Km,
the actions ahnk and aˆ
h coincide for all histories h with t(h) ≤ m.
Let shn be the strategy of the agent at history h which intends to play the
action ah
′
n at all histories h′  h and believes that these actions will be chosen
– that is, a coherent strategy. Similarly, we define the strategy sˆh with respect
to aˆ. Now consider the frame fˆ that assigns strategy sˆh to the agent at h, for
every history h.
First, we show that fˆ is consistent. Take any h, h′, the corresponding strate-
gies sˆh and sˆh
′
and some history h′′ with h′′ < h and h′′ < h′. Then
sˆh (h′′) =
(
aˆh
′′
, aˆh
′′)
= sˆh
′
(h′′) .
Thus, fˆ is a consistent frame.
We now prove that fˆ is sophisticatedly optimal. For this purpose, consider
an arbitrary agent, say at history h, and an agent at a history h′  h. By
construction, for every n ≥ t (h′), the action ah′n maximizes the utility of the
agent at h′ if all agents that succeed her play the action according to an. Thus,
bhn (h
′) = ah
′
n ∈ arg max
a∈Aω(h′)
Uh
′
b
(
shn [a : h
′]
)
and as we have seen, shn is coherent:
ihn (h
′) = bhn (h
′) .
By taking the limit along the subsequence (nk)k∈N and using continuity, we
obtain:
bˆh (h′) = aˆh
′ ∈ arg max
a∈Aω(h′)
Uh
′
b
(
sˆh [a : h′]
)
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and
iˆh (h′) = bˆh (h′) .
Thus, fˆ is a consistent sophisticatedly optimal frame indeed.
Again, we might ask whether there is a unique consistent sophisticatedly opti-
mal frame. In contrast with naively optimal frames, this is not the case even for
generic decision problems. In the problem of underinvestment (Section 3.A.2,
case 1.b.ii) we get multiple sophisticatedly optimal strategies for each history.
Moreover, the same example shows that there might be no stationary sophisti-
catedly optimal frame when we only allow for pure actions. Also, the induced
utilities of optimal frames can differ. Thus, only in some cases do we get a
unique sophisticatedly optimal frame, and with it, unique predictions for a so-
phisticated decision maker’s actions, intention, beliefs and induced utility.21 For
these cases Theorem 8 implies that the frame will be consistent, too.
Overall, our understanding of sophistication in terms of sophisticated agents
first working through their beliefs, then deriving their intentions is closest to the
self-awareness interpretation. However, sophisticated optimality can indeed be
regarded as a notion of intra-personal subgame-perfection.22 As there might be
several such equilibria, agents at various histories might pick actions correspond-
ing to different equilibria; thus, there is no a priori guarantee for the satisfaction
of rational expectations, or that the subgame-perfect equilibrium chosen by the
root agent will actually be followed through. Thus, the equilibrium aspect of
sophisticated optimality on the strategy level does not imply consistency or sta-
tionarity for the sophisticated frame. However, the above theorem shows that
a consistent sophisticatedly optimal frame exists.
The next natural question concerns the relative advantages of sophistication
against naiveté.23 The most commonly analyzed examples in the literature of
dynamic inconsistency are stories of procrastination, impulsiveness, underinvest-
ment, addiction and binging behavior. We can classify these problems into two
groups: In the first group, there are decisions that concern the execution of a sin-
gle task, like finishing an academic paper or ending a marriage in a sudden burst
21 On the non-uniqueness of sophisticatedly optimal strategies, see Phelps and Pollak (1968);
Peleg and Yaari (1973); Blackorby et al. (1973). More recently, Vieille and Weibull (2009) show
that non-uniqueness is a generic property for hyperbolic discounting, and also give sufficient
conditions for uniqueness. For a refinement concept, see Kocherlakota (1996).
22 This also highlights why in Definition 16 we defined a strategy as an intention-belief pair
for all future histories, since – as in subgame-perfection – the actions of agents at histories off
the optimal path are relevant.
23 For a the detailed comparison and the calculations, we refer the reader to the Appendix.
Here we summarize the main findings of the analysis contained therein.
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of anger (procrastination and impulsiveness). In the other conceptual box, we
put problems concerning the repeated execution of a task, like not saving enough
for retirement, and drug addiction (underinvestment and binging). It turns out
that we can model these as Markov decision problems with only two states
(Figures 3.9 and 3.10), if we assume a decision maker who uses quasi-hyperbolic
discounting, arguably the simplest form of non-exponential discounting.
In the Appendix, we derive conditions for the payoffs, the discount factor,
and the present-biasedness parameter to classify these problems. We find that
in some decision problems involving either a single or a repeated task, namely,
impulsivity and binging problems, sophisticates commit the same mistake as
naifs, and sophistication brings no benefits. This should not come as a surprise,
as we cannot expect a notion of intra-personal subgame-perfect equilibrium to
solve all welfare problems of decision makers. In some single and also in some
repeated decision problems, however, sophistication brings clear benefits, and
from the perspective of the root agent, the induced utility of a sophisticatedly
optimal frame can be strictly higher than that of a naively optimal one. Again,
this is something to be expected – sophistication would hardly deserve the at-
tention it receives if it never brought any improvement over naiveté.
Coincidentally, among our examples, decision problems in which sophisti-
cation is beneficial are also the ones where there exists no sophisticated frame
of stationary strategies. Thus, these cases serve as examples to the observa-
tion that a sophisticated agent might be forced to use a non-stationary optimal
strategy when mixed actions are disallowed. For the underinvestment prob-
lem, we also analyze the possibility of using mixed actions, and calculate the
mixing probability that leads to a consistent sophisticated frame in stationary
strategies.
The final section of the Appendix presents the indulgence problem, discov-
ered by O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a). This is the simplest known decision
problem where naiveté outperforms sophistication from the perspective of the
root agent. Thus, the advantages of sophistication are shown not be equivocal
across all decision problems, and changing to sophistication might harm the
decision maker. We make use of this finding of O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a)
to construct our final example of hybrid decision making in the next section.
3.7 Hybrid decision makers
This section introduces a new type of decision maker. So far, we have only con-
sidered decision makers who are either always naive, or always sophisticated.
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However, such purity is quite rare, perhaps even non-existent in the real world.
Even the most naive individual realizes after a while that her intentions might
not be credible; and even the most consistently sophisticated individual can slip
into wishful thinking about her future actions. Therefore, we try to model this
duality of an individual via hybrid types. In contrast to the partially naifs of
O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001) who (in the context of quasi-hyperbolic discount-
ing) are aware of future present-biasedness, but underestimate its magnitude,
our hybrid decision maker flip-flops between being sophisticated and naive, like
Ulysses before and after hearing the sirens sing.
We now extend our model to capture hybrid types. Our type space includes
naifs and sophisticates.
Definition 31. A Markov decision problem with agent types is made up of:
• the set of time periods {0, 1, 2, . . . };
• Θ ⊆ Ω ×X, where Ω is a finite state space and X = {N,S} is the finite
type space24; we denote a state-type pair by θ; the initial state-type pair is
θ¯ ∈ Θ; the state component is denoted by ω(θ); while the type component
is denoted by x(θ);
• a finite and nonempty set of pure actions Aω that the decision maker can
choose from in ω;
• a payoff function uω : Aω → R that assigns a payoff to every action in
state ω;
• transition probabilities mθ : Aω(θ) → ∆(Θ), with mθ
(
θ′|aω(θ)
)
denoting
the probability to transit from the state-type pair θ to the state-type pair
θ′ when action aω(θ) is chosen.
This definition keeps the Markovian properties of the original model, and adds
a specification of naiveté or sophistication to each state. Also, Θ is common
knowledge among the agents.
Our model is quite general. Before moving on to illustrate its use in detail
for our motivating example from Section 3.1, we list a few kinds of decision
problems for which it could be used:
• exogeneous types: All state-type combinations are allowed (Θ = Ω×X).
Moreover, in each new state, the agent is naive (or sophisticated) with the
24 N stands for naive, and S for sophisticated.
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same probability: mθ((ω′, x)|aω(θ)) = mθ((ω′′, x)|a′ω(θ)) for all θ, ω, ω′, x.
Such a model assumes no correlation between state and type.
• fixed type for each state: Here, we have (ω, x), (ω, x′) ∈ Θ⇒ x = x′. This
is the opposite of the previous scenario, as there is perfect correlation
between state and type. It can be easily seen that any Markov decision
problem with agent types can be reformulated in this manner by expanding
the state space; however, it can make the model less illuminating, possibly
hiding structural similarities between the problems faced by a naive and
a sophisticated agent.
• deterministic type determination: This requires that for all θ, aω(θ), there
is some x ∈ X, such that ∑ω′ mθ((ω′, x)|aω(θ)) = 1. This means that
whatever the agent chooses, her type (but not necessarily her state) in the
next period is fully determined.
• full control over type: For all θ, x ∈ X, there is some aω(θ) so that∑
ω′ mθ((ω
′, x)|aω(θ)) = 1. Each agent can always ensure her type to
be whatever she wants for the next period.
Of course, these are merely extreme cases, and many interesting situations lie
in the middle, having some, but imperfect correlation between state and type;
and giving some, but less than total control for agents over their future types.
Indeed, it could be argued that the drinking problem we present below should
involve stochastic rather than deterministic type determination. However, for
simplicity of analysis, we abstract from such complications.
To understand optimal strategies for hybrid agents, we first have to re-define
the notion of history:
Definition 32. A type-dependent history h has the form
h =
(
θ0, aω(θ0), . . . , θt−1, aω(θt−1), θt
)
, with:
• θi ∈ Θ, for i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , t}, and θ0 = θ¯;
• aω(θi) ∈ Aωi , for i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , t− 1};
• mθi
(
θi+1|aω(θi)
)
> 0, for i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , t− 1}.
Extending the previous notation, x(h) refers to the current type. We keep the
association between histories and agents – each history now corresponds to an
agent, and it also includes the agent’s type.
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Next, we define optimal type-dependent strategies for the Markov decision
problem with agent types. We make use of Definitions 29 and 30 for naively
and sophisticatedly optimal strategies. We first present the formal definition,
and then explain the intuitions below.
Definition 33. A type-dependent strategy s˘h for a Markov decision problem
with agent types is optimal at history h, if it satisfies the following conditions:
• for x(h) = N :
s˘h ∈ arg max
s∈Sh
Uhi (s) ,
and
b˘h (h′) = i˘h (h′) , for all h′ ∈ H<h.
• for x(h) = S:
b˘h (h′) ∈ [arg max
s∈Sh′
Uh
′
i (s)] (h
′) , for all h′ ∈ H<h with x (h′) = N ;
b˘h (h′) ∈ arg max
a∈Aω(h′)
Uh
′
b
(
s˘h
′
[a : h′]
)
, for all h′ ∈ H<h with x (h′) = S;
and
i˘h (h′) ∈ arg max
a∈Aω(h′)
Uh
′
b
(
s˘h
′
[a : h′]
)
, for all h′ ∈ H<h with x (h′) = N ;
i˘h (h′) = b˘h (h′) , for all h′ ∈ H<h with x (h′) = S.
A type-dependent frame f˘ is optimal, if f˘(h) is an optimal type-dependent
strategy for all h.
Although this definition is rather lengthy, it captures our basic intuitions for
the two types. A naive agent at h does not reason about future agents, as her
intentions determine her beliefs, and as a result, her whole optimal strategy in
the standard way. However, a sophisticated agent at h is able to reason about
future agents in the following manner: If a future agent at h′ is naive, then
the agent at h believes the agent at h′ will act in a naive way, maximizing her
expected utility based on intentions. If, on the other hand, a future agent at h′
is sophisticated, then the agent at h (correctly) believes that the agent at h′ will
act in a sophisticated way, being able to reason about future agents just as well as
h herself does. So a sophisticated agent at h intends to choose in a sophisticated
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manner at all nodes, giving a best response to the choices of future agents. This
implies that the intention and belief component of an optimal type-dependent
strategy match for all future histories where the agent is sophisticated, but they
might not match for future histories where the agent is naive. Coherence is
therefore not a necessary property of optimal type-dependent strategies.
Since naively optimal strategies are, in general, not made up of stationary
strategies, the belief-component of an optimal type-dependent frame can also be
non-stationary. Moreover, it is easy to see that such a frame is not consistent:
the intentions of sophisticated agents will not, in general, correspond to the
actions taken by naive agents. In both examples of hybrid decision making
we present below, we will see such inconsistencies.25 The lack of coherence,
stationarity and consistency represent the inner conflicts that arise within a
hybrid decision maker.
Theorem 9. For any decision problem, there exists a type-dependent optimal
frame.
Proof. First, start with determining the intentions and beliefs of naive agents,
i.e., those at histories where x(h) = N . For these, we can simply use the first
part of the proof of Theorem 7. So, we have s˘h = (˘ih, b˘h) defined for all h with
x(h) = N . Let f˘(h) = s˘h for all such h.
Moving now to histories at which the agent is sophisticated, our construction
is analogous to that of Theorem 8. Let A = ×h∈HAω(h), and take an arbitrary
a = (ah)h∈H ∈ A that assigns an action to each history.
Recall that a type-dependent optimal frame will not necessarily be coherent.
Therefore, both intentions and beliefs have to be constructed; we start with
beliefs. First, transform a into aˆ by fixing actions assigned to histories where
the agent is naive, i.e., where x(h) = N , so that they are actions corresponding
to those agents acting in a naive way:
aˆh = i˘h(h) , if x(h) = N ;
aˆh = ah , if x(h) = S.
Let an ∈ A be defined as follows: ahn = aˆh for all h with t(h) > n, or with
t(h) ≤ n, and x(h) = N . For the remaining histories with t(h) ≤ N and
x(h) = S, we move by backwards induction from n to 0, and let ahn be the best
response to the future actions, which are already all defined.
25 Recall that when an action is actually taken by an agent, it is both believed and intended
by the agent for the current history.
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Thus, we obtain a sequence (an)n∈N in A . Since A is sequentially compact
(see the proof of Theorem 8), the sequence an has a subsequence ank converging
to some aˆ ∈ A .26 Thus, for all possible choices of a horizon m, we can find a
Km such that aˆh = ahnk for all k ≥ Km and h with t(h) ≤ m.
Now, let the beliefs of a sophisticated agent – i.e., at a history h with x(h) =
S – be b˘h(h′) = aˆh
′
.
Finally, we construct the intentions of sophisticated agents. Set sophisticated
agents’ beliefs about future nodes as: i˘h(h′) = b˘h(h′) for all h′ with x(h) = x(h′).
For sophisticated agents’ intentions assigned to future naive nodes, we construct
a¯ by modifying aˆ in a way that whenever x(h) = N , a¯h is a best response to the
future actions in aˆ. We keep actions at other, sophisticated histories unchanged:
a¯ = aˆ. We set the intentions of a sophisticated agent to be i˘h(h′) = a¯h
′
.
We have thus defined both b˘h and i˘h for sophisticated agents. Let s˘h =
(˘ih, b˘h) and finally, f˘(h) = s˘h for all x(h) = S. This completes our construction
of a type-dependent optimal frame, as we have provided the strategies assigned
to histories where the agent is naive, and also to the ones where she is sophis-
ticated.
We will now review our construction again to confirm that f˘ is indeed a
type-dependent optimal frame. For x(h) = N , this is immediate. For x(h) = S,
we will first check the beliefs, and then the intentions.
First, suppose that x(h′) = N . We have:
b˘h(h′) = aˆh
′
= i˘h
′
(h′) ∈ arg max
s∈Sh′
Uh
′
i (s)(h
′),
which is what is required in the definition of f˘ . For the other case, take x(h′) =
S. Now, from our construction of ah
′
n , for all n ≥ t(h′):
b˘hn(h
′) = ah
′
n ∈ arg max
a∈Aω(h′)
Uh
′
b (b
h
n[a : h
′]).
Taking the limit along the subsequence nk, using continuity, we get:
b˘h(h′) = ah
′ ∈ arg max
a∈Aω(h′)
Uh
′
b (b
h[a : h′]).
For the intentions of sophisticated agents for future sophisticated nodes, we set
these directly to be i˘h(h′) = b˘h(h′). The last thing we need to check is the
26 There might be multiple subsequences converging to different aˆ-s; in that case, we can
select any one of them.
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intentions of sophisticated agents for future naive agents. These were defined
as:
i˘h(h′) = a¯h
′ ∈ arg max
a∈Aω(h′)
Uh
′
b (b˘
h′ [a : h′]).
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Figure 3.7: A drinking problem.
We now return to the problem raised in the introduction, displayed in Figure 3.7.
The decision maker is sitting in a pub, having finished her second beer (in state
ρ), and is of type S (sophisticated). She can either go home directly, by choosing
action A, transiting to state τ , where she does not need to make any more
decisions. Alternatively, she can drink ‘one more beer’ by choosing action B.
This, however, transitions her to a ‘drunken’ state σ, where she becomes type
N (naive). In this drunken state, she can choose between drinking one more
beer by choosing C (thus, maintaining her drunkenness and staying at σ), or
going home to state τ by choosing D.
Let h0 = ((ρ, S)) be the root agent. Our goal is to construct s˘h0 , the optimal
type-dependent strategy for the root agent. Since x(h0) = S, we have to deal
with the interesting case, that of a sophisticated root agent.
We start the analysis of this situation by focusing on the state σ. Take
any h′ such that ω(h′) = σ. As x (h′) = N if ω (h′) = σ, we get b˘h (h′) ∈
arg maxs∈Sh′ U
h′
i (s) (h
′) according to the definition; the root agent believes that
an agent at history h′ with a current state σ is naive. What is the naive choice in
67
state σ? It is easy to see27 that the (subgame-optimal) naively optimal strategy
is (C,C)(D,D)(D,D) . . . , i.e., ‘drink one more beer, and then go home’. Thus,
b˘h(h′) = C whenever ω(h′) = σ. The root agent thus believes she would continue
drinking after becoming naive.
What about the intentions of the root agent for the agent at σ? She believes
that at history h′, the continuation actions will be C. The agent at history h′
could only choose between C and D. Going for C yields 8 + 12 · 12 · 81− 12 = 12,
whereas picking D gives 0 + 12 · 12 · 281− 12 = 14. Therefore, i˘
h (h′) = D whenever
ω(h′) = σ. Together with the result of the previous paragraph, we get that
s˘h (h′) = (D,C) whenever ω(h′) = σ. We see that the intentions and the beliefs
of the root agent do not match: She would like future agents to pick D at every
h′, but correctly anticipates that future agents will be unable to do so, and
would actually choose C. The sober, sophisticated root agent realizes that if
she drinks just one more beer, she will end up drinking much more than what
she actually wishes for.
So what should the root agent choose at h? She can pick A, going home
directly, earning her Uh0b (s˘
h0 [A : h0]) = 30 +
1
2 · 12 · 281− 12 = 44. Or, she can pick
B, drink one more beer, and end up still being in the pub. This would earn
her Uh0b (s˘
h0 [B : h0]) = 38 +
1
2 · 12 · 81− 12 = 42. Going home seems best. Thus,
s˘h (h) = (A,A). The optimal type-dependent strategy is:
s˘h(h) = (A,A),
s˘h(h′) = (D,C), whenever ω (h′) = σ,
s˘h(h′) = (E,E), whenever ω (h′) = τ.
Note that a fully naive root agent would expect that she can resist the temp-
tation of drinking additional bottles of beer, and would expect a utility of
38 + 12 · 12 · 0 + 12 · 12
2 · 28
1− 12
= 45. The sophisticated root agent realizes that
this is unattainable, as the incentives and the type of the agents changes by
transiting to σ. So in the drinking problem, the sober, sophisticated root agent
avoids becoming naive, and thus is better off. Sophistication thus can help
avoiding the trap of naiveté. But can sophistication help in avoiding the pitfalls
of sophistication?
27 The decision problem reduced to the states σ and τ is that of a procrastination of a single
task, discussed in Section 3.A.1, case 1.b. Indeed, with these payoffs, 8 < (1− 1
2
)·0+ 1
2
·28 = 14,
and 8 > (1− 1
2
· 1
2
) · 0 + 1
2
· 1
2
· 28 = 7. So a non-present-biased agent would go home, but a
present-biased agent prefers to postpone it.
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Section 3.A.3 shows that in some decision problems – in particular, in the
indulgence problem – a naive decision maker is strictly better off than a sophis-
ticated one. The psychological intuition behind this is that being aware of one’s
inability to resist a temptation in the future can render one unable to resist the
temptation in the present, too. This observation allows us to construct the de-
cision problem in Figure 3.8, which we call the indulgence problem with hybrid
type.
τ, S
E | 0

σ0, S
C0|0
//
D0|4
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Figure 3.8: Optimal self-deception in the indulgence problem with hybrid type.
The agent at the root history h0 = ((ρ, S)) is sophisticated. Therefore, she
is able to reason about future agents in the following way: at history h1 =
((ρ, S), A, (σ0, S)), and at all succeeding histories, she will be sophisticated.
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Thus, she concludes – after an analysis similar to the one in Section 3.A.3
– that she will choose the action D0. On the other hand, at history h′1 =
((ρ, S), B, (σ0, N)), and at all succeeding histories, she will be naive. Thus, she
concludes that in the subgame starting at h′1, she will choose action D2. From
the perspective of the root agent:
Uh0b (s˘
h0 [A : h0]) =
1
2 · 12 · 4 = 1 < 2.5 = 12 ·
(
1
2
)3 · 40 = Uh0b (s˘h0 [B : h0]).
Therefore, the best response of the root agent is to choose action B. No-
tice that this means that a sophisticated agent chooses to face the indulgence
problem as a naif, thereby intentionally causing the agent at h′1 to have wrong
beliefs. In particular, the naive agent at h′1 believes that she will be able to wait
until the wine fully matures, and take action D3. The sophisticated agent at
the preceeding history h0 knows that this is not the case, that in fact, action
D2 will be taken. Thus, when choosing an optimal type-dependent strategy, the
root agent realizes that she is better off with false beliefs, and decides to deceive
herself.
By what means such self-deception might be effectively achieved, or whether
it can be achieved intentionally at all is, of course, a difficult problem. But it
seems like self-deception has its virtues, which might, in itself, challenge ethical
arguments on the inherent immorality of self-deception.28
3.8 Concluding remarks and future research
This work attempts to play a foundational role for future discourse in multi-
self models of dynamic inconsistency. It establishes that the basic epistemic
concepts to be considered are beliefs and intentions, and the main levels of
analysis should be those of strategies and frames. We would now like to provide
some remarks and outline some directions for follow-up research in this area.
An obvious limitation of the current framework is that it only allows for pure
actions. This limitation is introduced to ease the presentation, but the technical
adaptations required for dealing with mixed actions can be accomplished rather
straightforwardly. Mixed actions should play a particularly important role when
moving from decision-theoretic models to a game setting.
One might wonder how flexible this model is with regards to increasing the
state or action space of the decision problem. Countably infinite states and
actions can be allowed for without much difficulty, as long as the set of payoffs
28 For an overview on the philosophical problems of self-deception, see Deweese-Boyd (2012).
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for each action remains compact (and hence, bounded). However, handling
continuous time would require a fundamentally different framework, along with
a reinterpretation of the notion of ‘agent’.
Whereas our focus was the two most common types of decision makers fac-
ing dynamic inconsistency, naifs and sophisticates, there have been arguments in
the literature for taking seriously other types as well. In particular, McClennen
(1990) argues for the possibility of resolute decision making. Actually, resolute-
ness can easily be incorporated into our framework. It would be interesting to
expand the type space in Markov decision problems with hybrid types to include
resolutes.
The horizon of sophisticated decision makers requires further investigation.
If agents possess only a finite horizon, reasoning about future agents can be
based on two assumptions: Either the length, or the endpoint of the horizon
of that future agent is the same as that of the current agent. In the former
case, we are talking about a moving, in the latter, about a fixed horizon. The
implications of these two assumptions on the optimal strategies (generated, for
instance, via backward induction) are not yet understood. For example, it seems
that a moving horizons approach might be more appropriate to capture the
consistent stationary sophisticated strategy that is composed of mixed actions
of Section 3.A.2.
Finally, the most interesting application of the framework presented above
will be for game theory. How can players reason about the intentions and beliefs
of other players, as well as their types? How can one exploit the naiveté (or
sophistication) of others? What kind of equilibria are generated when (naive,
sophisticated, or hybrid) players are pitted against each other? We hope that
through this work, we have broken the ground for such questions.
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3.A Appendix – Comparison of naifs and sophis-
ticates
This Appendix discusses a few particular decision problems to compare naive
and sophisticated decision makers. In Sections 3.A.1 and 3.A.2, our analysis
involves simple decision problems with only two states. We show that many
classical examples of inconsistent behavior can already be formulated with such
decision problems. In Section 3.A.1, we tackle a class of decision problems where
the decision maker faces the choice between executing an action eventually or
never. We find that in the procrastination problem, but not in the impulsiveness
one, sophisticates might outperform naifs, depending on the exact parameters.
In Section 3.A.2 we focus on problems where an action can be chosen an arbi-
trary number of times, and it has both short- and long-term effects. Here, we
find similar results: Sophisticates can be better off than naifs in the underinvest-
ment, but not in the binge problem. Although a lot of ground can be covered
with just two states, in each of these cases sophisticates are at least as well off as
naifs. To show that this is not the case for all decision problems, Section 3.A.3
reviews a decision problem with five states adapted from O’Donoghue and Rabin
(1999a), where naiveté dominates sophistication from a welfare perspective.
Common to the analyses is the choice of quasi-hyperbolic discounting for the
utility function:
Uh
(
ut(h)→
)
= ut(h) + β
∞∑
t=t(h)+1
δt−t(h) ut.
Here, we assume 0 < β, δ < 1. The main advantages of this particular discount
function are that it captures dynamic inconsistency without much technical
ado, and also that the parameter β can be interpreted straightforwardly as the
present-biasedness factor.
When the discount function is quasi-hyperbolic, discounting is effectively
exponential from the next period onwards. Therefore, the analysis of optimal
strategies boils down to two questions: Under what conditions will choosing the
action be optimal in the future, and under what conditions will it be optimal
to perform it right away? Whenever there is a mismatch between these two
optimality conditions, the agent’s incentives will change from the current period
to the next one, and dynamic inconsistency will arise.
As our examples deal with purely naive or sophisticated decision makers,
and the optimal strategies for these types are all defined to be coherent, we
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know that for each agent, their beliefs and intentions match whenever they
choose optimal strategies. Therefore, we specify only one action for each future
history. Whenever we present utility calculations, it should be clear from the
agent type whether we are talking about utility based on intentions or beliefs;
therefore, we drop the subscript of the utility function. Moreover, notice that
our definition of a naively optimal strategy does not require perfection for the
strategy – it can specify any action for future agents that will not be reached.
To simplify the analysis, we therefore require our naive agents to adopt such
strategies.
3.A.1 Single tasks – procrastination and impulsiveness
The following decision problems model situations where the decision maker can
perform a single task once. The state space contains only two elements: in the
– initial – state ρ the task has not been chosen (yet), while in state σ it has
already been performed (see Figure 3.9).
ρ
B | b
//
A | a

σ
C | c

Figure 3.9: Single task problems.
We work with the assumption that whenever the agent is indifferent between
choosing A and B, she will execute the task by choosing B. Checking first
whether the agent has the incentives to execute the task in the next period,
we get that she would choose to do so when a ≤ (1 − δ)b + δc, and would not
otherwise. This yields two cases:
1. a ≤ (1− δ)b+ δc.
The agent would execute the task in the next period, but will she execute
it immediately? If she does, she gains b+β δ1−δ c; if she does not, she gains
a + βδb + β δ
2
1−δ c. This again yields two cases, where after some algebra
we get:
(a) a ≤ (1− βδ)b+ βδc.29
Here, executing the task is the optimal immediate choice, as well as
29 E.g., a = 4, b = 0, c = 20, β = δ = 0.5.
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the optimal choice for all future periods. Both naively and sophisti-
catedly optimal strategies prescribe choosing B at all histories where
the end-state is ρ; there is no dynamic inconsistency.
(b) a > (1− βδ)b+ βδc.30
In this case, executing the task is optimal in the next period, but not
immediately. This is the situation of procrastinating a single task.
A naively optimal strategy prescribes postponing B one period by
choosing A first. A naively optimal frame would involve choosing
such a strategy at every history. This implies that in the induced
strategy, action B is in fact never chosen, as each naive agent keeps
postponing B by one period. The induced utility over the naive frame
f˜ is thus: U˜r(f˜) = a+ β δ1−δa.
Although the decision problem looks simple enough, finding the so-
phisticatedly optimal strategy is not straightforward. Suppose that
the sophisticated agent at h¯ believes that no future agent will choose
B. If she chooses to also not do B herself, she gains U h¯(AAA . . . ) =
a+β δ1−δa. On the other hand, if she takes onB, she gains U
h¯(B . . . ) =
b+ β δ1−δ c. It so happens that our two conditions thus far do not de-
termine which of these values is larger.31 Therefore, we need two
more subcases:
i. a+ β δ1−δa ≥ b+ β δ1−δ c.
This means that choosing B is a best response to the belief that
no future agent would choose A. Condition 1.b implies that
choosing A is also a best response to the belief that in the next
period B will be chosen. Furthermore, we will now show that
choosing A is also a best reply to the belief that any future agent
chooses B. Suppose the agent at h¯ believes that k is the earliest
period when an agent would choose B. Then, we get:
U h¯(AA . . . AB . . . ) = a+ β δ(1−δ
k−1)
1−δ a+ βδ
kb+ β δ
k+1
1−δ c
= a+ β δ1−δa+ β
δk
1−δ (−a+ (1− δ)b+ δc)
≥ a+ β δ1−δa ≥ b+ β δ1−δ c = U h¯(B . . . ).
30 E.g., a = 4, b = 0, c = 10, β = δ = 0.5.
31 For instance, take a = −1, b = −1, c = 4, δ = 0.5, β = 0.5. These values satisfy
Conditions 1: a ≤ (1 − δ)b + δc, 1.b: a > (1 − βδ)b + βδc, with a + β δ
1−δ a > b + β
δ
1−δ c.
Changing only the assignment of c to c = 6, the parameters still satisfy Conditions 1 and 1.b,
but now a + β δ
1−δ a < b + β
δ
1−δ c. Thus Conditions 1.b.i/1.b.ii are independent from 1 and
1.b.
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Note that we only get equality if both Conditions 1 and 1.b.ii are
satisfied with equality. It can be derived that such a scenario is
impossible, given Conditions 1.b and β < 1. Therefore, at least
one of them is a strict inequality. This implies that A is a best
response to any belief about the future, and the only sophisticat-
edly optimal strategy for an agent is believing and intending A
for every future history. Thus, in this case, there is no difference
between the induced strategy of the naively and sophisticatedly
optimal frame, and the induced utilities are equal.
ii. a+ β δ1−δa < b+ β
δ
1−δ c.
32
Choosing B is the best response for an agent that believes all
future agents will choose A, and thus the strategy ‘all-A’ is not
sophisticatedly optimal. In what follows, we show that if the
moment at which B is taken in the future is sufficiently far, it is
optimal to choose B immediately.
Take the strategies sh¯k and s
h¯
k+1, where the index k ≥ 1 indicates
the first period in which action B is taken.33 For the utilities
generated by these two strategies, we get that:
∆k = U
h¯
(
sh¯k
)
− U h¯
(
sh¯k+1
)
=
(
a+ β δ1−δ
(
1− δk−1) a+ βδkb+ β δk+11−δ c)
−
(
a+ βδ1−δ
(
1− δk) a+ βδk+1b+ β δk+21−δ c)
= βδk (−a+ (1− δ)b+ δc) ≥ 0.
So we find, by Condition 1, that U h¯
(
sh¯k
)
is decreasing in k.
Taking the difference between the utility generated by strategy
sh¯1 = AB . . . and an arbitrary strategy with k > 1, we get:
U h¯
(
sh¯1
)
− U h¯
(
sh¯k
)
=
k−1∑
i=1
∆i = βδ
1−δk−1
1−δ (−a+ (1− δ)b+ δc) .
32 We ignore the possibility of mixed actions here, and instead choose to discuss it only
for the underinvestment problem. Moreover, we assume that when a sophisticated decision
maker can attain consistency, she will do so. For both issues, see Section 3.A.2 Condition
1.b.ii below.
33 E.g., sh¯1 = AB . . . , s
h¯
2 = AAB . . .
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Hence, we obtain:
lim
k→∞
U h¯
(
sh¯k
)
= U h¯
(
sh¯1
)
− lim
k→∞
(
U h¯
(
sh¯1
)
− U h¯
(
sh¯k
))
= a+ βδb+ β δ
2
1−δ c− β δ1−δ (−a+ (1− δ)b+ δc)
= a+ β δ1−δa.
We know from Condition 1.b that U h¯
(
sh¯1
)
= U h¯ (AB . . . ) >
U h¯ (B . . . ) = U h¯
(
sh¯0
)
. However, we see that limk→∞ U h¯
(
sh¯k
)
=
a + β δ1−δa < b + β
δ
1−δ c = U
h¯ (B . . . ). Therefore, as k grows
larger, playing B will at some point become the best response to
believing that A will be played until period k. In particular, there
exists a smallest such kˆ, for which U h¯[A : sh¯
kˆ−1] > U
h¯[B : sh¯
kˆ−1],
but U h¯[A : sh¯
kˆ
] ≤ U h¯[B : sh¯
kˆ
].
Thus, an optimal strategy requires an agent to choose A, if she
believes B will be chosen after at most kˆ − 1 periods, but pick
B otherwise. This leads to cyclical beliefs. Table 3.4 represents
a frame with such strategies in a compact manner: Each row
represent a strategy for which the row label identifies the agent’s
temporal distance from the root agent. Similarly, each column
identifies the history that is a certain temporal distance away
from the root agent.
t(h)− t(h0) =
0 1 2 3 4 5 . . .
t(h¯)− t(h0)=
0 A A B A A B . . .
1 – A B A A B . . .
2 – – B A A B . . .
3 – – – A A B . . .
4 – – – – A B . . .
5 – – – – – B . . .
. . . – – – – – – . . .
Table 3.4: A consistent sophisticatedly optimal frame for the procrastination problem,
Condition 1.b.ii.
It follows that a sophisticated agent will choose a non-stationary,
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cyclical strategy. When precisely she will pick B depends on the
beliefs of the root agent, but a consistent sophisticatedly optimal
frame will definitely induce action B to be chosen sometime in
the first kˆ periods (that is, up to period kˆ−1). It can be checked
that the expected utility of the induced strategy of the consistent
sophisticatedly optimal frame will be higher than that of the
naively optimal one. Thus, a sophisticated decision maker will
be better off in the procrastination problem.
2. a > (1− δ)b+ δc.
This condition means that the agent has no incentives to execute the task
in the next (and subsequent) periods. Thus, her utility is b+β δ1−δ c if she
decides to perform it immediately, while just a+β δ1−δa if she does not do
so (thus not performing the task at all). The two sub-cases are:
(a) (1− δ + βδ)a ≤ (1− δ)b+ βδc.34
Here, the agent has the incentives to do it right away given that no
agent would execute the task in a later period. A naively optimal
strategy simply prescribes choosing B right away, generating a utility
of U˜ = b+ β δ1−δ c for the naive agent.
The sophisticatedly optimal strategy depends on the beliefs of the
agent. Because of Condition 2.a, choosing B right away is optimal,
if the agent believes that no future agent will take it. Now, suppose
the sophisticated agent at h¯ believes that some future agent will pick
B. Let k be the earliest future period in which B will be chosen,
according to the strategy sh¯. We get that:
U h¯[B : sh¯] = b+ βδ1−δ c ≥ 1−δ+βδ1−δ a
= a+
βδ
1− δ (a− δ
k−1a+ δk−1a)
> a+ βδ1−δ
(
(1− δk−1)a+ (1− δ)δk−1b+ δkc)
= U h¯[A : sh¯]
We conclude that taking B right away is optimal, whatever the
agent’s beliefs. This means that the sophisticated decision maker
cannot avoid impulsivity, and that there is no difference between the
34 E.g., a = −4, b = 0, c = −10, β = δ = 0.5.
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utility gained by naifs and sophisticates. In either case, if the deci-
sion maker later reflects on this decision from a non-present-biased
perspective, she will regret taking B.
(b) (1− δ + βδ)a > (1− δ)b+ βδc.35
Now, picking A and staying in ρ is always optimal both for naifs and
sophisticates, and dynamic inconsistency does not arise.
This shows that for single task problems, there is no difference in the behavior
of sophisticated and naive agents for the problem of impulsiveness. In the
procrastination problem, it can happen that sophistication brings no benefits,
but – depending on the parameters of the problem – it might also be the case
that it overperforms naiveté.
The asymmetry found between problems of impulsiveness and procrastina-
tion might look counter-intuitive at first, as the structure of the Markov deci-
sion problem looks quite similar. However, our finding is consistent with Thaler
(1981), who presents some behavioral evidence that implicit discount rates are
much higher for gains than for losses. If we interpret taking an impulsive ac-
tion as a choice of an immediate reward, whereas taking the action that is to
be procrastinated as accepting an immediate loss, our result that sophisticated
decision makers can overcome the problem of procrastination are in line with
their findings.
3.A.2 Repeated tasks – underinvestment and binges
The following decision problems are very similar to the previous ones in that
there are two states, with only one of them requiring a decision, whether to
perform a task or not. The main difference is that the task can be executed
repeatedly, as the decision maker always returns to the initial state. Figure 3.10
presents the parametrized version of the repeated task problem.
To simplify the analysis, we restrict our attention to strategies where the
action assigned to a history h can be conditioned only on the current time and
state, i.e., Markovian strategies. This allows for a very compact representation
of coherent strategies, namely, as a sequence of A-s and B-s. For an agent at h¯
the kth element in such a sequence specifies what intention-belief pair the agent
assigns to period k − 1. For instance, when we write sh¯ = ABAA . . . it can be
read as: ‘The agent at h¯ (in state ρ) intends and believes A to be her current
action, intends and believes action B if she is in state ρ after one period, etc.’
35 E.g., a = 4, b = 0, c = 0, β = δ = 0.5.
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ρ
B | b
//
A | a

σ
C | c

Figure 3.10: Repeated task problem.
We also assume that whenever the agent is indifferent between the two actions
available in state ρ, she will execute task B.
Starting with the next period, the agent has the incentives to pick B when-
ever a+ δa ≤ b+ δc. We get the following cases:
1. a+ δa ≤ b+ δc.
The agent will prefer executingB from the second period onwards. Whether
she prefers to do it right away depends on the relationship between the pay-
off of picking A immediately, and then starting to do B, a+β δ1−δ2 (b+δc),
or starting to execute B right away, b+ βδc+ β δ
2
1−δ2 (b+ δc). After some
algebra, we get the following two cases:
(a) (1 + δ)(a− b) ≤ βδ(c− b).36
Here B is optimal whenever the state is ρ, regardless whether the
agent is naive or sophisticated. Dynamic inconsistency does not arise.
(b) (1 + δ)(a− b) > βδ(c− b).37
When this is the case, the decision revolves around choosing an ac-
tion that brings benefits in the longer run, but these benefits are
not sufficient to offset immediate costs when the agents are present-
biased. Depending on the particular interpretation, this can be called
a problem of slacking or underinvestment.
Let us focus on a naive decision maker first, supposing she is at
history h¯. Our Condition 1 implies that the optimal action for all
future histories is B, while Condition 1.b implies that the optimal
action for the current period is A. Therefore, the unique naively op-
timal strategy is s˜h¯ = ABBBBB . . . , irrespective of h¯. The naively
optimal frame is thus f˜(h) = ABBBBB . . . for all h. This frame
36 E.g., a = 0, b = 0, c = 4, β = δ = 0.5.
37 E.g., a = 4, b = 0, c = 16, β = δ = 0.5.
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is represented in a succint form in Table 3.5. Each row represents a
set of strategies for which the row label identifies the current agent’s
temporal distance from the root agent. Similarly, each column iden-
tifies histories that are a certain temporal distance away from the
root agent. From the representation it should be both clear that
the naively optimal frame is inconsistent and that the induced naive
strategy is Λ(f˜) = AAAAAA . . . , which would generate a utility of
Ur(f˜) = a+ β
δ
1−δa for the (naive) root agent.
t(h)− t(h0) =
0 1 2 3 4 . . .
t(h¯)− t(h0)=
0 A B B B B . . .
1 – A B B B . . .
2 – – A B B . . .
3 – – – A B . . .
4 – – – – A . . .
. . . – – – – – . . .
Table 3.5: Naively optimal frame for the underinvestment problem, Condition 1.b.
The analysis of the sophisticated decision maker is more complicated.
Let us start with checking whether A or B is the best response of a so-
phisticated agent at some h¯ whose belief is that in the next period ac-
tion A will be chosen. This implies that after two periods, the current
state will be ρ, so the utility generated by the rest of strategy (x) is
irrelevant. The agent at h¯ needs to compare U h¯(AA . . . ) = a+βδa+x
and U h¯(BA . . . ) = b + βδc + x. It turns out that Conditions 1 and
1.b do not determine which of the two is larger.38
i. a+ βδa > b+ βδc.
This means that U h¯(AA . . . ) > U h¯(BA . . . ); thus, if any A ap-
pears in the optimal strategy, it must be preceded by A-s. So,
any candidate for a sophisticatedly optimal strategy has the fol-
lowing form: A . . . AB . . . B. However, because of Condition
1.b above, U h¯(ABBBBB . . . ) > U h¯(BBBBBB . . . ) and con-
38 To show this, take a = −1, b = −1.6, c = 0, δ = 0.75, β = 0.75. These values satisfy
Conditions 1: a+ δa ≤ b+ δc, and also 1.b: (1+ δ)(a− b) > βδ(c− b), with a+βδa > b+βδc.
Changing only the assigment of b to b = −1.5, the parameters still satisfy Conditions 1 and
1.b, but now a+βδa < b+βδc. Thus, Conditions 1.b.i/1.b.ii are independent from 1 and 1.b.
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sequently there is only one candidate of such a strategy: all-
A. As we have already seen, A is a best-response whenever in
the next period A will be played. Therefore, for any h¯ the so-
phisticatedly optimal strategy is sˆh¯ = AAAAAA . . . . While the
sophisticated decision maker avoids inconsistency, her behavior
will be the same as that of naive decision maker, also earning
Ur(fˆ) = Ur(f˜) = a+ β
δ
1−δa.
ii. a+ βδa ≤ b+ βδc.
Now, we get U h¯(BA . . . ) ≤ U h¯(AA . . . ), so B is the best re-
sponse to choosing A in the next period. What about one period
before B, i.e., is U h¯(ABA . . . ) > U h¯(BBA . . . )? This is indeed
the case – to show it, we again need to realize that since the
strategy prescribes action A in the second period from the cur-
rent time, the sophisticated agent knows that the current state
three periods from now will be ρ, and that therefore the utility
generated by the rest of the strategy, denoted by x, is irrelevant
to this comparison. We get:
U h¯(ABA . . . ) = a+ βδb+ βδ2c+ x
= a− b+ b+ βδb+ βδ2c+ x
> β δ1+δ (c− b) + b+ βδb+ βδ2c+ x
= β δ1+δ (c+ δb+ δc+ δ
2c) + b+ x =
= β δ1+δ (δb+ δ
2c) + b+ βδc+ x
≥ b+ βδc+ βδ2a+ x
= U h¯(BBA . . . ).
This implies that A is the best response to playing B next period.
But as we are in Condition 1.b.ii, B itself is a best response to
playing A next period. So, for each h¯ we have two candidates39
for a sophisticatedly optimal strategy: sˆh¯AB = ABABAB . . . and
sˆh¯BA = BABABA . . . . Notice that none of these is a stationary
strategy. It is then clear that a sophisticatedly optimal frame
should be made up of strategies sˆAB or sˆBA. Two consistent
sophisticatedly optimal frames can be made up of these, one be-
ing represented in Table 3.6, the other having the entries A and
B exchanged. The induced strategies are sˆAB and sˆBA. But
39 Just like in the previous case, strategy BBBBBB . . . is ruled out by Condition 1.b.
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from the perspective of the root agent, these induced strategies
generate different utilities: Uh0 (sˆAB) = a + β δ1−δ2 (b + δc) >
b+ βδc+ β δ
2
1−δ2 (b+ δc) = U
h0 (sˆBA). However, it can be easily
checked that both of these generate a higher payoff than the in-
duced strategy of the naive agent.
t(h)− t(h0) =
0 1 2 3 4 . . .
t(h¯)− t(h0)=
0 A B A B A . . .
1 – B A B A . . .
2 – – A B A . . .
3 – – – B A . . .
4 – – – – A . . .
. . . – – – – – . . .
Table 3.6: A consistent sophisticatedly optimal frame for the underinvestment prob-
lem, case 1.b.ii.
Not only is there no unique consistent sophisticatedly optimal
frame, there are numerous other inconsistent frames.40 The
problem is that the beliefs of the agents are underdetermined by
the best-response condition imposed by sophistication. In fact,
we can create any induced strategy for the sophisticated decision
maker by manipulating these agents’ beliefs. For example, since
U h¯ (sˆAB) > U
h¯ (sˆBA) for all h¯, maybe each sophisticated agent
believes that the agent in the next period will pick B, so that
they should choose A at h¯!
We see that sophistication is no guarantee for either the existence
of pure stationary strategies, uniqueness of an induced sophisti-
cated strategy, or unique payoff for the root agent. It seems that
some kind of consistency of beliefs across agents is necessary to
acquire a unique sophisticatedly optimal frame, and thereby a
unique induced strategy. But even this might not guarantee sta-
tionarity.
One way to get a consistent sophisticatedly optimal frame of
stationary strategies is to allow for randomized actions.41 In our
40 For example, consider the stationary frame fˆ with fˆ(h) = ABAB . . . for all h.
41 Note that this is a short detour from our original framework, where we only allowed for
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strategy, at each history with current state ρ, action A is played
with probability p, and B with probability 1− p. Take an agent
at history h¯, with ω(h¯) = ρ. First, calculate the expected utility
from the next period onwards in state ρ, denoted by x = x(p):
x = p(a+ δx) + (1− p)(b+ δc+ δ2x).
We also know that the agent should be indifferent between play-
ing A and B in h¯, since she mixes between them. Therefore, we
have:
a+ βδx = b+ βδc+ βδ2x.
Solving this system of equations for p, we get:
p =
(1 + δ)(a− b)− βδ(c− b)
δ(1− β)(a− b) .
It can be shown that with the given conditions, p always falls in
the [0, 1] interval. By using mixed actions, we can thus construct
a consistent stationary sophisticatedly optimal frame, which in-
volves mixing between A and B with the given probability p at
all histories h with ω(h) = ρ. Despite the technical and con-
ceptual difficulties, our result is a positive one for sophistication:
the sophisticated decision maker can earn a higher payoff than
the naive one in the underinvestment problem, given that the
parameters fall into the right range.
2. a+ δa > b+ δc.
In this case, the agent will prefer picking A from the second period on-
wards. She will prefer to execute B immediately whenever a + βδa ≤
b+ βδc.
(a) a+ βδa ≤ b+ βδc.42
Here, the agent has incentives to choose B once immediately, but
never thereafter. A shopping binge or the consumption of an addic-
tive substance might serve as examples for such a decision problem:
present-biasedness induces the enjoyable action B, for which the costs
c only need to be payed later. A naive agent thus chooses B at the
outset, but intends to refrain from choosing it again later. Obviously,
pure actions.
42 E.g., a = −4, b = 0, c = −16, β = δ = 0.5.
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the frame generated by such strategies will be inconsistent, and the
naive decision maker will stay addicted or keep on binging, executing
B whenever in state ρ. The induced utility of this naively optimal
frame is Ur(f˜) = b+ βδc+ β δ
2
1−δ2 (b+ δc).
For finding sophisticatedly optimal frames, first consider an agent at
history h who believes the agent in the next period in state ρ would
choose A. This implies that regardless of what the agent at h chooses,
the current state will be ρ two periods from now. As the payoffs from
that period onwards are fixed, the agent at h only needs to contrast
the payoffs gained in this and the next period. By choosing A, she
would gain a + βδa; by choosing B, she would gain b + βδc. With
our assumption on the parameters, it is optimal for the agent at h to
choose B. This means that in a sophisticated strategy, an action A
is always preceded by an action B.
Now, take an agent at a history h¯ that chooses action A at that
history. There are two possibilities: either her strategy does not
assign action A to any future history where the current state is ρ,
or it assigns A to at least one. Suppose the first possibility; then,
the strategy of the agent assigns B to all future histories where the
current state is ρ. She can then choose between adopting strategy
sh¯A = ABBBBB . . . and strategy s
h¯
B = BBBBBB . . . . Her utilities
for these are:
U h¯
(
sh¯B
)
= b+ βδc+ β δ
2
1−δ2 (b+ δc)
≥ a+ βδa+ β δ
2
1− δ2 (b+ δc)
= β δ1+δ (a+ δa− (b+ δc)) + a+ β δ1−δ2 (b+ δc)
> a+ β
δ
1− δ2 (b+ δc)
= U h¯
(
sh¯A
)
.
Thus, if the agent believes that all future agents will choose B, she
also should choose B. Therefore, one sophisticatedly optimal strategy
– based on the belief that all future agents will choose B – is playing
and intending to play B in all periods.
The second possibility is that the agent at h¯ believes that at least
one future agent will choose A. Denote the earliest such period by
k + 1. The strategy of the agent at h¯ can then be either sh¯A =
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ABB . . . BBA . . . or sh¯B = BBB . . . BBA . . . , where the first and
last represented action are separated by k periods of choosing B. It
is clear that after period k + 1, the agent will definitely be in state
ρ – therefore, the payoffs from that point on can be ignored for the
purposes of choosing an action for the agent at h¯. We show that
U h¯
(
sh¯B
)
> U h¯
(
sh¯A
)
, so that choosing B is optimal. For simplicity,
we assume k is even; the proof for odd k is analogous.
U h¯
(
sh¯B
)
= b+ βδc+ βδ2 1−δ
k
1−δ2 (b+ δc)
≥ a+ βδa+ βδ2 1−δk1−δ2 (b+ δc)
> a+ βδ 1−δ
k
1−δ2 (b+ δc) + βδ
k+1a
= U h¯
(
sh¯A
)
.
The latter inequality follows from Condition 2. This shows that given
the belief that some future agent will choose A, a sophisticated agent
should choose B, which implies that no sophisticated strategy can
include action A. As we have already shown that BBBBB . . . is a
sophisticatedly optimal strategy, it is clear that sophisticates cannot
outperform naifs in the binging problem.
(b) a+ βδa > b+ βδc.43
With this parameter configuration, picking A is always optimal for
both naifs and sophisticates, and there is no issue of dynamic incon-
sistency.
Repeated task problems with two states involving dynamic inconsistency – i.e.,
underinvestment and binging problems – show a lot of similarity to single task
problems. The dangers of binging behavior and impulsiveness affect sophisti-
cates just as much as they do naifs. On the other hand, depending on the
exact parameters, sophisticates can avoid underinvestment, just like they can
overcome procrastination. The similarity between underinvestment and pro-
crastination problems is even deeper, as in both cases there might be no so-
phisticatedly optimal frame of stationary strategies when we allow only for pure
actions.
43 E.g., a = 4, b = 0, c = 0, β = δ = 0.5.
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3.A.3 Indulgence
In the previous two decision problems, the utility induced by a sophisticatedly
optimal frame was never strictly lower than that induced by a naively optimal
frame. Is this always the case? In this section, we review a decision problem
presented by O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a), displayed in Figure 3.11.
The problem is that of performing a single task in either period 0, 1, 2 or 3 by
a present-biased decision maker with β = 0.5 and δ = 0.5. Think of consuming
a bottle of valuable wine that gains in taste for up to three years as it ages, but
becomes undrinkable afterwards. Will she indulge in drinking it right away, or
will she wait for it to fully mature? In Figure 3.11, ‘D’ and ‘C’ stand for ‘delay’
and ‘consume’. We ignore specifying the choice of an action for histories h with
ω(h) = σ .
ρ0
D0 | 0 //
C0 | 4
''
ρ1
D1 | 0 //
C1 | 12
  
ρ2
D2 | 0 //
C2 | 40

ρ3
C3 | 144
~~
σ
R | 0
DD
β = 0.5, δ = 0.5
Figure 3.11: Indulgence problem.
The root agent is h0 = (ρ0). Then, a representation of a coherent strategy
for the root agent is a vector of four elements that specifies whether to open the
bottle if the wine has not been consumed yet. Since only the first choice of Ci
matters for induced utility, we get four relevant classes of strategies for the root
agent: Sh00 = C0 . . . ;S
h1
1 = D0C1 . . . ;S
h2
2 = D0D1C2 . . . ;S
h3
3 = D0D1D2C3.
44
44 In order to simplify notation, we introduce the following abbreviations: h0 = (ρ0);h1 =
(ρ0D0ρ1);h2 = (ρ0D0ρ,D1ρ2). Moreover, we use the following notation for strategies: strat-
egy sht′t should be read as ‘the agent at ht′ intends and believes to drink the wine in period t’.
We will not make a strict distinction between strategies that are members of the same class
– the only relevant element of a strategy is when the earliest period in which some action Ci
(drinking the wine) appears. In Table 3.7 we are even sloppier, and omit the reference to the
agent from the indication of a strategy class.
86
The expected utilities calculated from the perspective of each agent for these
strategy classes are presented in Table 3.7. For instance:
Uh1(sh13 ) = 0 +
(
1
2
)2 · 0 + ( 12)3 · 144 = 18.
Uh(s)
h
h0 h1 h2
s ∈
S0 = (C0, . . . ) 4 – –
S1 = (D0, C1, . . . ) 3 12 –
S2 = (D0, D1, C2, . . . ) 5 10 40
S3 = (D0, D1, D2, C3) 9 18 36
Table 3.7: Expected utilities of coherent strategies from the various agents for the
decision problem in Figure 3.11.
The naively optimal strategy at h0 and h1 is thus choosing sh03 and s
h1
3
respectively, but at h2 is choosing sh22 . Therefore, for the naively optimal frame
f˜ , we get f˜(h0) ∈ Sh03 , f˜(h1) ∈ Sh13 , and f˜(h2) ∈ Sh22 . The naive decision maker
believes and intends postponing consumption right until the end, but one year
before the wine fully matures, she indulges herself. The decision maker thus
waits two periods, and this generates a total utility of Ur(f˜) = 5 for the root
agent.
To calculate the sophisticatedly optimal frame, we use backward induction.
The sophisticated agent at h2 chooses sh22 , for the same reasons as the naive
agent, since there are no more decisions to make afterwards. Therefore, the
sophisticated agent at h1 can only consider two possibilities: sh11 or s
h1
2 . Since
Uh1(sh11 ) = 12 > 10 = U
h1(sh12 ), she chooses to hasten the indulgence, since she
correctly believes that she is unable to hold on until the end anyway. Following
the same reasoning, the root agent can choose between sh00 and s
h0
1 , and opts for
sh00 , consuming immediately. For the sophisticatedly optimal frame fˆ , we get
fˆ(h0) ∈ Sh00 , fˆ(h1) ∈ Sh11 and fˆ(h2) ∈ Sh22 . The sophisticated decision maker
indulges herself earlier, precisely because the root agent is able to correctly
reason about future agents. As the sophisticated frame generates a utility of
Ur(f˜) = 4 for the root agent, we get Ur(f˜) > Ur(fˆ); thus, sophistication can
leave somebody worse off than naiveté.
This shows that there are decision problems in which a sophisticated decision
maker is worse off than a naive one. We emphasize that this is not a new result45,
45 Gruber and Kőszegi (2001) also found that sophistication can exascerbate drug consump-
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but shows that our framework can easily be put to use to make such welfare
comparisons between agents of various types, as well as to generate interesting
insights about self-deception 3.7.
Overall, by merely using the framework of quasi-hyperbolic discounting, it
is possible to construct extremely simple Markov decision problems that cover
most classical examples of dynamically inconsistent behavior. With these mod-
els, we can illustrate that sophistication is indeed a double-edged sword: when
compared to naiveté, it may provide benefits, but it may also generate welfare
losses.
Moreover, our approach shows some interesting aspects of sophistication:
Even for decision problems with only two states, it can lead to cyclical beliefs
and non-stationary strategies for all agents. For such cases, our method of
representing decision makers via tables does indeed provide useful.
tion for unaddicted people. Furthermore, in a scenario that involves punishment, sophistica-
tion can actually lead to worst possible outcome (Heidhues and Kőszegi, 2009).
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Chapter 4
Building the Leviathan –
Voluntary Centralization of
Power Sustains Cooperation
Abstract. The prevalence of cooperation among humans is puzzling because
cooperators can be exploited by free riders. Peer punishment has been suggested
as a key to this puzzle, but cumulating evidence questions its effectiveness in sus-
taining cooperation. Punishment has to be powerful, meaning that the effect of
punishment has to be sufficiently larger than its cost. Since group members can
refrain from punishing non-cooperators, peer punishment poses a social dilemma
in itself. By exploring a novel experimental setup, we show that the voluntary
transfer of punishment power enables groups to overcome the problem of free
riding when peer punishment can not. Participants are willing to empower in-
dividuals who act in the interest of the group. The endogenous establishment
of power centralization solves the social dilemma inherent to peer punishment,
sustains cooperation, and increases welfare. Our results could explain why hi-
erarchical power structures are widespread among animals and humans.
This chapter is based on joint work with J. Gross, A. Riedl and S. Okamoto-Barth.
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4.1 Introduction
The scale of cooperation observed among humans constitutes a puzzle for the
social and biological sciences. Cooperative efforts bear the risk of exploita-
tion as selfish agents can reap their benefits without contributing to the com-
mon good. Nevertheless, cooperation is frequently sustained in human societies
(Trivers, 1971, Alexander, 1987, Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003, Nowak and Sig-
mund, 2005). Peer punishment has been proposed as a possible means to sustain
cooperation (Güth et al., 1982, Yamagishi, 1986, Boyd and Richerson, 1992, Os-
trom, Walker and Gardner, 1992, Fehr and Gächter, 2000, Fehr and Gächter,
2002, de Quervain et al., 2004, Walker and Halloran, 2004, Falk, Fehr and Fis-
chbacher, 2005). Experiments on public goods dilemmas show that cooperation
deteriorates quickly in the absence of sanctioning mechanisms, but can stabilize
when free riders can be punished (Yamagishi, 1986, Yamagishi, 1988, Fehr and
Gächter, 2000, Fehr and Gächter, 2002, Gächter et al., 2008).
However, peer punishment does not guarantee cooperation. Recent research
documented crucial limitations of peer punishment in its ability to sustain co-
operation and foster welfare. The cost of punishment has to be sufficiently low
relative to its effect on the punished (Masclet et al., 2003, Casari, 2005, Falk,
Fehr and Fischbacher, 2005, Egas and Riedl, 2008, Nikiforakis and Normann,
2008, Ohtsuki, Iwasa and Nowak, 2009). Further, non-cooperators sometimes
punish cooperators out of spite or retribution, thereby undermining cooperation
(Dreber et al., 2008, Herrmann, Thöni and Gächter, 2008, Janssen and Bush-
man, 2008, Nikiforakis, 2008, Gächter and Herrmann, 2009, Rand et al., 2010,
Rand and Nowak, 2011, Dreber and Rand, 2012). The excessive use of pun-
ishment can stabilize cooperation but leads to adverse results for group welfare
(Masclet et al., 2003, Dreber et al., 2008, Gächter et al., 2008, Janssen, Holahan
and Ostrom, 2010, Engelmann and Nikiforakis, in press). Finally, not all group
members are willing to participate in the punishment of non-cooperators. It
is frequently observed that some, while willing to cooperate, are not willing to
punish non-cooperators. Hence, peer punishment produces a second-order social
dilemma in which cooperators not willing to punish can second-order free ride
on those who do engage in costly punishment (Boyd et al., 2003, Panchanathan
and Boyd, 2004, Fowler, 2005, Kiyonari and Barclay, 2008, Perc, 2012).
Social institutions provide an alternative for upholding cooperation through
centralized punishment mechanisms (Yamagishi, 1986, Ostrom, 1990, Casari
and Plott, 2003, Rockenbach, Guererk and Irlenbusch, 2006, Sefton et al., 2007,
Kosfeld, Okada and Riedl, 2009, Boyd, Gintis and Bowles, 2010, Sigmund et al.,
2010, Guala, 2012). Laws are issued to tackle ‘tragedies of the commons’, like
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problems of over-fishing, littering or air pollution. Contracts are made between
individuals to prevent exploitation in mutual agreements like rentals, insurances
or investments. Authorities, like courts or the police force, enforce these formal
institutions. An essential characteristic of these executive institutions is that
they embody a centralized power to punish (Flew, 1954).
Centralized power is also an important feature of groups that are not fully
governed by laws or contracts, ranging from hunter-gatherer chiefdoms to mod-
ern internet communities. For example, Wikipedia provides a global public good
to which everybody can contribute, but only a small share of its editors holds
the right to enforce policy and sanction antisocial behaviour.
We propose that this centralization is created and maintained through the
voluntary transfer of power to a few trusted individuals. In particular, the trans-
fer of punishment power, fundamental to executive institutions, could solve the
problems associated with decentralized peer punishment. We test this hypoth-
esis experimentally by introducing a new experimental setup, which we call the
‘power transfer game’.
4.2 Methods
4.2.1 The power transfer game
The power transfer game consists of three stages: the power transfer, the contri-
bution, and the punishment stage. In our experiment, participants played the
game in groups of five.
In the power transfer stage, group members can give up and transfer pun-
ishment power to other group members at no cost. Each group member has a
power of 1 at her disposal. Power can be transferred in units of 0.1 and can
be distributed among multiple group members. The sum of power kept and re-
ceived from others determines one’s punishment effectiveness (see below). After
all power transfer decisions are made, everyone is informed about how much
punishment power each group member has. Power transfer does not change the
total punishment power in the group but (may) change its distribution among
group members.
In the contribution stage, representing the classic public goods game, partic-
ipants receive an endowment of 20 monetary units (20 MUs = e0.50) and decide
how much to contribute to a ‘group project’. Group members keep any MUs not
contributed. The sum of MUs contributed to the group project is then multi-
plied by 1.5, and distributed equally among all five group members, regardless of
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how much each individual contributed. This poses a social dilemma: The return
of each contributed MU is 1.5 MU for the group, but only 0.3 MU for the indi-
vidual. Therefore, if participants are selfish payoff-maximisers, they should not
contribute at all. However, if everyone contributes their entire endowment to the
group project, participants will earn 30 MUs (20 MUs × 5 group members ×
1.5 multiplier / 5 group members), whereas if no one contributes, participants
will only earn 20 MUs each. Contribution decisions are made simultaneously.
Afterwards, everyone is informed about how many MUs each of the other group
members contributed and how many they kept for themselves.
Finally, in the punishment stage, group members are able to punish their
peers. Punishment is dealt out by assigning between 0 and 10 punishment
points. Punishment decisions are also made simultaneously. Subsequently,
group members see how many punishment points each group member assigned,
and to whom. Punishment reduces the earnings of both the punisher and the
punished. For each assigned punishment point, the punisher pays 1 MU. Impor-
tantly, the amount of MUs that are deducted from the punished is determined
by the power of the punisher. For example, assume that in the power transfer
stage, group member A decided to transfer all of her power to group member
B, and no one else transferred any power. B would now have a power of 2,
whereas A would have a power of 0. Suppose both A and B decide to punish
group member C. Because of her increase in power, each point B uses to punish
C will lead to a reduction of 2 MUs in earnings for C. On the other hand, A,
who transferred all her power to B, and did not receive any power from others,
would have a punishment effectiveness of 0. Thus, A would still pay 1 MU for
each punishment point that she assigns to C, but those would not decrease the
earnings of C. A game theoretic description and a detailed presentation of the
computer interface can be found in Appendix A.
4.2.2 Experiment
Participants were recruited from the subject pool of the Behavioural and Exper-
imental Economics lab (BEElab) at Maastricht University and were invited via
e-mail. Each experimental session comprised at least 3 and at most 5 groups.
Participants (n = 350, mean age = 21.1, SD = 2.6, 204 female) were allocated
to one of three conditions that differed in how punishment power was deter-
mined. The experiment lasted for a total of 20 rounds in fixed groups of five.
In the endogenous condition (n = 135) participants played the power transfer
game described above. Voluntary transfer of power was only possible in this
condition.
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Power transfer decisions made in the previous round served as the default
option for the current round. However, participants could freely change their
allocation each round.
The remaining participants were allocated to one of two control conditions:
the fixed condition (n = 80), or the exogenous condition (n = 135). In the
fixed condition, each participant had a punishment power of 1 and partici-
pants were not able to transfer any power. Thus, each group member had a
1:1 effectiveness-to-cost ratio of punishment during the whole experiment. In
the exogenous condition, power transfer was not voluntary. Instead, for each
group in the endogenous condition a twin group was created in the exogenous
condition, in which the history of power transfers and, hence, punishment ef-
fectiveness, was mirrored at the individual level. Thus, each group member
followed the same change in punishment power across rounds as its twin. The
purpose of the exogenous condition is to test whether it is important that power
transfer is voluntary. In the endogenous condition, power transfers can make
some group members more effective punishers. At the same time, group mem-
bers are also free to determine who these effective punishers are going to be.
The exogenous condition therefore disentangles the effects of increasing punish-
ment effectiveness and voluntarily selecting group members to hold punishment
power.
In all three conditions, the different stages of the game were introduced
sequentially to the participants (Figure 4.1). The experiment started with a
round consisting of only a contribution stage (public goods game). The second
round consisted of a contribution and a punishment stage (public goods game
with punishment). In the third round, the power mechanism was introduced
to the experiment according to the condition. Subsequent rounds followed the
structure of the third round.
4.3 Results
Participants in all three conditions transferred roughly half of their endowment
to the group project in the first round. In the fixed condition with decentralized
1:1 punishment, cooperation decreased steadily (Figure 4.2a; mixed effect re-
gression, round coefficient = -0.28, 95% CI = [-0.51, -0.05]). In contrast, in the
endogenous condition, with voluntary transfer of power, initial cooperation was
not only sustained, but even increased slightly over time (Figure 4.2a; mixed
effect regression, round × endogenous condition coefficient = 0.46, 95% CI =
[0.16, 0.74]). This was not the case for groups in the exogenous condition. Lack-
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round 4-20… … …
round 1
contribution
endogenous!
power transfer
exogenous!
power transfer
fixed!
power
condition
round 3
punishmentcontribution
round 2
punishmentcontribution
Figure 4.1: Timeline of the experiment. Groups in all three conditions started
with one round of a contribution stage, followed by round 2, consisting of a
contribution stage and a punishment stage. In round 3, the experimental ma-
nipulation was introduced. In the endogenous condition, representing the power
transfer game, group members were able to transfer power to other group mem-
bers before the contribution and punishment stages. Each exogenous condition
group mirrored the power transfers of one endogenous condition group and thus
group members were not able to transfer power voluntarily. In the fixed con-
dition, power transfers were not possible, and everyone’s power was fixed to 1.
Rounds 4 to 20 followed the structure of round 3, according to the assigned
condition.
95
ing the freedom to decide whom to transfer power to, these groups showed a
decline in cooperation that was not significantly different from that in the fixed
condition (Figure 4.2a; mixed effect regression, round × exogenous condition
coefficient = 0.22, 95% CI = [-0.06, 0.51]). Thus, only the voluntary transfer of
power could solve the social dilemma.
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Figure 4.2: Cooperation and punishment over rounds. (a) Mean contributions
to the group project for endogenous (dark green), exogenous (light green) and
fixed (grey) conditions. Yellow pie charts show overall earnings as a percentage
of the social optimum (maximum cooperation without punishment, 30 MUs per
group member = 100%), compared to the selfish outcome (minimal cooperation
without punishment, 20 MUs per group member = 0%) for each condition. (b)
Average amount of MUs spent on punishment in the endogenous (dark red),
exogenous (light red), and fixed (grey) conditions. Red pie charts show the av-
erage amount of MUs lost due to punishment dealt and received as a percentage
of the total earnings for each condition. Error bars show the within-subject
standard errors of the mean.
The punishment histories for all three conditions are displayed in Figure
4.2b. Overall, average MUs assigned for punishment declined over the course
of the experiment. This decline was the strongest in the endogenous condition
(mixed effect regression, round × endogenous condition coefficient = -0.07, 95%
CI = [-0.13, -0.00]). Higher levels of cooperation, and the more pronounced
decline in punishment in the endogenous condition paid off for participants in
terms of earnings. Participants with the ability to transfer power earned pro-
gressively more compared to participants in the two control conditions (Figure
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4.18, mixed effect regression, round × endogenous condition coefficient = 1.47,
95% CI = [0.56, 2.41]; difference between round × endogenous and round ×
exogenous condition coefficient = 0.79, 95% CI = [0.32, 1.26]). In contrast,
there was no significant difference in earnings over rounds between the fixed
and exogenous condition (mixed effect regression, round × exogenous condition
coefficient = 0.68, 95% CI = [-0.24, 1.59]). Thus, voluntary power transfer en-
abled participants to achieve an outcome much closer to the social optimum,
thereby enhancing group welfare.
To understand how groups in the endogenous condition solved the cooper-
ation dilemma, we first looked at the power centralization that emerged over
time. Power was already transferred in the first round with a power transfer
stage (round 3, see Figure 4.1). A substantial fraction of participants (37%) were
willing to transfer power in this round. The amount of power held by the most
powerful group member increased significantly over rounds (Figure 4.3a, mixed
effect regression, round coefficient = 0.02, 95% CI = [0.00, 0.04]). Thus, power
became more and more centralized. Centralization of power was positively re-
lated to cooperation in the endogenous condition, but not in the exogenous
condition. For each group, we computed the correlation across rounds between
power held by the most powerful group member and average cooperation. For
groups who could transfer power voluntarily, higher power centralization was
associated with higher average group cooperation (Figure 4.3b, mean Pearson’s
r = 0.24, one-sample t-test, t(25) = 2.9, p < .01, two-sided). In contrast, for
groups in the exogenous condition who experienced exactly the same power
centralization but without the ability to transfer power voluntarily, correlations
between power centralization and cooperation were not significantly different
from zero (Figure 4.3b, mean Pearson’s r = 0.08; one-sample t-test, t(26) =
1.3, p = 0.21, two-sided).
Next, we analyzed decisions in the endogenous condition on the individual
level in order to understand who transferred and who received power, how it
was used, and what effect it had on group members. Interestingly, even though
participants were unaware of the subsequent introduction of the power transfer
mechanism, behaviour in the first two rounds reliably predicted the average
power status of a group member: Initial cooperators, i.e., those who contributed
at or above the group average in the first round, received significantly more
power over the course of the experiment than initial free riders, defined as group
members who contributed less than the group average (Mann-Whitney U-test,
U = 2847.5, p < .01, two-sided). Similarly, group members who punished free
riders in the first punishment stage (round 2) received significantly more power
from other group members than those who were not willing to punish (Mann-
97
round
m
ax
im
um
 p
ow
er
1 4 7 10 13 16 20
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2.0
2.2
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ● ●
●
●
●
● ●
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● −1.0
−0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
co
rre
lat
ion
endogenous
round
av
er
ag
e 
ea
rn
ing
s (
in 
M
U)
1 4 7 10 13 16 20
90
100
110
120
130
140
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
● ●
●
●
● ●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
● ●
● ●
●
●
● ● ● ● ●
●
●
●
round
m
ea
n 
co
nt
rib
ut
ion
1 4 7 10 13 16 20
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
●
●
●
●
● ●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ● ●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
● ●
● ● ● ●
●
round
m
ea
n 
pu
nis
hm
en
t
1 4 7 10 13 16 20
0
1
2
3
4
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
● ● ● ●
●
●
●
● ● ●
●
power received
ea
rn
ing
s c
om
pa
re
d 
to
 g
ro
up
 a
ve
ra
ge
[0] (0,0.3] (0.3,0.5] (0.5]
−60
−40
−20
0
20
40
60
7% 6% 6%
a
29% 33% 45%
round 1 round 2 round 3
contribution contribution contribution
punishment punishment
power transfer
fixed endogenous exogenous
round 4–20
…
…
…
av
er
ag
e 
co
nt
rib
ut
ion
av
er
ag
e 
pu
nis
hm
en
t
a b
av
er
ag
e 
m
ax
im
um
 p
ow
er
endogenous exogenous
b
co
rre
lat
ion
av
er
ag
e 
ea
rn
ing
s (
in 
M
U)
round 3-8 round 9-14 round 15-20
co
op
er
at
ion
 d
ec
re
as
ing
 (n
=1
0)
co
op
er
at
ion
 in
cr
ea
sin
g 
(n
=1
7)
av
er
ag
e 
po
we
r r
ec
eiv
ed
C F
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
PF NP
first round type second round type
av
er
ag
e 
po
we
r r
ec
eiv
ed
first round type       second round type
ea
rn
ing
s c
om
pa
re
d 
to
 g
ro
up
 a
ve
ra
ge
1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.0
10
11
12
13
14
average maximum power
av
er
ag
e 
co
nt
rib
ut
ion
●
●●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●●
● ●●●
●
3
4 5
6
7
8 9
10
11
12
13
1415
16 171819
20
av
er
ag
e 
co
nt
rib
ut
ion
i  r
Figure 4.3: Power and cooperation. (a) Change of average power of the most
powerful group member over rounds in the endogenous condition (blue). In the
exogenous condition, power transfers were identical to the endogenous condi-
tion, and thus, the average power of the most powerful group member was the
same, too. In the fixed condition, power was fixed to 1 (grey). Error bars show
the within-subject standard errors of the mean. (b) Distribution of correla-
tions across rounds between maximum power and cooperation for each group in
the endogenous and exogenous condition. Thick horizontal bars represent the
medians.
Whitney U-test, U = 2294, p = 0.02, two-sided).
Looking at power transfers from round to round, power transfers were mostly
initiated by non-punishers. Group members with a lower than average punish-
ment expenditure were significantly more likely to give up power (mixed effect
logistic regression, t-1 punishment difference coefficient = 0.51, 95% CI = [0.17,
0.84]). In line with the first two rounds, the likelihood of receiving power was
significantly increased by being a cooperator or spending MUs on punishing free
riders in the previous round (mixed effect logistic regression, t-1 cooperator co-
efficient = 0.52, 95% CI = [0.18, 0.86]; t-1 punishing free rider coefficient = 0.78,
95% CI = [0.39, 1.19]). In turn, gaining power further increased the odds of
punishing free riders (mixed effect logistic regression, power coefficient = 1.55,
95% CI = [0.85, 2.23]). Since those willing to engage in costly punishment and
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cooperating above group average were more likely to gain power, and, in turn,
gaining power further increased the likelihood of spending own MUs on punish-
ment, powerful group members earned less than the group average (correlation
of power and earnings, Spearman’s rank correlation r = -0.24, p < .01, Figure
4.20). This indicates that the behaviour of powerful group members was not
driven by selfish payoff-maximisation.
Group members increased their contributions in response to punishment and
power changes. The more MUs someone lost due to receiving punishment in the
previous round, the more she increased her contribution to the group project
(mixed effect regression, earning reduction coefficient = 0.31, 95% CI = [0.25,
0.37]). Furthermore, the higher the increase in power centralization from the
previous round, the more group members increased their contributions com-
pared to the previous round (mixed effect regression, power change coefficient
= 4.76, 95% CI = [3.06, 6.48]). Thus, group members reacted not merely to
actual punishment, but also to the threat of powerful punishment.
However, not all groups in the endogenous condition were able to solve the
social dilemma. Out of 27 groups, cooperation increased steadily over time in 17
(cooperative groups), while it decreased in 10 (non-cooperative groups). This
increase or decrease in cooperation is not explained by initial propensities to
cooperate: Cooperation in the first round was not significantly different between
cooperative and non-cooperative groups (t-test, t(24) = 0.8, p = 0.43, two-
sided). To reach a solution to the free rider problem from a state of weak and
decentralized punishment, a punisher needs to be sufficiently empowered by her
peers. Therefore, some group members have to be willing to give up power
and believe that their power will be used in their interest. We measured this
willingness by the total amount of power transferred within the group. Further,
they have to select the right person to shift power to, somebody who will use
this power for the benefit of the group. To evaluate whether this selection was
successful, we calculated the share of rounds in which the group member most
willing to punish free riders in the past became the most powerful.
Power centralization, the willingness to give up power, as well as selection
success were not different in the first third of the experiment across coopera-
tive and non-cooperative groups (Figure 4.4). However, power centralization
increased more sharply in cooperative groups and remained stable towards the
end of the experiment (Figure 4.4a). This result supports the findings reported
above (see Figure 4.2b). In non-cooperative groups, power centralization de-
creased towards the end of the experiment. This observed difference was not
driven by willingness to give up power. The average amount of power transferred
was similar in the first two thirds of the experiment (Figure 4.4b). Instead,
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Figure 4.4: Characteristics of cooperative and non-cooperative groups across
time intervals. Bars depict groups in which cooperation declined (light grey),
or increased (dark grey). (a) Power centralization, measured by the power of
the most powerful group member; (b) average amount of power transferred; (c)
selection success, measured by the share of rounds in which the most active
punisher of non-cooperators of past rounds was the most powerful.
cooperative and non-cooperative groups diverged in their success to central-
ize power in the hands of a group member who reliably punished free riders
over past rounds (Figure 4.4c). Thus, groups that transferred sufficient power
to the right group member could maintain cooperation. Figure 4.5 shows the
power transfer networks. Although the initial networks had a similar structure,
non-cooperative groups diverted more power away from the centre, and also
transferred it along circles, leading to less power centralization. On the other
hand, cooperative groups directed more and more power to one group member
over time.
4.4 Discussion
Power hierarchies help foster cooperation and lead to a better social outcome
in environments where decentralized peer punishment is unable to sustain co-
operation. The transfer of power solves the social dilemma by enabling group
members who do not punish (second-order free riders) to empower cooperators
who are willing to sacrifice private resources to bring free riders in line. Free
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Figure 4.5: Power networks by time interval and cooperation success. Each net-
work shows the average power transfers (blue arrows) of groups in which either
cooperation increased (top), or declined (bottom) in a given third of the exper-
iment. The thickness of the line is proportional to the amount transferred. The
size of the group members (nodes) is proportional to the amount of accumulated
power.
riders anticipate this behaviour and raise their cooperation when they observe
that a powerful group member is emerging.
Our work demonstrates the emergence of centralized punishment out of a
‘state of nature’, characterized by weak and decentralized punishment. The
resulting power hierarchy overcomes the problems of peer punishment. As pro-
social punishers gain power, anti-social punishment becomes more risky. In-
terestingly, the most powerful group members earned the least, indicating that
their behaviour was not driven by financial incentives. They were instead will-
ing to use their power for the sake of the group. Conversely, it is essential that
power is concentrated in the right hands. When groups did not have the freedom
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to decide whom to direct power to, or failed to select the right group member,
cooperation could not be sustained.
Social structures that are characterized by an unequal distribution of power
are not only prevalent in human societies but also in other social animals (Ellis,
1995). For example, many nonhuman primates live in complex social groups or-
ganized in dominance hierarchies (de Waal, 1987, Cheney and Seyfarth, 1990).
The emergence of social structures in which some group members have more
power than others to enforce shared goals may thus be a crucial step in the
evolution of cooperation. In human societies, institutions such as elected rep-
resentative bodies, legal courts and law enforcement agencies govern much of
social life. These institutions are built upon, and embody the centralization of
power. The willingness to give up, transfer and centralize power, demonstrated
here, can be seen as an important intermediary step and prerequisite to the
constitution of such complex institutions.
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4.A Appendix – Supplementary materials
4.A.1 Game description
We introduce a new game, the ‘power transfer game’. In the power transfer
game, a punishment stage and a power transfer stage are added to the standard
public goods game. The game-theoretic description given below first presents
the standard public goods game, and then adds the punishment and the power
transfer mechanisms sequentially. For equilibrium analysis, we focus on subgame
perfect and trembling hand perfect equilibria.
Public goods game
The public goods game is played by n > 2 players. Each player has an ini-
tial endowment of E monetary units (MUs). Players decide on how much of the
endowment to contribute to a public good, keeping the remaining amount. Con-
tributions to the public good are multiplied by m, and then distributed equally
among all players. We assume m > 1 and mn < 1;
m
n is called the ‘marginal
per capita return’. Decisions on contribution are made simultaneously. The
contribution of player i is denoted by ci, with 0 ≤ ci ≤ E. After the contribu-
tion decisions are made, each player is informed about the contributions of all
players, and the level of the public good.
In the public goods game, player i’s payoff is given by:
pii = E − ci + 1
n
m
n∑
j=1
cj .
Selfish payoff-maximisation prescribes a contribution of ci = 0 for each indi-
vidual i, as mn < 1, and thus the private return on each invested MU is negative:
m
n − 1 < 0. However, since m > 1, the social return of contributions is positive:
m − 1 > 0. Therefore, social optimum, defined as the sum of all monetary
payoffs, is reached when all the players contribute their full endowment, i.e., at
ci = E. With full contributions, the earnings of everyone will be mE. How-
ever, at individually rational contributions of zero, each player earns just their
endowment E. Thus, everyone contributing their full endowment constitutes
a Pareto-improvement over zero contributions. As selfish motives clash with
group interests, the public goods game is an example of a social dilemma.
Because contributing zero is a strictly dominant strategy for every player,
ci = 0 for all players constitutes the only Nash-equilibrium of the game. When
the public goods game is played for a finite number of periods, we get through
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a backward induction argument that contributions are zero for every period in
the only subgame perfect equilibrium of the game.
In our experiment, the game was played with n = 5 players, and the contri-
bution multiplier was set to m = 1.5. The initial endowment was E = 20, and
only integer contributions were allowed.
Public goods game with punishment
A punishment option is added to the simple public goods game. Following con-
tributions and after being informed about their peers’ contributions, players
simultaneously make a punishment decision. Player i can assign 0 ≤ dij ≤ dmax
deduction points (DP) to each other player j 6= i. For each DP that player i
assigns to player j, player i’s own payoff is reduced by the cost of punishment,
pc, while the punished player j’s payoff is reduced by the effectiveness of pun-
ishment pe. After punishment decisions are made, players are informed about
who punished whom, and by how much (i.e., all DP assignments dij).
In the public goods game with punishment, player i’s payoff is given by:
pii = E − ci + 1
n
m
n∑
j=1
cj − pc
n∑
j=1
j 6=i
dij − pe
n∑
j=1
j 6=i
dji.
In the only subgame perfect equilibrium of the one-shot public goods game
with punishment, punishments and contributions are zero. The reasoning is as
follows: Once the contribution decisions are made, no selfish payoff-maximiser
has any incentive to punish, because doing so would only reduce her payoffs.
Therefore, it can be known from the start that dij = 0. Therefore, later punish-
ment is not credible, and cannot raise contributions above ci = 0. In the finitely
repeated public goods game with punishment, the same backwards induction
argument can be used, starting with the last period, to show that in a subgame
perfect equilibrium, punishment and contribution is zero in all periods.
Almost ubiquitously in the literature, the cost of punishment is set at pc = 1.
In the majority of experiments, the effectiveness of punishment is higher than
its cost, with the most commonly used value of pe = 3. In our experiment, we
set the initial effectiveness to the same level as its cost at pe = pc = 1 (see
the next subsection). We limited the number of deduction points that could
be assigned to dmax = 10. We imposed no lower constraint on the earnings of
players. Thus, players could punish and be punished below zero income.
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Power transfer game
We modify the public goods game with punishment by adding an additional
decision before the contribution decision where players may transfer their power.
Power determines the effectiveness of punishment. Players control an equal
amount of power p̂e, and can decide to transfer it to other players. Thus, player
i decides on how much power ptij to transfer to each player j (allowing for
j = i), with ptij ≥ 0 and
∑n
j=1 ptij = p̂e. Power transfer is free. Moreover,
transferring power has no impact on the cost of punishment pc. The power pei
of player i will be the total power she keeps for herself and receives from others:
pei =
∑n
j=1 ptji. Players are informed about every player’s power before they
decide on their subsequent contributions.
In the power transfer game, player i’s payoff is given by:
pii = E − ci + 1
n
m
n∑
j=1
cj − pc
n∑
j=1
j 6=i
dij − pej
n∑
j=1
j 6=i
dji
To recapitulate, the items of the sum are, in turn, the initial endowment, the
contribution to the public good, the individual return from the public good, the
cost of punishment dealt to others, and the punishment received from others.
The cost of punishment pc is not affected by power transfers. Thus, the
same argument showing that both punishments and contributions are zero in
the only equilibrium of the public goods game with punishment can be extended
to the power transfer game straightforwardly. Therefore, ci = 0 and dij = 0
in the subgame perfect equilibria of the finitely repeated power transfer game.
However, we get a multiplicity of equilibria, because any level of power transfers
is compatible with these choices. We can get a unique equilibrium by focusing
instead on trembling hand perfection. In this case, ‘slips of hand’ – strategies
that assign a positive probability to every pure strategy – should be taken into
account. Thus, a player needs to consider the possibility that she might get
punished by another by mistake. If the player has transferred any power to
whomever punishes her, her payoff will be lower than if she had chosen not to
transfer power. Because of this potentially harmful effect of power transfers,
players should not transfer power to any other player. Therefore, in the only
trembling hand perfect equilibrium, we get peij = 0 for each player i and other
player j 6= i.
In our experiment, each player controlled a total power of p̂e = 1, so the
constraint on power transfers was
∑n
j=1 ptij = 1.
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4.A.2 Timeline and parameter setup
We assign each simultaneously made decision, together with the feedback/information
provided after the decision to a stage. The timeline of the power transfer game
is thus the following.
1. Power transfer stage: power transfer decision;
players are informed about every player’s effectiveness.
2. Contribution stage: contribution decision;
players are informed about every player’s contribution.
3. Punishment stage: DP assignment;
players are informed about all DP assignments.
To summarise, our choice of parameters for the experiment was as follows:
• n = 5 players;
• contribution multiplier m = 1.5;
• initial endowment E = 20 MUs;
• maximum number of deduction points dmax = 10;
• punishment cost pc = 1;
• own power p̂e = 1.
4.A.3 Participants
Participants were recruited from the subject pool of the Behavioural and Ex-
perimental Economics lab (BEElab) at Maastricht University and were invited
via e-mail. Participants were randomly assigned to groups of five. Each exper-
imental session comprised at least 3 and at most 5 groups.
Participants were paid the sum of monetary units (MUs) earned over the
20 rounds (10 MUs = e 0.25) plus a show-up fee of e 3 and a small sum based
on an incentivised social value orientation questionnaire. In three groups the
experiment was aborted due to a network malfunction. In these groups data
are available for at least 14 rounds and used as such in the analysis.
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4.A.4 Experimental setup
Participants were seated in separate cubicles and stayed there for the duration
of the whole experiment. Each participant had a notepad and a pen to make
notes.
The experiment started with one round of a public goods game (PG). Partic-
ipants read instructions explaining the rules of the PG on the computer screen.
Instructions used neutral labels for describing the social dilemma: Participants
were told that they would receive 20 MUs each round and that they have to
decide how many MUs to contribute to a ‘project’. The output of the project
would then be distributed equally among all group members, irrespective of how
much each member contributed. After reading the instructions, participants had
to answer a set of comprehension questions about the rules of the PG.
Round 1: contribution
At the beginning of the first round each participant was asked to indicate how
much of the 20 MUs to contribute to the project. When entering a number,
the participant saw a graphical representation of the share of MUs she would
contribute. After each participant in the group made a contribution decision,
they saw how much each group member contributed. Group members were
associated with a unique symbol by which they could be identified throughout
the whole experiment. Participants saw a summary of the earnings of each group
member and the outcome of the group project for this round. This summary
was provided at the end of every round.
Round 2: punishment
In the second round, punishment was introduced. Participants received instruc-
tions on the computer screen and answered a set of comprehension questions
about the punishment rules. Instead of ‘punishment’ we used the neutral label
‘deduction’ and ‘deduction points (DP)’ in the instructions and throughout the
experiment. Upon answering all questions correctly, participants entered the
contribution stage of round 2. After getting informed about the contribution
of each group member, participants simultaneously assigned between 0 and 10
deduction points to each other group member. When entering a number, par-
ticipants saw the DP costs as well as the effect the punishment would have on
the punished.
The deduction stage outcome summary showed which participants were pun-
ished and by whom using a graphical matrix representation. By going through
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the matrix by columns, participants could see how much a group member con-
tributed in the contribution stage, how many DPs in total this group member
spent on punishing others, and how many DPs were assigned to her by the oth-
ers as well as the effect it had on her earnings. By going through the matrix by
rows, participants could see how much the corresponding group member pun-
ished other group members. On this screen, participants also had the possibility
to look at behaviour of previous rounds. Thus, it was possible to review past
contribution and punishment decisions of each group member. The round ended
with the outcome screen.
In the second round, for each assigned DP, the punisher had to pay 1 MU
and the punished would lose 1 MU. With the power transfer mechanism intro-
duced in the third round and explained below, this effectiveness-to-cost ratio of
punishment could change from round to round.
Round 3: power transfer
Before entering the next round, participants received the third and final set of
instructions. In the fixed condition, participants were told that the contribution
stage and the punishment stage would be repeated for another 18 rounds. In
the endogenous condition, the power transfer stage was explained to the partici-
pants. Neutral labels for power was used. Instead of ‘power’, we used ‘deduction
effectiveness’ and the stage was called ‘shifting stage’. After answering a set
of comprehension questions about the power transfer mechanism, participants
started the third round with the power transfer stage. In this stage, participants
had the possibility to transfer power to other group members. Each participant
had a power of 1 and could transfer power in units of 0.1 to other group mem-
bers. Power could also be distributed among multiple group members (e.g., it
was possible to transfer 0.5 to one participant, 0.2 to another participant and
keep 0.3 to oneself).
After all participants made their power transfer decisions, they were shown
the power each group member had for this round, based on the five transfer
decisions. Note that participants could not see the individual transfer decisions
of the other group member but only the outcome of these decisions, i.e., the
total power of each group member for this round.
In the exogenous condition, instead of transferring power by themselves,
power changed exogenously based on the power transfer decisions that partici-
pants made in one of the endogenous groups. In the instructions set, participants
were told that “deduction effectiveness of you and the other group members can
change” from round 3 to 20. Therefore, they could not transfer power voluntar-
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ily, but only saw the changes in power at the beginning of each round, starting
from round three.
Changes in power modified the effectiveness of punishment. In the fixed
condition, power was fixed to 1 and transferring power was not possible, just
like in round two for all conditions. In the other two conditions power could
change as explained above.
Rounds 4–20
In the exogenous and endogenous condition the power transfer, the contribution
and the punishment stage were repeated for the consecutive 17 rounds, with the
difference that in the exogenous condition, participants saw the change in power
from round to round, without being able to influence it themselves.
Each round began with the power transfer stage. The transfer decisions
made in the previous round served as the status quo for the current round.
When entering round 4, participants would see the power status each group
member had in the previous round together with the transfer decisions made
by the participant in the previous power transfer stage. Thus, by default, the
participant would make the same power allocation as th one she chose in the
previous round. However, the participant could also decide to reverse or change
the previous decision by changing the numbers below each bar accordingly (with
the only constraint that the total amount of power transferred could never
exceed 1).
By introducing punishment and power transfer stage round by round to the
participants, we were able to measure baseline contribution and punishment
rates across conditions. There should be no significant differences in average con-
tributions in the first and average contributions and punishment in the second
round between conditions, since the actual experimental manipulation started
in the third round.
Computer interface
Figures 4.6 to 4.16 show what a group member would see on the computer
screen in the different stages from round 3 to the beginning of round 4 in the
endogenous treatment in a hypothetical round. What is shown is meant as an
example to explain the computer interface and does not represent real data.
At the beginning of round 3, our group member sees the first power transfer
stage screen (Figure 4.6). In this example, our group member decides to transfer
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0.5 of her power to group member 3 and 0.2 of her power to group member 4
(Figure 4.7).
After all group members made their power transfer decision, the power trans-
fer outcome screen is shown. Due to power transfers of our and the other group
members, group member 3 now holds the most power, while our group member
is the least powerful in the group (Figure 4.8).
The next screens show the contribution stage (Figure 4.9). Our group mem-
ber decides to contribute 15 MUs to the group project (Figure 4.10). After
all group members made their contribution decision, the contribution outcome
screen is shown (Figure 4.11).
After the contribution stage, the group enters the deduction stage (punish-
ment). Figure 4.12 shows the input screen of the deduction stage. In the first
row, the contributions of each group member in the previous contribution stage
is shown. By entering numbers between 1 and 10 below each column, our group
member is able to assign deduction points. This is shown in Figure 4.13. Our
group member decides to assign 2 DPs to group member 2 and 5 DPs to group
member 5.
After all group members made their punishment decisions, the deduction
outcome screen is shown. In this example, both our group member and group
member 3 decides to punish group member 5 by 5 DPs for free riding in this
round’s contribution stage (Figure 4.14). Since our group member only has
a power of 0.3, her punishment is rather ineffective. The 5 DPs costs her 5
MUs but will only reduce the earnings of group member 5 by 1.5 MUs (0.3
effectiveness times 5 DPs). In contrast, group member 3 received power from
other group members and has a total power of 2. The 5 DPs assigned to group
member 5 also reduces her earnings by 5 (costs of punishment), but will reduce
the earnings of group member 5 more substantially. Group member 5 would
lose 10 MUs due to this punishment (2.0 effectiveness times 5 DPs). The same
logic applies to the punishment of group member 2 by our group member and
group member 3 (Figure 4.14).
On the next screen the outcome of this round is shown (Figure 4.15). Group
members see the earnings of each group member as well as the outcome of the
group project.
By pressing the button at the bottom of the screen, our group member can
enter the next round, starting with the power transfer stage. Previously, she
decided to transfer some of her power to group members 3 and 4. This decision
serves as the default option in this round’s power transfer stage (Figure 4.16).
By pressing ‘accept & proceed’, she would again transfer 0.5 and 0.2 of her
power to these group members, respectively.
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Figure 4.6: Power transfer stage before input, round 3. Since this is the first
round with power transfers, the status quo option, visualised here, is not to
transfer any power to others. Each group member is associated with a unique
symbol throughout the whole experiment. Note that this screen did not appear
in the fixed and exogenous condition.
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Figure 4.7: Power transfer stage screen, round 3. Input to each field is followed
by a graphical representation of how the power status of the respective group
member will change (if nobody else transfers any power). Own power is shown
in dark blue. A button labelled ‘accept & proceed’ allows the participant to
finalize her decision. Note that this screen did not appear in the fixed and
exogenous condition.
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Figure 4.8: Power transfer outcome screen, round 3. After every group member
made her power transfer decision, the power transfer outcome screen is shown.
Bars represent the power of each group member for this round. Power changes
due to transferring own power are shown in dark blue. Note that this screen
did not appear in the fixed condition.
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Figure 4.9: Contribution stage before input, round 3. Participants decide si-
multaneously how much of their endowment of 20 monetary units (MUs) to
contribute to the group project.
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Figure 4.10: Contribution stage input screen, round 3. After inputing a number,
the participant sees a graphical representation of the fraction of her endowment
she would contribute. A button labelled “accept & proceed” allows the partici-
pant to finalize her decision.
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Figure 4.11: Contribution stage outcome screen, round 3. After all participants
make their contribution decision, the outcome screen shows how much each
group member contributed.
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Figure 4.12: Punishment stage screen before input, round 3. Each participant
sees a 5×5 punishment matrix (yellow and grey rectangles) and assigns between
0 and 10 deduction points (DPs) to each other group member. Information
about the power of each group member is available (blue number next to player
symbols on the left). In the first row, the contributions of each group member
in the contribution stage of this round are shown.
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Figure 4.13: Punishment stage screen after input, round 3. The participant
sees the total cost of her DP assignments (orange bar on the top left). The
current DP assignment, as well as the effect on the punished group member are
represented in the 5×5 matrix (yellow bars for DP assignments, orange numbers
in parentheses next to them representing the effect on the punished).
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Figure 4.14: Punishment stage outcome screen. Participants see who was pun-
ished by whom. Each column indicates by how much a group member was pun-
ished, while the rows indicate by whom these deduction points were assigned
by.
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Figure 4.15: Earnings screen, round 3. This screen is shown at the end of
each round summarising earnings and the outcome of the group project (sum
of contributions ×1.5). The sum of MUs kept, MUs received from the group
project, losses due to assigning DPs, and losses due to receiving punishment led
to the payoffs seen on the screen.
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Figure 4.16: Power transfer stage screen before input, round 4. Each bar rep-
resents the power of each group member in the previous round. The power
transfers made in the previous round serve as the status quo allocation for this
round. Dark blue bar segments indicate the power allocated by the active group
member. Thus by pressing “accept & proceed”, the participant will again allo-
cate 0.5 of her power to group member 3 and 0.2 of her power to group member
4.
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4.B Appendix – Supplementary analysis
4.B.1 Measurements
For the statistical analysis, we defined proxies and compound measures based
on the behavioural data. Each of these measures is defined below.
Punishment behaviour
For the receiving power and use of power models (see below), we were interested
in how power was used with regards to punishment. We wanted to differentiate
the punishment dealt to free riders from that dealt to cooperators (antisocial
punishment). Moreover, we opted for a measure that assigned higher value
for punishing non-cooperators who deviated more from average contributions.
Punishment behaviour was defined as:
punishment behaviourit =
5∑
j=1
i6=j
( c¯t − cjt
σct
× dijt
)
where cjt = contribution of player j in round t,
c¯t and σct = mean and standard deviation of contributions
in round t,
dijt = deduction points assigned by i to j
in round t, with 2 ≤ t ≤ 20.
(4.1)
Thus, for each group member in each round, assigned deduction points were
weighted by the standardised cooperation of the punished group member and
summed up. Negative numbers therefore indicated that punishment was pre-
dominantly used to punish cooperators (antisocial punishment), while positive
numbers indicated that punishment was predominantly used to punish free rid-
ers (e.g., a punishment behaviour value of 1 can be interpreted as using one
deduction point to punish a group member with a contribution that was 1 stan-
dard deviation below group average in this round’s contribution stage). Figure
4.17 shows the percentage of punishment behaviour types across treatments.
Antisocial punishment (free riders punishing cooperators) was observed less fre-
quently than no punishment and the punishment of free riders.
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Figure 4.17: Cooperation and punishment decisions. Percentage of punishment
decisions observed across treatments (light grey = endogenous condition, grey
= exogenous condition, dark grey = fixed condition). C = cooperator, FR =
free rider.
Power centralization
We summarised power centralization through a single indicator: the power of
the most powerful group member. In the fixed condition every group member
had a fixed power of 1. For the endogenous and exogenous conditions, power
centralization was defined by:
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power centralizationt = max
i∈1,... ,5
peit
where peit =
5∑
j=1
ptjit, power (i.e., punishment effectiveness) of i
in round t, with 3 ≤ t ≤ 20.
(4.2)
A minimal power centralization of 1 was achieved by, for instance, no power
being transferred in a given round. A full power centralization value of 5 would
be achieved, if all group members transferred their power to a single individual.
Willingness to transfer power
We defined our measure for the willingness to transfer power as the sum of all
power transferred in a certain round.
willingness to transfert =
5∑
i=1
5∑
j=1
j 6=i
ptjit
where ptjit = power transferred from j to i
in round t, with 3 ≤ t ≤ 20.
(4.3)
In rounds when group members did not transfer any power to each other,
our willingness to transfer measure took a value of 0. A willingness to transfer
of 5 would be achieved, if everyone transferred all their power.
Selection success
We introduced a measure to gauge a group’s ability to select the most active
prosocial punishers as the recipient of power transfers. First, building on Defi-
nition 4.1, we defined the aggregate (past) punishment behaviour as:
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APBit (aggregate punishment behaviourit) =
t−1∑
j=2
(
punishment behaviourij
)
in round t, with 3 ≤ t ≤ 20.
(4.4)
This variable summarized information about the past behaviour of group
members, as potential leaders of the in-group power hierarchy. Within a group,
larger values for a certain member i indicated both the amount of resource i
sacrificed for punishment, as well as her propensity to pick less cooperative group
members, as a target for her punishment. If the past is a reliable predictor of
an individual’s future behaviour, those who showed a willingness to punish non-
cooperators should receive the most power. Thus, for groups in the endogenous
condition, we defined our selection success in the following manner:
selection successt =
{ 1
| arg max
i=1,... ,5
peit| if APBit ∈ arg max
i=1,... ,5
peit,
0 otherwise,
in round t, with 3 ≤ t ≤ 20.
(4.5)
Specifically, if in a certain round individual i having the highest aggregate
punishment behaviour was strictly more powerful than all other group members,
then for that round the selection success of the group would be 1. If, however, i
was less powerful than some other group member, we would assign it a value of
0. In case of a tie, the value would be 1 divided by the number of group members
that are equally (most) powerful. In such a case, the group has partially solved
the selection problem, and we would assign 12 ,
1
3 , etc. to the selection success
variable.
4.B.2 Statistical models
Because of the hierarchical structure of the data (participants clustered in groups
and repeated measures over rounds), we fitted Bayesian mixed effects models to
the data using R and JAGS.
Non-informative Gaussian priors (m=0, sd=100) were used for each predic-
tor and non-informative uniform priors (range from 0 to 100) for the error terms.
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In every model, random intercepts and slopes were allowed to covary. Therefore,
the variance-covariance matrix was estimated alongside the fixed and random
coefficients. For the correlations between random effects, non-informative uni-
form priors (range from −1 to 1) were used. We used three parallel chains. For
every estimated coefficient, the potential scale reduction factor (Gelman and
Rubin Diagnostic) was below 1.05, indicating good mixing of the three chains
and thus high convergence. Regression tables reported below show estimated
coefficients together with the 95% confidence interval (CI, also called highest
density interval in the Bayesian framework). Note that, since non-informative
priors were used, a 95% CI that only contains negative or positive values can be
interpreted as significant at a p = .05 two-sided threshold from the frequentist
perspective. Fitting the models using restricted maximum likelihood (REML)
as implemented in the lme4 package in R revealed similar estimates and the
same statistical inferences. However, models on the individual subject level
failed to converge and also the censoring in the data could not be accounted for
in these models.
Group level analysis
The aim of the group level analysis was to compare cooperation (i.e., contribu-
tion to the group project), punishment and earnings across the three different
conditions, as well as to analyse the increase of maximum power over rounds in
the endogenous condition (and thus also the exogenous condition). For this, we
aggregated the data by group members, such that for each group we had one
data point for each round (e.g., average contribution).
Contribution. The fixed part of the contribution model contained two dummy
variables coding the three experimental conditions (with the fixed condition as
baseline), a continuous round predictor and the round × condition interactions.
The random part contained a random intercept as well as a random slope for
the round predictor for each group. Thus, for each group a separate baseline
cooperation rate in round 1, and a separate slope of cooperation over rounds
was estimated (see Equations 4.6). Since average group contribution could not
exceed 20 and fall below 0, the data were treated as left and right censored.
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yi ∼ N(µy, σ2y), for i = 1, . . . , n
µy = α1j + β1jround + α2 + β2round
+ β3exogenous + β4endogenous
+ β5exogenous× round + β6endogenous× round(
α1j
β1j
)
∼ N
((
0
0
)
,
(
σ2α1 ρσ
2
α1σ
2
β1
ρσ2α1σ
2
β1
σ2β1
))
, for j = 1, . . . , J,
where n = number of observations,
J = number of groups.
(4.6)
Table 4.1 shows the estimated coefficients together with the 95% CI. First
round cooperation was predicted to be 12.6 for the fixed condition. Groups in
the exogenous and endogenous conditions did not significantly differ from this
initial level of cooperation (β3 and β4). In the fixed condition, there was a
significant drop in cooperation over rounds (β2). The drop in cooperation was
not significantly different in the exogenous condition (β5). In contrast, in the
endogenous condition, cooperation over time was significantly higher (β6).
Examining the posterior distributions of the exogenous × round and endoge-
nous × round parameter revealed an estimated difference of 0.24 with a 95%
CI ranging from 0.08 to 0.39. Thus, also compared to the exogenous condition,
cooperation over time was significantly higher in the endogenous condition.
Punishment The punishment model followed the same structure as the con-
tribution model (see Equations 4.6), except for average deduction points spent
as the dependent variable. Since average group punishment could not fall below
0, the data were treated as left censored.
Table 4.2 shows the estimated coefficients together with the 95% CI. Pun-
ishment expenses in the second round (first round with punishment) did not
significantly differ across conditions (α2, β3 and β4). In the fixed condition, the
use of punishment dropped over rounds (β2). Groups in the exogenous condition
did not deviate significantly from this trend (β5). In the endogenous condition,
the drop in punishment expenses over rounds was significantly higher compared
to the fixed condition (β6).
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estimate 95% CI
α2 intercept (fixed condition,
round 1)
12.60 [10.19, 14.95]
β2 round -0.28 [-0.51, -0.05]
β3 exogenous condition dummy -1.84 [-4.86, 1.01]
β4 endogenous condition dummy -1.47 [-4.56, 1.46]
β5 exogenous condition × round 0.22 [-0.06, 0.51]
β6 endogenous condition × round 0.46 [0.16, 0.74]
σ2α1 error-term random intercepts 0.47 [0.38, 0.56]
σ2β1 error-term round slopes 2.41 [2.31, 2.51]
σ2y error-term y 4.55 [3.76, 5.42]
ρ correlation between random ef-
fects
-0.15 [-0.40, 0.09]
Table 4.1: Contribution regression model.
Dependent variable: Contribution group average clustered by group.
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estimate 95% CI
α2 intercept (fixed condition,
round 2)
1.32 [0.70, 1.94]
β2 round -0.08 [-0.13, -0.03]
β3 exogenous condition dummy -0.19 [-0.97, 0.58]
β4 endogenous condition dummy 0.10 [-0.66, 0.89]
β5 exogenous condition × round -0.01 [-0.08, 0.05]
β6 endogenous condition × round -0.07 [-0.13, -0.002]
σ2α1 error-term random intercepts 0.08 [0.05, 0.10]
σ2β1 error-term round slopes 1.47 [1.39, 1.55]
σ2y error-term y 1.04 [0.78, 1.32]
ρ correlation between random ef-
fects
-0.60 [-0.82, -0.35]
Table 4.2: Punishment regression model.
Dependent variable: Average punishment expense clustered by group.
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Figure 4.18: Average earnings over rounds. Average earnings in the fixed condi-
tion (grey), exogenous condition (light yellow) and endogenous condition (dark
yellow). Error bars show the within-subject standard errors of the mean.
Group earnings Figure 4.18 shows the average earnings over rounds by con-
dition. There was a substantial drop in earnings in all three conditions after the
introduction punishment to the experiment in round 2, as it is often observed
in PG experiments with punishment.
The group earnings regression model followed the same structure as the
contribution model (see Equations 4.6), except for aggregated earnings (in MUs)
as the dependent variable. Since earnings for one round could not exceed 150
MUs (20 MUs× 5 participants× 1.5), the data were treated as right censored.
Table 4.3 shows the estimated coefficients together with the 95% CI. Earn-
ings in the first round did not significantly differ between fixed and exogenous
condition, as well as fixed and endogenous condition (β3 and β4). Earnings were
significantly higher over rounds in the endogenous condition compared to the
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estimate 95% CI
α2 intercept (fixed condition,
round 1)
118.72 [111.12, 127.07]
β2 round -0.36 [-1.08, 0.36]
β3 exogenous condition dummy -3.31 [-13.29, 6.79]
β4 endogenous condition
dummy
-3.30 [-13.30, 6.64]
β5 exogenous condition × round 0.68 [-0.24, 1.59]
β6 endogenous condition ×
round
1.47 [0.56, 2.41]
σ2α1 error-term random intercepts 1.36 [1.06, 1.68]
σ2β1 error-term round slopes 13.58 [13.01, 14.15]
σ2y error-term y 14.91 [12.01, 18.04]
ρ correlation between random
effects
-0.24 [-0.50, 0.02]
Table 4.3: Earnings regression model.
Dependent variable: Average earnings clustered by group.
fixed condition (β6).
Examining the posterior distributions of the exogenous × round and endoge-
nous × round parameter revealed an estimated difference of 0.79 with a 95%
CI ranging from 0.32 to 1.26. Thus, also compared to the exogenous condition,
earnings over time were significantly higher in the endogenous condition.
Maximum power The maximum power regression model followed the same
random structure as the contribution model (see Equations 4.6), but since power
transfers only happened in the endogenous condition and exogenous condition
groups merely mimicked these transfers over time, the model used only data
of the endogenous condition and therefore contained only one predictor coding
the round. The dependent variable was power centralization, i.e., the amount
of power of the most powerful group member in a particular round. Since
maximum power could not fall below 1, the data were treated as left censored.
Table 4.4 shows the estimated coefficients together with the 95% CI. Already
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estimate 95% CI
α2 intercept (round 3) 1.455 [1.237, 1.672]
β2 round 0.024 [0.004, 0.043]
σ2α1 error-term random intercepts 0.041 [0.023, 0.060]
σ2β1 error-term round slopes 0.579 [0.536, 0.624]
σ2y error-term y 0.499 [0.314, 0.699]
ρ correlation between random
effects
-0.063 [-0.574, 0.465]
Table 4.4: Power change regression model.
Dependent variable: maximum power clustered by group.
in the first power transfer stage (round 3), average power centralization was
predicted to be 1.5 by the model (α2). Power accumulation increased over
rounds. In each round, the maximum power was estimated to increase by 0.02
on average (β2).
Individual level analysis
The aim of the the individual level analysis was to analyse who received power,
who was willing to give up power, and how power affected contributions in the
endogenous condition on a round-by-round basis. Therefore, the data were not
aggregated on a group level and thus was clustered by groups and by individuals
(over time). The regression models accounted for that by having two grouping
levels (see below).
In the receiving, giving, and use of power models, the distributions of the
dependent variables were non-normal and highly restricted. We therefore trans-
formed the dependent variable in these models into a dichotomous variable and
fitted logistic regressions.
Also some predictors were transformed to dichotomous ‘type’ variables. This
has the downside of losing some statistical power, as well as the ability to make
more detailed quantitative statements (e.g., with a one point increase in the in-
dependent variable, the probability of the dependent variable being 1 changes by
x). On the other hand, coefficients can be interpreted more easily. For example,
by converting contributions to a binary variable (equal to or above/below group
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average), participants are classified into free riders (those who contributed less
than group average) and cooperators (those who contributed at least or above
group average).
Receiving power The dependent variable of the receiving power model was
power received by other group members (0 = no power received, 1 = power
received). The fixed part of the model contained the continuous round predictor,
a dummy predictor indicating free riding or cooperation (0 = below average
contribution, 1 = equal to or above average contribution) in previous round’s
contribution stage, and a dummy predictor coding the punishment behaviour
(see Equation 4.1; 0 antisocial or no punishment, 1 = punishment of free riders)
of previous round’s punishment stage as predictors.
The random part of the model contained a random intercept and a random
slope for the round predictor for each group, as well as a random intercept
and a random slope for the round predictor for each participant. Thus, for each
group a separate baseline of the likelihood of power transferring in round 3 (first
power transfer stage), and a separate slope in how the likelihood of transferring
power changed over rounds was estimated. Separately, the model estimated the
likelihood of power being transferred in round 3, as well as the change in the
likelihood of receiving power over rounds for each participant (see Equations
4.7).
Pr(yi = 1) ∼ logit−1(µy), for i = 1, . . . , n
µy = α1j + β1jround + α2k + β2kround
+ α3 + β3round + β4contribution typet−1
+ β5punishment typet−1(
α1j
β1j
)
∼ N
((
0
0
)
,
(
σ2α1 ρ1σ
2
α1σ
2
β1
ρ1σ
2
α1σ
2
β1
σ2β1
))
, for j = 1, . . . , J,
(
α2k
β2k
)
∼ N
((
0
0
)
,
(
σ2α2 ρ2σ
2
α2σ
2
β2
ρ2σ
2
α2σ
2
β2
σ2β2
))
, for k = 1, . . . ,K,
where n = number of observations,
J = number of groups,
K = number of subjects.
(4.7)
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Table 4.5 shows the estimated coefficients together with the 95% CI as well as
the odds ratio (exponential of coefficient). According to the model, cooperators
had a 68% increase in odds of receiving power (β4). The odds of receiving power
more than doubled for participants who punished free riders in the previous
punishment stage (β5).
estimate odds ratio 95% CI
α3 intercept (round 3) 0.16 [-1.13 1.53]
β3 round -0.14 0.87 [-0.25 -0.03]
β4 contribution typet−1 0.52 1.68 [ 0.18 0.86]
β5 punishment typet−1 0.78 2.18 [ 0.39 1.19]
σ2α1 error-term random intercepts
(group level)
3.23 [2.08, 4.53]
σ2β1 error-term round slopes (group
level)
2.54 [1.87, 3.26]
σ2α2 error-term random intercepts
(individual level)
0.23 [0.13, 0.33]
σ2β2 error-term round slopes (indi-
vidual level)
0.27 [0.19, 0.34]
σ2y error-term y 49.97 [1.39, 96.31]
ρ1 correlation random effects
(group level)
-0.55 [-0.89, -0.14]
ρ2 correlation random effects (in-
dividual level)
-0.46 [-0.72, -0.18]
Table 4.5: Receiving power regression model.
Dependent variable: power received (0 = no, 1 = yes) clustered by group and
participant.
Giving away power The regression model for giving away power followed
the same random structure described in Equations 4.7. The dependent variable
coded the transfer of power to other group member (0 indicated no transfer of
power and 1 indicated transfer of power).
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In this analysis, we were interested in whether the willingness to spend points
on punishment predicted the likelihood of giving away power. Therefore, we used
the difference in the amount of points spent on punishment compared to group
average as a dummy predictor (0 = punishment expense equal to or above group
average, 1 = punishment expense below group average). The fixed part of the
model also contained the continuous round predictor and a dummy predictor
indicating free riding or cooperation (0 = below average contribution, 1 = equal
to or above average contribution) in the previous round’s contribution stage.
Table 4.6 shows the estimated coefficients together with the 95% CI as well
as the odds ratio. According to the model, punishing below group average
increased the odds of transferring power to other group members in the next
round by 67% (β5).
Use of power The regression model for use of power followed the same ran-
dom structure described in Equations 4.7. The dependent variable coded the
punishment behaviour (0 indicated no punishment or antisocial punishment and
1 indicated punishment of free riders).
As predictors we used the continuous round predictor, the group contribution
of the present round and a dummy variable indicating whether the participant
had power above 1 in the present round (0 = power below or equal to 1, 1 =
power more than 1), as well as the interaction of this dummy with the group
contribution.
Table 4.7 shows the estimated coefficients together with the 95% CI as well
as the odds ratio. According to the model, having a power greater than 1
increased the odds to punish free riders in the consecutive punishment stage
nearly fivefold (β5). Higher group contributions decreased these odds slightly.
For each additional MU invested by the group, the odds for a powerful group
member to punish decreased by 1% (β6).
Effect of power and punishment. The regression model for the effect of
power and punishment followed the same random structure described in Equa-
tions 4.7. The dependent variable coded the change in cooperation from the
previous round. Since the individual change in cooperation could not exceed 20
and fall below -20, the data were treated as left and right censored.
As predictors we used the continuous round predictor, the reduction in earn-
ings due to punishment in the last round and the change in maximum power
from last round, as well as the interaction of change in power and a reduction
in earnings due to punishment.
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estimate odds ratio 95% CI
α3 intercept (round 3) -1.42 [-2.52, -0.41]
β3 round -0.04 0.96 [-0.13, 0.04]
β4 contribution differencet−1 0.03 1.03 [-0.32, 0.38]
β5 punishment differencet−1 0.51 1.67 [ 0.17, 0.84]
σ2α1 error-term random intercepts
(group level)
1.08 [0.04, 2.17]
σ2β1 error-term round slopes (group
level)
4.55 [3.48, 5.67]
σ2α2 error-term random intercepts
(individual level)
0.07 [0.00, 0.16]
σ2β2 error-term round slopes (indi-
vidual level)
0.34 [0.26, 0.42]
σ2y error-term y 49.96 [0.39, 95.35]
ρ1 correlation random effects
(group level)
-0.19 [-1.00, 0.83]
ρ2 correlation random effects (in-
dividual level)
-0.64 [-0.83, -0.44]
Table 4.6: Giving away power regression model.
Dependent variable: Power giving (0 = no power was transferred,
1 = power was transferred) clustered by group and participant.
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estimate odds ratio 95% CI
α3 intercept (round 3) -1.03 [-1.78, -0.28]
β3 round -0.12 0.89 [-0.18, -0.06]
β4 group contribution -0.01 0.99 [-0.02, 0.00]
β5 power 1.55 4.71 [ 0.85, 2.23]
β6 group contribution × power -0.01 0.99 [-0.02, -0.001]
σ2α1 error-term random intercepts
(group level)
0.62 [0.02, 1.17]
σ2β1 error-term round slopes
(group level)
1.66 [1.19, 2.12]
σ2α2 error-term random intercepts
(individual level)
0.09 [0.03, 0.16]
σ2β2 error-term round slopes (indi-
vidual level)
0.13 [0.08, 0.18]
σ2y error-term y 49.97 [0.04, 95.00]
ρ1 correlation random effects
(group level)
-0.30 [-1.00, 0.68]
ρ2 correlation random effects (in-
dividual level)
-0.64 [-0.88, -0.35]
Table 4.7: Use of power regression model.
Dependent variable: punishment behaviour (0 = no punishment or antisocial
punishment, 1 = punishment of free riders) clustered by group and participant.
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Table 4.8 shows the estimated coefficients together with the 95% CI. Accord-
ing to the model, contribution decisions were influenced by actual punishment,
as well as changes in power of the most powerful group member (threat of get-
ting punished). For every MU a participant lost due to getting punished in the
last round increased her contribution by 0.3 MUs (β4). A change in power of 0.1
of the most powerful group member increased contributions by 0.5 MUs (β5).
Additionally, getting punished followed by an increase in power also increased
contributions significantly (β6).
estimate 95% CI
α3 intercept (change to round 3) -0.12 [-0.49, 0.25]
β3 round -0.03 [-0.08, 0.01]
β4 earnings reduction (from punishment in
round t− 1)
0.31 [0.25, 0.37]
β5 change in maximum power (from round t−1) 4.76 [3.06, 6.48]
β6 earnings reduction × change in power 0.54 [0.08, 0.99]
σ2α1 error-term random intercepts (group level) 0.46 [0.00, 0.89]
σ2β1 error-term round slopes (group level) 0.11 [0.00, 0.28]
σ2α2 error-term random intercepts (individual
level)
0.07 [0.01, 0.12]
σ2β2 error-term round slopes (individual level) 0.01 [0.00, 0.03]
σ2y error-term y 3.73 [3.62, 3.84]
ρ1 correlation random effects (group level) -0.73 [-1.00, 0.23]
ρ2 correlation random effects (individual level) -0.27 [-1.00, 0.83]
Table 4.8: Effect of power and punishment regression model.
Dependent variable: change in cooperation from roundt−1 clustered by group
and participant.
Individual level analysis for the exogenous condition
To analyse how gaining power and a change in maximum power affected indi-
vidual decisions in the exogenous condition in which power transfers were not
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possible, we fitted the ‘use of power’ and the ‘effect of power and punishment’
models described above also to the data of the exogenous condition groups.
The regression models followed the same structure as described above for the
endogenous condition.
Table 4.9 shows the estimated coefficients together with the 95% CI as well
as the odds ratio for the use of power regression model. Table 4.10 shows the
estimated coefficients together with the 95% CI for the effect of power and
punishment regression model.
Like in the endogenous condition, having a power greater than 1 increased
the odds to punish free riders in the consecutive punishment stage (β5, Table
4.9). Individual contributions in turn increased after experiencing a reduction
in earnings due to punishment, similarly to the endogenous condition (β4, Table
4.10). However, contrary to the endogenous condition, a change in maximum
power from last round (threat of punishment) did not affect contribution deci-
sions significantly (β5, Table 4.10).
Thus, the difference in cooperation we observe over rounds between the en-
dogenous and exogenous condition can not be attributed to a lower willingness
to punish free riders after receiving power or a lower effect of punishment on
cooperation. Instead, observing an increase in power centralization already in-
creased cooperation of group members in the endogenous condition, while power
centralization did not affect cooperation of group members in the exogenous
condition.
Other remarks
Power and cooperation. In Figure 3b of the manuscript, we reported the
correlation of maximum power and average cooperation across rounds for each
group. For the calculation of these correlations we omitted round 20 from each
group. This was done because of the sharp drop of cooperation in the last round
(known as the endgame effect). As can be seen in Figure 4.19, with increased
maximum power, mean contribution increased. Round 20 can be identified as
an outlier.
Including round 20 in the reported analysis did not change the statistical
inferences reported in the manuscript. Quantitatively, the average correlation
dropped from r = 0.24 to r = .21 for the exogenous condition groups.
Power and earnings. As reported in the manuscript, receiving power was
correlated with lower earnings compared to the other group members. Figure
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estimate odds ratio 95% CI
α3 intercept (round 3) -2.57 [-3.33, -1.78]
β3 round -0.01 0.99 [-0.05, 0.03]
β4 group contribution 0.00 1.00 [-0.01, 0.02]
β5 power 1.69 5.42 [ 1.03, 2.34]
β6 group contribution × power -0.01 0.99 [-0.02, 0.00]
σ2α1 error-term random intercepts
(group level)
0.79 [0.30, 1.30]
σ2β1 error-term round slopes (group
level)
1.67 [1.26, 2.07]
σ2α2 error-term random intercepts
(individual level)
0.06 [0.01, 0.10]
σ2β2 error-term round slopes (indi-
vidual level)
0.09 [0.05, 0.13]
σ2y error-term y 50.01 [0.18, 95.02]
ρ1 correlation random effects
(group level)
-0.18 [-0.84, 0.80]
ρ2 correlation random effects (in-
dividual level)
-0.79 [-0.97, -0.59]
Table 4.9: Use of power regression model for the exogenous condition.
Dependent variable: punishment behaviour (0 = no punishment or antisocial
punishment, 1 = punishment of free riders) clustered by group and participant.
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estimate 95% CI
α3 intercept (change to round 3) -0.25 [-0.73 0.22]
β3 round -0.03 [-0.08 0.02]
β4 earnings reduction (from punishment in
round t− 1)
0.38 [ 0.30 0.46]
β5 change in maximum power (from round t−1) -0.13 [-0.54 0.29]
β6 earnings reduction × change in power 0.19 [ 0.08 0.30]
σ2α1 error-term random intercepts (group level) 0.15 [0.00, 0.38]
σ2β1 error-term round slopes (group level) 0.23 [0.00, 0.66]
σ2α2 error-term random intercepts (individual
level)
0.02 [0.00, 0.04]
σ2β2 error-term round slopes (individual level) 0.03 [0.00, 0.08]
σ2y error-term y 4.56 [4.42, 4.69]
ρ1 correlation random effects (group level) -0.26 [-1.00, 0.83]
ρ2 correlation random effects (individual level) -0.25 [-1.00, 0.82]
Table 4.10: Effect of power and punishment regression model for the exogenous
condition.
Dependent variable: change in cooperation from round t− 1 clustered by group
and participant.
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Figure 4.19: Average cooperation and average maximum power in each round
of the exogenous condition. The numbers in each circle indicate the round.
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Figure 4.20: Earnings and power. Average earnings of group members compared
to the group average for different average amounts of power received over the
experiment. Horizontal bars depict the median.
4.20 shows how the earnings of a participant decreased as the power received
by her increased.
First and second round types When examining the connection between
behaviour in the first two rounds and later power status, we omitted an anal-
ysis of antisocial punishers, because antisocial punishment was very rare. The
distribution of initial punishment behaviour was as follows: 75 participants de-
cided not to punish in the second round, 49 participants punished primarily free
riders, and only 11 participants punished antisocially.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
We have started with an emphasis on the occasional difficulties in distinguishing
between fraudulent and serious science. The previous chapters provided entirely
frank investigations of various decision- and game-theoretic problems. While the
transitions between chapters might have seemed somewhat rough, at least this
thesis can provide an illustration of the state of knowledge in economics today:
uncertain, fragmented, but open in many directions. It is almost as if the notion
of tâtonnement had been transformed into the style of research for the entire
field.
The second chapter, perhaps the most technical one, can be read as a de-
tailed examination of the concept of ‘optimality on the limit of finite horizons’.
It showed that the meaning of this expression is far from ambiguous. When
comparing two strategies on the limit of finite horizons, a distinction should be
made between weakly and strongly favoring a strategy over the other. Because
the induced ‘favored-on-the-infinite-horizon’ relations are either not transitive,
or not complete, ‘optimality’ can also have two possible meanings. Beat-all and
not-beaten optimality, combined with the variations of the favored relations
yielded a plethora of possible definitions for ‘optimality on the limit of hori-
zons’. However, after the conceptual dust had settled, we were left with a total
of five refinements: strict optimality on the infinite horizon, strict and non-strict
overtaking optimality, as well as strict and non-strict repeating optimality.
We analyzed and visualized the containment relationships between sets of
optimal strategies, and related it to pointwise limits of strategies optimal on
finite horizons, studied by Fudenberg and Levine (1983). It has turned out that
these limit optimal strategies might fall outside even of our weakest refined set,
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that of repeatedly optimal strategies. The next problem was that of existence.
Through simple examples, it could be shown that most of our defined sets of
optimal strategies can be empty. However, an open question for future research
remains: Do repeatedly optimal strategies exist? While we conjectured that it
is so, we were unable to find a proof. Section 2.6 presented a ‘valiant effort’ for
such a proof through transfinite induction, and have shown why that particular
attempt fails.
The overall carriage of the second chapter is both technical and conceptual.
While it is impossible to predict when conceptual clarifications will prove to
be academically or socially beneficial, nevertheless such exercises are not futile.
First, they help us to think more clearly about matters, in particular, when dis-
cussing ‘limit optimality’. Moreover, our vocabulary expands, encompassing the
previously-introduced Ramsey-Weizsäcker overtaking criterion (von Weizsäcker,
1965). Finally, we have gained a set of examples, some easy and straightforward,
some more sophisticated, which can be used for future research.
In the third chapter, we focused on dynamic inconsistency in decision prob-
lems. Naiveté and sophistication have been characterized in many ways, albeit
usually en passant, not as a direct problem for research. Here, we presented a
new pair of definitions, based on the distinction between beliefs and intentions.
Thus, a naive agent is one that first forms intentions about the future, and then
believes them; whereas a sophisticated agent first forms (credible) beliefs about
the future, and then makes her intentions match those beliefs. While both pro-
cedures yield corresponding intentions and beliefs for the future, the process of
determination of the components of agent’s strategies is different for the two
types.
The main point of departure for this work was O’Donoghue and Rabin
(2001), who were first to explicitly consider the intermediate ground between
naiveté and sophistication. However, their model used quasi-hyperbolic dis-
counting because that way the present-biasedness parameter could be handled
easily. The framework introduced here is not limited to quasi-hyperbolic dis-
counting, but instead allows for arbitrary utility functions. Our hybrid type also
differs from previous approaches in that we encode naiveté or sophistication as
part of the state of the decision problem. Thus, we can now allow for situations
in which type changes endogenously and stochastically – for example, when
one becomes naive by entering an emotionally ‘hot’ state, or through substance
abuse.
The Markov decision problems of the Appendix revisited many well-known
phenomena from the literature on dynamic inconsistency: procrastination, un-
derinvestment, indulgence, etc. This part also served to exemplify the usage of
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the notion of frame, novel in the literature, which summarizes all the informa-
tion about a decision maker present in our model. By comparing the induced
utilities of naive and sophisticated frames, it became clear that sophistication
is not unequivocally favorable to naiveté. This has lead to a further interesting
conclusion: A hybrid decision maker might intentionally choose to become naive
to achieve a higher expected payoff.
I believe the insights of this chapter are relevant for research on inconsis-
tent decision making, even outside the disciplinary boundary of decision theory.
Hybrid decision making could be of interest to psychologists and therapists.
For example, patients struggling with addiction could be asked to record their
intentions and beliefs about the future in the form of a diary, following our def-
inition of a frame. Our results on the occasional optimality of turning oneself
naive can open up interesting questions on self-deception. Is such self-deception
conceptually meaningful? If so, can it be achieved in practical terms? And is it
ethical to cause oneself to have false beliefs? Finally, our foundational account
of naiveté and sophistication opens up the possibility of analyzing dynamically
inconsistent players facing each other in a strategic setting.
Chapter 4 shifted ground from theory-driven research on decision making
to an experimental study on the emergence and role of power. The ‘power
transfer game’ presented therein introduces a novel mechanism in the literature
on peer punishment. We allowed groups to not only choose between having a
punishment authority or not, but also to determine which group member will
become that authority. Moreover, the exact level of the authority’s punishment
power was also determined entirely by the participants. The power transfer
game thus stands in contrast with research on ‘voting with feet’ models, which
only allow the choice between punishment mechanisms already predetermined
by the experimenter. In this sense, the power transfer game allows for a truly
endogenous emergence of a central punishment authority.
It gives cause for optimism that our subjects managed to overcome the free
rider problem starting in an anarchistic state of weak peer punishment. Even
the confines of self-organization allowed by our experiment are thus sufficient to
enable groups to reach a welfare-enhancing state rather quickly. Nevertheless,
such self-organization is not a trivial task, and some of our experimental groups
playing the power transfer game failed to sustain cooperation. Naturally, the
heterogeneity of motivations, as well as path-dependence play an important
part; yet their effects are difficult to measure precisely. On the other hand, this
research does identify some crucial factors for reaching a cooperative state: the
willingness to give up power; the ability to identify and coordinate on a reliably
pro-social punisher; and ultimately, the creation of a centralized punishment
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power. Finally, the contrast between the success of the endogenous condition
and the failure of the exogenous conditions indicates that the ability to freely
create a powerful punisher might be crucial. Thus, the perceived legitimacy of
the punishment authority could have a strong impact on the efficiency of (peer)
punishment to steer free riders towards cooperation.
As it is so often the case, our findings generate more questions than they
answer. Some are related to the economics of power and power transfers: Will
group members give away power if this choice is costly for them? Can hierar-
chies emerge when holding power brings extra benefits for the powerful, such
as it is often documented in the animal kingdom? Finally, will hierarchies also
emerge spontaneously if transferred power cannot be taken back freely, as in
many social institutions? Other questions relate to the potentially harmful side
of hierarchies. For example, if power transfers are permanent, some group mem-
bers might choose to act prosocially for a while to gain power, just to abuse their
situation later on by free riding. Moreover, if holding power is associated with
individual benefits, a competition for power might generate too much punish-
ment, undermining social welfare. Lastly, there are larger differences in peer
punishment behavior across cultures. We need to examine the precise cultural
milieus that allow for an endogenous emergence of hierarchies empirically, rather
than assuming prematurely that our results can serve as a context-independent
general picture of social behavior.
Overall, this doctoral thesis presents the most prominent pieces of the re-
search I have conducted with my supervisors and colleagues at Maastricht Uni-
versity since 2010. I do not subscribe to any grand theory of decision making
and strategic choice. Indeed, if economists should learn anything from post-
modernism, it is that grand narratives are dead (Lyotard, 1984). I believe the
concepts included selected for title – beliefs, intentions, and power – should
and will play a larger role in economic thinking. However that may be, we as
theoreticians should not fall into the trap of self-aggrandizement. We should
strive not for an abstract construction of ‘economic science’, but to further the
understanding of fellow humans. Only by shedding new light on well-known
phenomena, by engaging in games of dialogue, by questioning what we think
we already know can we avoid being deceived by tricksters, and also save our
minds from a digital conquest.
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